Simpson v. County Bd. of Appeals for Montgomery County

Decision Date19 November 1958
Docket NumberNo. 28,28
PartiesPercy S. SIMPSON et al. v. COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

David Macdonald, Silver Spring, for appellants.

Edward S. Northrop, Arthur G. Lambert and Walter S. Furlow, Jr., Rockville, for North Chevy Chase Swimming Pool Ass'n, Inc., appellee.

Rourke J. Sheehan, Asst. County Atty., Alfred H. Carter, Acting County Atty., Rockville, for Montgomery County, appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., HENDERSON, HAMMOND and HORNEY, JJ., and W. LAIRD HENRY, Jr., Special Judge.

HORNEY, Judge.

The County Board of Appeals of Montgomery County (the Board of Appeals or board) granted the North Chevy Chase Swimming Pool Association, Inc., (the association or proponents) a special exception to construct and operate a community swimming pool over the objections of Percy S. Simpson and others (the protestants). The protestants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The court heard the appeal on the record (including exhibits) made before the board, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals. The protestants have appealed to this Court from the order of the circuit court.

The proposed site of the pool is located in a zone classified as R-90 1 under the zoning ordinance applicable to that portion of the Maryland-Washington Regional District in Montgomery County. The association is the owner of a tract of land containing 2.5988 acres situated in the suburban area of Chevy Chase, on the east side of Brierly Road immediately north of the dead-end of Walnut Hill Road, in the heart of a residential area of single-family homes worth from $26,000 to $40,000. There are homes immediately east and south of the proposed pool and the west side of Brierly Road--directly across the street from the pool site--is fully developed. There are also homes directly south of the pool site on both sides of Walnut Hill Road. Many of the protestants are adjacent property owners and all own homes in or near the area described herein.

The association is a private, non-profit, membership corporation, which was incorporated for the purpose of constructing and operating a swimming pool and other related facilities. The by-laws require members to pay an initiation fee of $220 or $260, depending on when they apply for membership, plus annual dues to be fixed by the board of directors.

Section 107-27a of the Montgomery County Code (1955) adopted December 15, 1953, by Ordinance 2-125, provides in part that a special exception may be granted when it is found the proposed use does not affect adversely 'the general plan for the * * * district' and 'the health and safety of [the] residents or workers in the area,' and that such use 'will not be detrimental to the use or development of adjacent properties or the general neighborhood,' provided the standards for each use have been met. Subsection b [of § 107-27] places the 'burden of proof,' the 'burden of going forward with the evidence' and the 'burden of persuasion on all questions of fact' on the applicant. The uses for which special exceptions may be granted under the provisions of § 107-27a and b, supra, with the exception of community swimming pools, are set forth in § 107-28a through kk.

Section 107-28dd [now § 107-28z-4], relating to community swimming pools, adopted May 24, 1955, by Ordinance 3-28, entitled 'Swimming pool, community'--the section with which we are primarily concerned--specifically provides that the provisions of § 107-27, supra, shall not apply. Section 107-28dd, supra, further provides that a special exception may be granted in any zone for a community swimming pool 'upon a finding by the board that such use will not affect adversely the present character or future development of the surrounding residential community.' Under this section, use as a swimming pool must also conform to certain minimum requirements, including the setback of the pool from property lines, the availability and use of the public water supply, and the screening of the pool from view from the nearest property by means of a wall, fence or shrubbery. Special conditions--such as off-street parking, additional fencing, planting and landscaping, additional setbacks, location and arrangement of lighting, and financial responsibility--are also required when necessary to safeguard 'the general community interest and welfare.'

Apparently the County Council had a dual purpose in adopting a more liberal ordinance with regard to the granting of a special exception for community swimming pools. The 'opinion' recorded in the ordinance journal recognizes the public need for community swimming pools as well as the necessity of protecting the present character and future development of the surrounding community. The journal also indicates that the council intended that adjacent property owners in the 'surrounding community' should be further protected by requiring that certain special conditions be met--in addition to the usual minimum requirements--before the special exception is granted. It appears, however, that the burden of proof and other burdens prescribed by § 107-27b, supra, may have been shifted from the proponents to the protestants.

Other than what appears in the opinion of the Board of Appeals and a brief reference thereto in the court's memorandum opinion, we are unable to determine the exact nature or extent of the testimony taken by the board concerning the adverse affect of a community pool on the residential properties in the surrounding community. The only oral testimony printed in the record extract which we may consider is an except from the transcript of proceedings before the board when a witness for the proponents was called to testify as to whether adjacent properties would be appreciated or depreciated in value as a result of the construction of a community pool. The chairman of the board stated that they were not interested 'in the effect on immediate adjacent properties,' but would hear testimony as to 'the detrimental effect on the surrounding community.' We were informed at the oral argument that when the board refused to receive the testimony of the witness referred to, the protestants made no effort to introduce into the evidence or to proffer any testimony as to how or why their properties would be adversely affected or in what manner the protestants would be damaged. The board heard testimony concerning the probable increase of traffic in the area, the desirability of keeping 'open' the land proposed to be used as the site of the pool, and the oral and written proposals or protests of numerous property owners in the area for or against the granting of a special exception. At the end of the hearing the board found the requirements of the ordinance had been satisfied and granted the special exception, but imposed certain special conditions to safeguard the 'interest and welfare' of the 'general community.'

In this Court the protestants raise only two questions, both of which concern the constitutionality of § 107-28dd, supra. One question relates to the denial of due process; the other to the denial of the equal protection of the laws. 2

(i). Due Process.

The protestants contend that § 107-28dd, supra, is an invalid delegation of police power to the board because the words 'surrounding residential community' are too uncertain and indefinite to be a proper standard for the exercise of such power. The ordinance prescribes that the proposed use shall not 'affect adversely the present character or future development...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • McBriety v. City of Baltimore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • February 20, 1959
    ...such right on his own behalf, the question, which will then be real and live, can be answered. Cf. Simpson v. County Board of Appeals for Montgomery County, 1958, 218 Md. 222, 146 A.2d 37. (b). Necessity. Whether the ordinance was actually necessary is a question with which the courts are n......
  • City of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • March 3, 1970
    ...a claim of unconstitutional discrimination may be asserted only by a person discriminated against. Simpson v. County Bd. of Appeals for Montgomery County, 218 Md. 222, 146 A.2d 37 (1958). We conclude that there is no reason why Concord's motion to dismiss should have been The Constitutional......
  • Master Royalties Corp. v. City of Baltimore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 1964
    ...taking thereunder on any of these grounds. McBriety v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 223, 148 A.2d 408; Simpson v. County Board of Appeals for Montgomery County, 218 Md. 222, 146 A.2d 37. The appellants seek to escape from their difficulties with regard to standing by a flank attack. They cont......
  • Martin v. Martin
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • November 13, 2017

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT