Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1969
• Citation: Simpson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 N.Y.2d 262, 299 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. 1969)
• Parties: , 247 N.E.2d 655 Selma SIMPSON, Respondent, v. PHOENIX MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 835

299 N.Y.S.2d 835

24 N.Y.2d 262, 247 N.E.2d 655

Selma SIMPSON, Respondent, v. PHOENIX MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 9, 1969.

Edward T. Post, New York City, Rowland H. Long, Monson, Mass., and Michael W. Brody, New York City, for appellant.

Joseph L. Fishman, New York City, for respondent.

Townley, Updike, Carter & Rodgers, New York City, for Life Ins. Assn. of America, amicus curiae.

KEATING, Judge.

Selma Simpson was designated by her husband Leonard as the beneficiary of a group life insurance policy procured by his employer, Lebanon Cemetery Association of Queens, Inc. (hereinafter Lebanon), through the trustees of the Cemetery and Funeral Service and Supply Industry Group Insurance Fund, from Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter Phoenix). The master policy issued by Phoenix on January 1, 1963 to Lebanon contained a provision that eligible employees for insurance coverage were all full-time employees regularly working at least 30 hours per week at the employer's usual place of business.

Phoenix supplied enrollment cards to Lebanon to distribute to its eligible employees. The employees filled out the cards designating their beneficiaries. ¹ The enrollment card Simpson executed contained a printed clause, above the blank left for the applicant's signature, which read: 'I request the insurance for which I may become eligible under said Group Policy'. Simpson's card along with those of the other employees was forwarded to Phoenix, which then issued individual certificates to each employee. The certificate was a multipage printed form. On the first page of the certificate the employee's name and the amount of insurance coverage he was entitled to under the group policy were inserted. In addition, the first page noted that the terms of insurance, which were contained in the master policy issued to Lebanon, were set out in the subsequent pages of the document. Simpson received such a certificate and, up until his death, Lebanon paid all the insurance premiums as they became due.

On June 17, 1964 Leonard P. Simpson was killed during a robbery in the elevator of his apartment house. Lebanon filed a notice of claim and proof of death with Phoenix on July 22, 1964 and requested the insurer to transmit the insurance proceeds directly to Mrs. Simpson. Phoenix, after investigating the claim, notified Lebanon that it had discovered that Simpson was not an eligible employee, as defined in the group policy, since he had not been employed 30 hours a week. Therefore, no proceeds would be paid to the employee's beneficiary.

Selma Simpson commenced this action on April 22, 1966 to recover the amount which her husband's certificate indicated his beneficiary was entitled to receive under the group life insurance policy. After issue was joined, plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, affidavits were submitted which admitted that Leonard Simpson, though employed by Lebanon, did not work 30 hours a week. Simpson was Lebanon's assistant secretary and his duties required that he devote only a few days a month to the association's business. His yearly remuneration never exceeded $1,000. Simpson's principal vocation was the practice of law. Mrs. Simpson argued that summary judgment was proper, notwithstanding the fact that her husband did not work 30 hours a week, because the policy's incontestable clause barred the insurer from asserting the defense of Simpson's ineligibility at the inception of the group policy as the basis for refusing to pay the insurance proceeds.

In opposing the motion, Phoenix argued that employment eligibility, as established by the group policy, was a limitation of the risk it contracted to insure. Since eligible employment is a limitation rather than a condition, it argues that it was not barred from raising employment eligibility even though the period in which it could contest the validity of the policy had elapsed.

The Supreme Court denied summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, one Justice dissenting (30 A.D.2d 265, 291 N.Y.S.2d 532).

The question posed for decision is whether employment, as defined in this group life insurance policy, is a condition of insurance or a limitation of the risk which the insurer contracted to underwrite. If employment is a condition the defense is now barred by the policy's incontestable clause. (See Piasecki v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 637, 154 N.E. 637; Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 44, 166 N.E. 798, 64 A.L.R. 956; Romano v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 271 N.Y. 288, 2 N.E.2d 661, 105 A.L.R. 989.) If it is a limitation, the beneficiary cannot recover under the policy.

We conclude that employment, as defined in this group policy, is a condition of insurance and, therefore, since the insurer did not contest the employee's eligibility within the period of contestability, it is barred from raising it as a defense to the beneficiary's action (Eagon v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 785, 164 N.Y.S.2d 37, 143 N.E.2d 793). ²

Our courts in the past have stringently enforced the incontestable provision required by statute to be included in every group and individual life insurance policy because of the important purposes which it is intended to serve. The provision safeguards an insured from excessive litigation many years after a policy has already been in force and assures him security in financial planning for his family, while providing an insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate. The troublesome problem in interpreting the precise reach of the incontestable provision is to determine what defenses are barred to the insurer and those which may still be raised after the expiration of the contestable period.

Both parties direct our attention to the identical passage in Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 452, 169 N.E. 642, 643, as controlling the precise question for decision on this appeal. In Conway, Chief Judge CARDOZO writing for a unanimous court stated, 'The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a mandate as to Coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the insurer. It means only this, that within the limits of the coverage, the policy shall stand, Unaffected by any defense that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken.' (Emphasis added.) Though this passage is instructive, in the context of this appeal it is not dispositive. The quoted passage establishes a frame of reference for decision but does not unequivocally indicate which particular risks are conditions of insurance and thus borne by the insurer, if not discovered and contested within two years of issuance of the policy, and those hazards considered limitations on the risk an insurer is willing to assume and, therefore, not barred by the lapse of time.

In New York the incontestable clause is viewed normally with reference to the manner of death. Risks which are considered limitations are those which could not be ascertained by the insurer by investigation at the time the policy of insurance was issued. (Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, Supra; Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Beha, 226 App.Div. 408, 235 N.Y.S. 501, affd. Sub nom. Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449, 169 N.E. 642, Supra; Woodbery v. New York Life Ins. Co., 129 Misc. 365, 221 N.Y.S. 357, mod. on another ground 223 App.Div. 272, 227 N.Y.S. 699). If the additional risk to the insurer of issuing a policy to a particular applicant could have been...