Simpson v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 08 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 4341.,4341.
• Parties: William R. SIMPSON, Jr., Appellant, v. Becky H. SIMPSON and Wade Ingle, Defendants, of whom Becky H. Simpson is Respondent.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

660 S.E.2d 278

377 S.C. 527

William R. SIMPSON, Jr., Appellant, v. Becky H. SIMPSON and Wade Ingle, Defendants, of whom Becky H. Simpson is Respondent.

No. 4341.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Submitted November 1, 2007.

Decided February 8, 2008.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 2008.

Steven S. McKenzie, of Manning, for Appellant.

James McLaren, C. Dixon Lee, Jan L. Warner, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

In this domestic action, William Robert Simpson, Jr., (Husband) appeals the family court's order, arguing the family court erred in (1) its equitable distribution of marital property; (2) finding Simpson Farms, LLC, was marital property; (3) failing to correctly ascertain the inventory of the Buck and Bull store; (4) failing to give Husband credit for $16,000 in monies he paid to his former wife, Becky H. Simpson (Wife); (5) finding the parties' residence was transmuted into marital property; and (6) awarding Wife attorney's fees and costs. We affirm.

FACTS

Husband and Wife were married on September 3, 1989. At the time of the marriage, Husband was nineteen and Wife was seventeen years of age. During the marriage, Wife primarily stayed at home and took care of the parties' two children. She maintained periodic outside employment, including a job at the children's private school, Clarendon Hall, for which the parties received reduced tuition.

Throughout the marriage, Husband worked as a farmer with his father, William Simpson, Sr. (Simpson, Sr.).¹ In exchange for Husband earning a nominal salary and working hard, Simpson, Sr. awarded him a fifty percent interest in Simpson Farms. Husband also bought other property that he farmed separately from his father. He financed the purchase of the additional land in various ways. At times, he farmed the land or cut timber in order to pay the purchase price. At other times, he borrowed money from banks.

At the beginning of the marriage, the parties purchased a mobile home, using $6,000 Wife inherited, which was located on Simpson, Sr.'s property. Over time, the parties cleared the land, and in 1995, they built the marital residence. On May 15, 1996, Simpson, Sr. formally deeded the property to Husband. At the time of the final hearing, the residence had $78,600 outstanding on the mortgage.

In late 2003, Wife began acting somewhat erratically and appeared depressed. Husband found Wife to be more irritable and believed she preferred to be alone without him or the children. To support Husband's claim that Wife was acting irrationally, he testified that when Wife returned from a trip to Florida in July 2004, she had three tattoos. Eventually, Wife was diagnosed as bipolar. Thereafter, Husband asked Wife for a divorce.

At this point, Wife was not represented by counsel. Husband took Wife, who was accompanied by her elderly grandfather, to his attorney's office to sign a separation agreement. Wife signed the separation agreement, which was later approved by the family court. When she signed the agreement, Wife claimed she was unaware of the parties' finances because Husband handled the financial aspects of their marriage. In the time frame between Husband asking Wife for a divorce and the signing of the separation agreement, Wife began dating Wade Ingle.

A few months later, Wife retained counsel and moved to have the separation agreement set aside, claiming she was undergoing psychotherapy and taking medication at the time she signed the separation agreement. She also argued Husband had not made a full financial disclosure. The family court, noting it would not have approved the separation agreement had it known Wife's mental condition, set aside the agreement.

After the family court set aside the separation agreement, Husband instituted this action seeking a divorce based upon Wife's adultery. While the divorce proceedings were pending, Husband closed the Buck and Bull store he operated and attempted to auction off the inventory. The family court halted the sale in order to determine the inventory's value.

The family court subsequently issued a bifurcated decree of divorce, granting Husband a divorce based upon Wife's adultery, which occurred after the parties separated. The family court left open all other issues, noting, "This [o]rder shall not be construed as making any finding relative to the issues of fault of either party ... as may affect equitable division, custody, counsel fees, [and] suit money."

After a two-day hearing on the remaining issues, the family court issued its final order.² The order provided Wife was barred from alimony because of her adultery. The family court awarded Husband sixty percent of the marital property, totaling $320,655, and awarded Wife forty percent of the marital estate, totaling $213,876, pursuant to the family court's consideration of the equitable distribution statute. Additionally, the family court ordered Husband to pay half of Wife's attorney's fees and costs.

Accordingly, Husband filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to reconsider, which the family court denied. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the family court, this Court has the authority to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Rutherford v. Rutherford, 307 S.C. 199, 204, 414 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1992). This broad scope of review does not require us to disregard the family court's findings, and we remain mindful that the family court, who saw and heard the witnesses, is in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign weight to their testimony. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 525, 280 S.E.2d 541, 541 (1981).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Equitable Distribution

Husband argues the family court erred in its equitable distribution of the marital property. Specifically, Husband contends the family court's equitable division attempted to compensate Wife for her failure to receive alimony. We disagree.

The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the family court, and on appeal, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Greene v. Greene, 351 S.C. 329, 340, 569 S.E.2d 393, 399 (Ct.App.2002). Section 20-7-472 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2006) imparts the family court with fifteen factors to consider in equitably apportioning marital property. The statute vests the family court with the discretion to decide the weight to assign various factors. See id. ("In making apportionment, the court must give weight in such proportion as it finds appropriate...."). On appeal, "this [C]ourt looks to the overall fairness of the apportionment, and it is irrelevant that this [C]ourt might have weighed specific factors differently than the family court." Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 213-14, 634 S.E.2d 51, 55 (Ct.App.2006).

In Berry v. Berry, 294 S.C. 334, 335, 364 S.E.2d 463, 464 (1988), the family court's order, which awarded an adulterous spouse an equal share of the marital property, provided,

Although it was ... adultery that precipitated this divorce action, no deduction has been made from her share by reason of her fault.... Were it not for the length of this marriage and the fact that [she] is barred from alimony, I would have awarded her a substantially lower percentage of the marital property.

In affirming this Court's reversal of the family court's order, the Supreme Court noted, "[T]he preclusion of an alimony award to a spouse cannot be used to increase an equitable distribution award." Id.

In the present case, Husband alleges the family court attempted to compensate Wife through equitable distribution because she was statutorily barred from receiving alimony. He points to what he believes is the family court's "skewed" factual findings in favor of Wife to award her forty percent of the marital estate.

We find the record fails to support Husband's contention. In its order, the family court granted Husband a divorce based upon Wife's adultery that took place after the parties separated. Further, the order provided, "There is no evidence of marital misconduct from either party that would rise to the level to [a]ffect the division of property. The wife's adultery took place only after the parties' separation." Unlike the situation presented in Berry, the family court specifically stated Wife's marital misconduct did not affect the equitable distribution.

In this case, the family court awarded Husband twenty percent more than Wife, dividing the property in a sixty-forty split. The court took into consideration the direct and indirect contributions of both parties and the substantial "sweat equity" of Husband. The award considered the appropriate statutory factors and this State's public policy that a party's marital misconduct does not justify a severe penalty for equitable apportionment purposes. See Doe, 370 S.C. at 216, 634 S.E.2d at 57 (finding South Carolina law "expressly disallow[s] fault as a penalty" in determining equitable apportionment between a husband and wife). Therefore, we agree with the family court that a forty percent award of the marital property to Wife is proper.

II. Marital Property

Husband argues the family court erred in finding Simpson Farms was marital property. Husband maintains his fifty percent interest in Simpson Farms was a gift from Simpson, Sr. and, as such, is a nonmarital asset. We disagree.

Marital property is defined as "all real and personal property which has been acquired by the parties during the marriage and which is owned as of the date of filing or commencement of marital litigation ... regardless of how legal title is held." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473 (Supp.2006). However, property may be considered nonmarital if it is acquired by gift or inheritance. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-473(1). Because of the general presumption that property acquired during the marriage is an asset of the marriage, "[t]he burden to show an exemption under S.C.Code Ann. Section 20-7-473 is upon the one claiming that property acquired during...