Simpson v. Brown Cnty.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-01660-TWP-TAB |
| Parties | JOHN SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. BROWN COUNTY, INDIANA, BROWN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BROWN COUNTY HEALTH BOARD, and JOHN KENNARD, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff, John Simpson's ("Mr. Simpson") Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Filing No. 52). Alleging that Brown County, Indiana, Brown County Department of Health, Brown County Health Board (collectively, "Brown County"), and John Kennard ("Mr. Kennard") (collectively, "Defendants") violated his procedural due process rights and intentionally interfered with his business relations, Mr. Simpson filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Filing No. 29.) On September 29, 2014, this Court granted Brown County's motion to dismiss both of Mr. Simpson's claims. (Filing No. 50.) Mr. Simpson filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part, Mr. Simpson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.
As stated in the prior order, the facts of this case are taken directly from Mr. Simpson's Second Amended Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss and all reasonable inferences are drawn in a light most favorable to Mr. Simpson. See Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir. 1991).
Mr. Simpson is the sole owner of a business known as Monroe, LLC, which is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Indiana. Through Monroe, LLC, Mr. Simpson installed and repaired septic systems within Brown County, Indiana. He held a valid license to install and repair septic systems through the Brown County Department of Health. On May 31, 2013, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. Simpson regarding his mother's property, stating that corrective action was required on the septic system. The letter also stated that if corrective measures were not taken on the septic system, the Brown County Health Officer, Paul Page, D.O., would request an executive meeting of the Brown County Health Board and recommend that Mr. Simpson's septic system installer license be rescinded. Two weeks later, on June 14, 2013, the Brown County Health Officer sent another letter to Mr. Simpson, informing him that the Brown County Health Board had revoked his license to install and repair septic systems in Brown County.
In the interim, however, Brown County did not inform Mr. Simpson of any public meeting by the Brown County Health Board concerning the revocation of his license. In addition, Brown County did not inform Mr. Simpson of any law, ordinance, or regulation which he allegedly violated, nor did Brown County set forth the basis for the revocation.
Mr. Simpson also alleges that Brown County Commissioner and Health Department employee, John Kennard, has a personal vendetta against him. In this regard, Mr. Kennard told Mr. Simpson that he would "see to it that [Simpson] would never work in Brown County again" and Mr. Kennard "planned and conspired to have [Simpson] removed as an approved septic installer within Brown County."
On January 29, 2014, Mr. Simpson filed a Second Amended Complaint, with claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for violations of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as a state lawclaim against Mr. Kennard for intentional interference with business relations, based upon the revocation of Mr. Simpson's septic system installer license. On March 20, 2015, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 50). Mr. Simpson now asks the Court to alter or amend its Order dismissing the action.
The purpose of a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is to ask the court to reconsider matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits. Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989). A Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Resnick, 594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010). Relief pursuant to a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend is an "extraordinary remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case." Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008). In this regard, a manifest error is not demonstrated by merely presenting "the disappointment of the losing party." Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (). Further, a motion to alter or amend a judgment is not an opportunity to "relitigate motions or present arguments, issues, or facts that could and should have been presented earlier." Brownstone Publ'g, LLC v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-1630-SEB, 2009 WL 799546, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2009). See also Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007).
Mr. Simpson moves to alter or amend the Court's order dismissing his due process and intentional interference with business relations claims. For the following reasons, this Court grantsin part and denies in part Mr. Simpson's motion.
To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for the deprivation of a property interest without due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he had a constitutionally protected property interest, (2) he suffered a loss of that interest amounting to a deprivation, and (3) the deprivation occurred without due process of law. LaBella Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2010).
Brown County does not dispute, at least for purposes of the motion to dismiss and the motion to alter or amend the judgment, that Mr. Simpson had a "liberty and/or property interest in his business of installing and repairing septics in Brown County, Indiana and receiving income from such business." (Filing No. 29 at 4 ¶ 25.) Brown County also does not dispute that the Brown County Department of Health and the Brown County Health Officer revoked Mr. Simpson's license to install and repair septic systems. Instead, Brown County disputes whether Mr. Simpson plausibly pled that the loss of his license denied him due process of law. Specifically, Brown County argues that Mr. Simpson did not plausibly plead that Brown County denied him a pre-deprivation remedy, in particular notice or a hearing. In the alternative, Brown County also argues that Mr. Simpson did not plausibly plead that he availed himself of all state post-deprivation remedies before filing his due process claim in this Court.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Simpson alleged that Brown County's revocation decision was made "without notice, without any sort of hearing, and without any justification". (Filing No. 29 at 4 ¶ 26.) In addition, Mr. Simpson alleged that Brown County "did not inform [Simpson] of any law, ordinance or regulation which he allegedly violated, nor did it set forth anyfacts in writing which form the basis of the violation of any laws, ordinances, or regulations." (Filing No. 29 at 3 ¶ 18.) Despite these assertions, it is not clear on the face of Mr. Simpson's Second Amended Complaint, what procedures he believes should have been utilized when making the revocation decision or what laws and regulations governed the decision-making process.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Brown County did not fill in the details and, instead, argued that Mr. Simpson was afforded a sufficient pre-deprivation remedy. In particular, Brown County pointed to the fact that Mr. Simpson was issued a letter two weeks before his license was revoked, warning Mr. Simpson that failure to take action to repair his mother's septic system would result in revocation of his license.
In this Court's prior order granting the motion to dismiss, this Court concluded that Brown County's letter, sent to Mr. Simpson prior to his license revocation and explaining what corrective action Mr. Simpson was required to take to avoid revocation, provided Mr. Simpson with sufficient notice and opportunity to respond.1 (Filing No. 50 at 6.) However, this conclusion regarding the adequacy of Mr. Simpson's pre-deprivation remedies was grounded largely in an erroneous determination that Mr. Simpson had failed to avail himself of an adequate post-deprivation remedy under I.C. § 13-15-7-3, which allows for administrative review of permit revocations made by the Indiana Department of Environmental Management. Id. at 4-7.
In addition, upon closer inspection, this Court's prior reasoning was mistakenly made upon the factors asserted in Mathews v. Eldridge 424 U.S. 319 (1976), rather than under the more-closely related pleading considerations articulated in Dusanek v. Hannon 677 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1982) and its progeny.
Consequently, this Court considers its prior analysis regarding the sufficiency of Mr. Simpson's due process pleading to have amounted to a manifest error of law, sufficient to justify alteration to this Court's prior order. See Oto, 224 F.3d at 606. Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Mr. Simpson's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Filing No. 52); and this Court VACATES its prior analysis evaluating the sufficiency of Mr. Simpson's due process pleading (Filing No. 50 at 4-7). Instead, this Court AMENDS its prior order to include the following analysis and conclusions regarding the sufficiency and plausibility of Mr. Simpson's due process pleading.
When evaluating procedural due process claims, courts distinguish between deprivations based on established state procedures and deprivations based on ...
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