Simpson v. Manson
Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Citation | 178 N.E. 250,345 Ill. 543 |
Docket Number | No. 20791.,20791. |
Parties | SIMPSON et al. v. MANSON. |
Decision Date | 23 October 1931 |
345 Ill. 543
178 N.E. 250
SIMPSON et al.
v.
MANSON.
No. 20791.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Oct. 23, 1931.
Commissioners' Opinion.
Separate suits by Edward J. McGarry, by Jane Simpson, and by Elizabeth Emerson, against Mary Manson, in which defendant filed cross-bills. From adverse decrees, defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
[345 Ill. 545]
[178 N.E. 251]
Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; William J. Lindsay, judge.
George D. Kimball, of Chicago, for appellant.
Harry C. Kinne and Joseph H. McGarry, both of Chicago, for appellees.
EDMUNDS, C.
On February 2, 1924, Edward J. McGarry filed a bill in the superior court of Cook county for partition of certain real estate on East Seventy-Fifth street, in the city of Chicago, hereinafter referred to as the Seventy-Fifth street property. On February 15, 1924, Jane Simpson filed a bill in the same court to cancel a quitclaim deed to said property executed by her September 7, 1923, and also praying partition and full and complete accounting. On February 18, 1924, Elizabeth Emerson filed a bill in the same court to cancel a quitclaim deed to said property given by her and her husband and Martin McGeary and his wife on April 21, 1905, and also praying partition and full and complete accounting. These suits were consolidated. Mary Manson, named as defendant in all the bills, filed an answer, and also a cross-bill praying that all records of the probate court of Cook county and the county recorder showing an interest in other persons be removed as a cloud on her title to the property. The cause was referred to a master, who heard evidence, found that the above-mentioned deeds had been obtained by fraud, and recommended that a decree be entered in accordance with the prayers of the bills. From a decree so entered, Mary Manson has appealed.
[345 Ill. 546]On October 2, 1892, Annie T. McGeary died seized of said property. She left a will, which, after making several specific bequests, including a piano and music to Mary Emerson, daughter of Elizabeth Emerson, provided as follows: ‘I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate-real, personal and mixed, wheresoever situate, to my sister, Mary Manson, of Chicago, Cook county, Illinois, her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns in trust, however-to, upon and for the uses, trusts, intents and purposes, and with and subject to the limitations and conditions hereinafter mentioned, that is to say, to take possession of my real and personal estate, collect the rents, issues and profits thereof, as well as interest on my bond, notes, mortgages or other securities; and after payment of all taxes, insurance, repairs and all other necessary expenses, to apply the surplus or such part thereof as may be necessary to the care, nurture, support and maintenance of my beloved mother, Ann McGeary, in such manner as may be suitable for her in her condition of life; and after her death to see that she be properly interred.’ The will gave appellant power to sell realty and personalty, the proceeds of such sale or sales to be applied toward the support of the mother, if necessary, and the remainder to be reinvested. It also provided as follows: ‘It is my will that after the death of my beloved mother that my estate so held in trust by my trustee aforesaid, be divided among my brothers and sisters, Martin McGeary, Michael McGeary, Elizabeth Emerson, and Mary Manson, share and share alike, the heirs of any one of whom who may have deceased in the meantime to take the share to which said decedent would have been entitled.’
Upon the death of Annie T. McGeary appellant took possession of the Seventy-Fifth street property and also of another parcel of real estate owned by Annie on Dickson street. The Seventy-Fifth street property was then incumbered by several mortgages, aggregating in amount $4,000. [345 Ill. 547]A two-flat frame, stove-heated building thereon was unfinished but was completed by appellant. Appellant collected all the rents from the Seventy-Fifth street and Dickson street properties, and paid all interest, taxes, and expenses. She sold the Dickson street property in 1896 for about $2,400. She listed the Seventy-Fifth street property for sale, but it was not sold. Subsequently she paid off the $4,000 incumbrances. She never accounted to the residuary legatees or their heirs for the rents collected or for the proceeds of the Dickson street property, nor was any accounting ever demanded of her until the institution of the present suits. The master found the building
[178 N.E. 252]
on the Seventy-Fifth street property to be, at the time of the hearing, nearly forty years old and in a bad state of repair, but further found the present value of the property to be about $20,000, ‘on account of increase in value of vacant property in that part of Chicago.’ After Annie's death, the mother stayed part of the time with appellant, part of the time with Elizabeth Emerson, and part of the time at a hospital. Appellant paid the hospital expenses, and, when the mother stayed at Elizabeth's, appellant paid or credited Elizabeth with $10 per month for the mother's board. The mother died intestate on April 27, 1901. The above-named residuary legatees were all living at that time. Michael McGeary died intestate on September 15, 1901, leaving as his heirs the above-named residuary legatees who survived him, and also Jane Simpson, a half-sister, complainant herein, and Patrick McGarry, a half-brother. Patrick died intestate on July 28, 1904, leaving Edward J. McGarry, the original complainant herein, and others as his heirs.
At the hearing appellees introduced in evidence the foolowing letter, written October 19, 1904, by Bastrup & O'Neill, attorneys, to Martin McGeary: ‘We have written you several times in reference to the property 105-75th street, before putting Mrs. Manson to the expense and trouble of straightening up the matter and in order to prevent[345 Ill. 548]the expense incident to foreclosure. We would like to see you, and we would like to see you this week. Please call at our office and see Mr. O'Neill and he will talk the matter over with you, and oblige.’ Hugh O'Neill, who had not acted in the administration of Annie's estate, testified that he was appellant's attorney at the time he wrote the letter; that he drew the quitclaim deed which the Martin McGearys and the Emersons subsequently executed; that there were several conferences, participated in by witness, appellant, and the Emersons, before it was executed; that there was some discussion about Michael McGeary's death and the possible interest of his heirs; that Mrs. Emerson stated she would not sign the deed until appellant released Emerson from a claim of $100 which appellant had against him; that witness told Martin MeGeary that under the will Martin had a vested remainder, which could only be conveyed by deed; also that Michael had an interest as a vested remainderman which would go to Michael's heirs, of whom Martin was one, and before the title could be put in appellant's name Martin would have to sign the deed; that witness told Mrs. Emerson that she had a remainder under the will, and that she also had an interest as heir of Michael, which entire interest she could convey by quitclaim deed; that appellant said in Mrs. Emerson's presence that the Seventy-Fifth street property was very heavily incumbered, and that she had been paying charges and taxes on the property, and at that time it was not more than good security for the indebtedness or what she had paid out in handling it; that Emerson stated he had seen it; that appellant asked Mrs. Emerson to see the property and say what should be done with it and see at that time that all debts had been paid by her, what bills had been paid, and what the carrying charges were, claiming that she had spent more money than the property would represent; that appellant mentioned in this connection specific amounts of money, which witness could not recall at the time of testifying;[345 Ill. 549]that appellant told Mrs. Emerson ‘she wanted a quit-claim deed to the property-to become the owner of it;’ that appellant said it would not reimburse her for all the expenditures, and she wanted a...
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...... The defendants point out that where the trustee repudiates the trust the statute begins to run from the time of repudiation (Simpson v. Manson, 345 Ill. 543, 178 N.E. 250 (1931); Thomas v. Bourdes, 327 Ill.App. 197, 63 N.E.2d 621 (1945); Becker v. Billings, 304 Ill. 190, 136 N.E. ......
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...ordinary promptness is required of a claimant if the property involved is of a speculative or fluctuating character, (Simpson v. Manson, 345 Ill. 543, 178 N.E. Page 345 250; Carlock v. Carlock, 249 Ill. 330, 94 N.E. 507,) and, because oil and mining property is of such a specially precariou......
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Mercer v. Wayman, 33959
...in the case of one cotenant who claims adversely to other cotenants. The doctrine was well stated [9 Ill.2d 445] in Simpson v. Manson, 345 Ill. 543, 551, 178 N.E. 250, 253: 'The rule is well settled that the mere possession by one tenant in common who receives all the rents and profits and ......
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...not require ignorance of adverse claims or defects in the title, and notice, actual or constructive, is immaterial. Simpson v. Manson, 345 Ill. 543, 178 N.E. 250;Coward v. Coward, 148 Ill. 268, 35 N.E. 759. Conceding that color of title under section 6 was obtained in good faith and that de......