Simpson v. Cnty. of Cape Girardeau

• Decision Date: 02 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-3682,16-3682
• Citation: 879 F.3d 273
• Parties: Cheryl SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant v. COUNTY OF CAPE GIRARDEAU, MISSOURI, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

879 F.3d 273

Cheryl SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.COUNTY OF CAPE GIRARDEAU, MISSOURI, Defendant-Appellee

No. 16-3682

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 20, 2017

Filed: January 2, 2018

Michael Keith Hill, MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Gillian R. Wilcox, ACLU OF MISSOURI FOUNDATION, Kansas City, MO, Anthony E. Rothert, Jessie M. Steffan, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MISSOURI, Saint Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Albert M. Spradling, III, SPRADLING & SPRADLING, Cape Girardeau, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Cheryl Simpson brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the County of Cape Girardeau, Missouri ("Cape Girardeau "), alleging that the Cape Girardeau County Jail’s postcard-only incoming-mail policy for non-privileged mail violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by impermissibly restricting her ability to communicate with her son, Trey Simpson, who was then an inmate. At trial, Ms. Simpson attempted to introduce incoming-mail policies from other institutions that permit inmates to receive multi-page letters in envelopes as evidence that Cape Girardeau’s postcard-only policy was unreasonable. The district court¹ excluded those policies as irrelevant and held that the postcard-only policy did not violate Ms. Simpson’s constitutional rights. We affirm, holding that the district court’s exclusion of the other institutions’ mail policies was harmless error and the postcard-only incoming-mail policy is constitutional.

I. Background

When Trey Simpson was first imprisoned at Cape Girardeau County Jail, the jail had no restrictions on the length or number of letters that inmates received. Ms. Simpson wrote Trey several lengthy letters a week that included family photos, drawings by his nephew, and various pieces of personal information. On January 1, 2014, during Trey’s imprisonment, Cape Girardeau implemented a new incoming-mail policy requiring non-privileged mail to be sent on postcards:

All non-privileged correspondence entering the Jail Facility must be post cards [sic]

a) All postcards must be standard white postcards, no index cards or photographs.

b) Postcards must be no larger then [sic] 5? X 7?.

c) Postcards will have their stamps removed and discarded prior to delivery to the inmate.

d) Postcards must be addressed with the return address clearly readable.

e) There will be no limit on how many postcards inmates can receive but inmates will be limited to ten postcards in their cell at any one time.

f) Unacceptable postcards will be returned to sender

1) Defaced or altered postcards are unacceptable

2) No plastic/wrappings on postcards.

3) No labels or stickers will be accepted

4) No postcards with watermarks or stains

5) No postcards with bio-hazards, including lipsticks or perfumes

6) No postcards depicting nudity, weapons, alcohol or gang references.

R. at 61.

Cape Girardeau’s reasons for imposing the postcard-only policy were to reduce the risk of contraband entering the jail and to reduce the time that officers spent searching the mail. The other means of communication available to inmates at the time included fifteen-minute visits on Saturdays and collect phone calls that prisoners could place, costing $9.99 for ten minutes. After the new policy was implemented, Ms. Simpson could not fit as much writing on a single postcard as she could in a letter, so she wrote multiple postcards and numbered them so that Trey could read them in order. Ms. Simpson claims the postcards were confusing because they did not always arrive at the same time or in order and if there were more than ten postcards, Trey could not keep them all in his possession at once. Ms. Simpson also testified that limiting her writing to postcards changed the nature of her communications with her son because anyone would be able to read what she wrote, including postal employees.

Ms. Simpson filed suit against Cape Girardeau under § 1983, and on November 6, 2015, the parties appeared for a bench trial. The district court found that the four factors in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), applied to determine whether the postcard-only policy is constitutional. The court held that the first factor favored Cape Girardeau because safety and efficiency are legitimate penological concerns and scanning postcards is more efficient than opening envelopes and scanning multi-page letters. The court additionally found that the policy minimizes the possibility that contraband will be introduced into the jail. The court then determined that the second factor was neutral because though there were alternative ways to communicate with inmates, they are more expensive and less private.

Next the court held that the third factor favored Cape Girardeau because the policy saves time by allowing officers to check the mail faster and in turn use that time on other issues related to security. Finally, the court found that the fourth factor favored Cape Girardeau because returning to the previous mail policy that required the staff to open envelopes individually and to inspect the contents and scan multi-page letters would have more than a de minimis cost. Ms. Simpson attempted to introduce evidence of incoming-mail policies from several other jails and prisons, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, to show there were alternative policies that would have no more than a de minimis cost to implement. The district court excluded these policies as irrelevant. Based on these findings, the court held that the postcard-only policy did not violate Ms. Simpson’s constitutional rights.

II. Excluded Policies

The first issue on appeal is whether the district court committed reversible error when it excluded as irrelevant evidence of incoming-mail policies from other institutions. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and give "deference to the district judge who saw and heard the evidence." United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1139 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court abuses its discretion when "a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment." Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 893 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984) ). We will only reverse an improper evidentiary ruling if it affected a party’s substantial rights or more than slightly influenced the verdict. Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1139. Further, "[w]e will not reverse a harmless error." Id.

Ms. Simpson argues that the district court committed reversible error because the Supreme Court has held that the policies of other correctional institutions are relevant in deciding whether a jail’s policy violates a constitutional right and excluding the other institutions’ incoming-mail policies prevented her from presenting relevant, substantive evidence showing that the postcard-only policy was unconstitutional. Cape Girardeau argues that the court did not abuse its discretion because: Ms. Simpson did not make an appropriate offer of proof to preserve the issue on appeal; she did not show how the policies were relevant or how their exclusion would be prejudicial; and considering the other prisons’ policies would be a waste of time under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

Assuming that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the other institutions’ policies, we only reverse the district court if the exclusion of the policies affected Ms. Simpson’s substantial rights or if the ruling "had more than a slight influence on the verdict." Johnson, 860 F.3d at 1139 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, though the district court excluded the policies from other institutions, it still considered Cape Girardeau’s previous incoming-mail policy as an alternative policy. Cape Girardeau’s previous policy does not meaningfully differ from the other institutions’ incoming-mail policies. Cape Girardeau’s previous policy and the other institutions’ policies did not contain postcard-only restrictions, and all called for mail inspections before the mail was delivered to the inmates. Because these policies are materially indistinguishable, the other institutions’ policies would not have made a difference in the district court’s analysis. Additionally, Ms. Simpson was able to adequately present evidence on the fourth Turner factor by presenting Cape Girardeau’s previous policy as an alternative to the postcard-only policy. Therefore, Ms. Simpson’s substantial rights were not affected, and the exclusion of the policies did not have an impact on the district court’s decision. We hold that the exclusion, if error, was harmless.

III. Constitutionality of Postcard-Only Policy

The second issue on appeal is whether Cape Girardeau’s postcard-only policy is constitutional under Turner. We review the application of the Turner factors de novo . Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1990).

In Turner, the Supreme Court held that a prison regulation or action that restricts a prisoner’s constitutional rights "is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."² 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Turner established "four factors that courts should consider in making that determination": (1) "whether there is a ‘valid rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the government interest justifying it"; (2) "whether there is an alternative means available to the prison inmates to exercise the right"; (3) "whether an accommodation would have ‘a significant "ripple effect" ’ on the guards, other inmates, and prison resources"; and (4) "whether there is an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner ‘at de...