Simpson v. Gautreau, s. 7705, 7706.
| Citation | 5 A.2d 302 |
| Decision Date | 06 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 7705, 7706.,s. 7705, 7706. |
| Parties | SIMPSON v. GAUTREAU. SAME v. KASTNER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alberic A. Archambault, Judge.
Actions of trespass on the case by Julius Simpson against Leo P. Gautreau and against Herbert C. Kastner for injuries sustained in an intersectional collision between plaintiff's automobile and truck operated by first named defendant and owned by second named defendant. Motion for nonsuit was granted in each case, and plaintiff brings exceptions.
Exceptions in each case sustained and each case remitted to superior court for new trial.
Harold F. Hathaway, of Boston, Mass., and Greenough, Lyman & Cross, of Providence, for plaintiff.
William A. Gunning, of Providence, for defendants.
These are two actions of trespass on the case for negligence, the former against the operator of a motor truck and the latter against his employer, the owner of the truck. The accident which is involved in both cases occurred in the city of Pawtucket in or just east of the intersection of Mineral Spring avenue, running about east and west, and Conant street, running about north and south.
The two cases were tried together before a justice of the superior court and a jury; and at the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff a motion for a nonsuit was granted in each case by the trial justice. The cases are now before us on exceptions by the plaintiff, namely, an exception to this ruling in each case and numerous other exceptions, nearly all of them being to rulings as to the admission of evidence.
Just to the south of the intersection, Conant street was approximately 21 feet wide from curb to curb; and just to the west of it, Mineral Spring avenue was approximately 30 feet wide from curb to curb. The avenue was much more heavily traveled than the street. A short time before the collision occurred, which was at about seven o'clock in the evening of November 24, 1933, the weather being clear, the plaintiff was operating a Chrysler sedan car easterly on the avenue and approaching the intersection at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour. At the southwest corner there was a house set back a considerable distance from Conant street, and a person located at a point on Mineral Spring avenue 10 to 15 feet west of the intersection had an unobstructed view southerly on Conant street for about 100 feet.
According to the plaintiff's testimony, when he was approximately at that distance from the intersection, he slowed down to a speed of not more than 18 miles per hour and looked to the south on Conant street and saw the lights of an approaching car, at a distance which he estimated to be over 100 feet. He then proceeded straight across the intersection at a speed of 15 to 18 miles per hour, without again looking to his right. His car had almost cleared the intersection when, from the mirror in front of him, he perceived a flash of light in the rear of his car; and immediately afterward the truck owned by the defendant Kastner and operated by the defendant Gautreau, being the car the lights of which the plaintiff had seen just before he started to cross, crashed with great force into the rear of the plaintiff's car, which had then almost, if not entirely, cleared the intersection.
Another witness supported the plaintiff's story of how the accident occurred, and in particular testified that he saw the truck coming north on Conant street, when it was 75 to 100 feet away from Mineral Spring avenue, but could not estimate its speed, except that it was greater than that of the sedan; and that he saw no change in its course before its front right side crashed violently into the rear of the sedan.
A brother-in-law of the plaintiff testified to having had, soon after the accident, a conversation with the defendant Gautreau, in which the latter said, referring to the plaintiff's car: "To tell you the truth, I didn't see the machine until I was on top of it." No exception to this testimony was taken in behalf of either of the defendants. From the testimony of these two witnesses the jury could reasonably have found that the defendant Gautreau used no care to avoid a possible collision with any car that might be crossing Conant street on Mineral Spring Avenue.
Therefore, the crucial question which we must decide, in passing upon the exception to the entry of a nonsuit in each case, is whether, on the uncontradicted evidence, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence per se, or whether there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that he was not guilty of contributory negligence. On the one hand are the facts that he drove his car into the intersection with the knowledge that there was a motor car to his right on Conant street, apparently coming toward the intersection at an unknown speed; that the plaintiff continued to drive across the intersection at a speed of 15 to 18 miles per hour, without looking again to his right; and that his car was struck by the other car.
On the other hand, there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that, when the plaintiff drove into the intersection, he had just looked to his right and had estimated that this other car was more than 100 feet away; that his car did not change its speed and had very nearly, if not entirely, cleared the intersection before the collision and only the rear end of the car was hit; that when it was passing the middle line of Conant street, it must have been practically straight ahead of the truck, which was being operated by the defendant Gautreau, with nothing to obstruct his view, and which must then have been far enough away so that, if he had used ordinary care, he could and would have slowed it down or steered it to the left and thus avoided the collision; but that he adopted neither of these precautions.
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...intersection, we have repeatedly held that the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence raises a jury question. Simpson v. Gautreau, 62 R.I. 309, 5 A.2d 302; Hevey v. Vieira, 84 R.I. 59, 121 A.2d 657. The state of the evidence was such as in our opinion warranted the jury's findi......
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...that the question of whether or not plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury. Simpson v. Gautreau, 62 R.I. 309, 314, 5 A.2d 302. The defendant has cited several authorities in support of his contention that the trial justice erred in not granting hi......
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...that her claim in this connection is supported by three similar cases, namely, Lamb v. Feyler, 68 R.I. 83, 26 A.2d 752; Simpson v. Gautreau, 62 R.I. 309, 5 A.2d 302; Higginbotham v. Young, 59 R.I. 1, 193 A. 626. The rules applicable generally in determining whether or not the plaintiff, in ......
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