Simpson v. State

• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LUMPKIN, J
• Citation: Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 22 L.R.A. 248, 44 Am. St. Rep. 75, 17 S. E. 984 (Ga. 1893)
• Decision Date: 29 May 1893
• Parties: SIMPSON. v. STATE.

17 S.E. 984

92 Ga. 41

SIMPSON.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 29, 1893.

Shooting at Another—Venue—State Line— Evidence.

1. A person in a boat on the Savannah river; within 30 yards of the Georgia side, at a point where the river is at least 175 yards wide, is prima facie in the state of Georgia.

2. The offense of shooting at another is committed in this state when one in the state of South Carolina, without malice aforethought, but not in his own defense, or under other circumstances of justification, aims and fires a pistol at another who at the time is in this state, although the ball misses him, and strikes the water in this state, near the boat which he occupies.

3. The evidence warranted the verdict, and there was no error in denying a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Hart county; J. H. Guerry, Judge.

Joseph Simpson was convicted of shooting at another, and brings error. Affirmed.

McCurry & Proffitt, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. M. Howard, Sol. Gen., for the State.

LUMPKIN, J. 1. According to the convention of Beaufort between the states of Georgia and South Carolina, agreed on by the commissioners of both states on the 28th of April, 1787, the current or main thread of the channel of the Savannah river is the boundary between the two states. Code, §16; Hotchkiss St. 913-917. This being so, at a point where the river is not less than 175 yards wide, a person in a boat not more than 30 yards fromthe Georgia side is prima facie in this state. In the present case it was practically conceded that the testimony showed the person assaulted was on the Georgia side of the main current of the river.

2. Under the evidence introduced in behalf of the state, and which the jury evidently believed to be true, the accused shot twice at the prosecutor, intending the balls from the pistol used to take effect upon him. At the time of the firing the prosecutor was in a boat upon the Savannah river, and within the state of Georgia, and the accused was standing upon the bank of the river in the state of South Carolina. It was conceded that if either or both of the balls bad struck the prosecutor an offense of some kind would have been committed in Georgia, upon the idea that the act of the accused took effect in this state; but it was contended that, inasmuch as the prosecutor was not struck, no effect whatever was produced in Georgia by the act in question. This contention is not well founded in point of fact, for the evidence shows conclusively that, although the prosecutor was not injured, the bails did strike the water of the river in close proximity to him, within this state, and therefore it is certain that they took effect in Georgia, although not the precise effect intended, assuming that the verdict correctly finds it was the deliberate purpose of the accused to actually shoot at the prosecutor. What the accused did was a criminal act, and it did take effect in this state. Mr. Bishop says: "The law deems that a crime is committed in the place where the criminal act takes effect. Hence, in many circumstances, one becomes liable to punishment in a particular jurisdiction while his personal presence is elsewhere. Even in tills way he may commit an offense against a state or county upon whose soil he never set his foot. " 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 53. And see Bish. Crim. Law, § 110. Of course, the presence of the accused within this state is essential to make his act one which is done in this state, but the presence need not be actual. It may be constructive. The well-established theory of the law is that, where one puts in force an agency for the commission of crime, he, In legal contemplation, accompanies the same to the point where it becomes effectual. Thus, a burglary may be committed by inserting into a building a hook or other contrivance by means of which goods are withdrawn therefrom; and there can be no doubt that, under these circumstances, the burglar, in legal contemplation, enters the building. So, if a man in the state of South Carolina criminally tires a ball into the state of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes. If an unlawful shooting occurred while both the parties were in this state, the mere fact of missing would not render the person who shot any the less guilty. Consequently, if one shooting from another state goes, in a legal sense, where his bullet goes, the fact of his missing the object at which he aims cannot alter the legal principle. Cases are numerous in which it has been held that where a person wounds another in one state or country, but the person wounded dies elsewhere, beyond its territorial boundaries, the courts of the state or country in which death occurred have jurisdiction to try the offense. A leading case on this line is that of Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320, in which there was a dissenting opinion by Justice Campbell. The ruling of the majority of the court, however, was approved in the case of Com. v. Macloon, 101...