Simpson v. State
Decision Date | 29 May 1893 |
Citation | 92 Ga. 41,17 S.E. 984 |
Parties | SIMPSON. v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Shooting at Another—Venue—State Line— Evidence.
1. A person in a boat on the Savannah river; within 30 yards of the Georgia side, at a point where the river is at least 175 yards wide, is prima facie in the state of Georgia.
2. The offense of shooting at another is committed in this state when one in the state of South Carolina, without malice aforethought, but not in his own defense, or under other circumstances of justification, aims and fires a pistol at another who at the time is in this state, although the ball misses him, and strikes the water in this state, near the boat which he occupies.
3. The evidence warranted the verdict, and there was no error in denying a new trial.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from superior court, Hart county; J. H. Guerry, Judge.
Joseph Simpson was convicted of shooting at another, and brings error. Affirmed.
McCurry & Proffitt, for plaintiff in error.
Wm. M. Howard, Sol. Gen., for the State.
LUMPKIN, J. 1. According to the convention of Beaufort between the states of Georgia and South Carolina, agreed on by the commissioners of both states on the 28th of April, 1787, the current or main thread of the channel of the Savannah river is the boundary between the two states. Code, §16; Hotchkiss St. 913-917. This being so, at a point where the river is not less than 175 yards wide, a person in a boat not more than 30 yards fromthe Georgia side is prima facie in this state. In the present case it was practically conceded that the testimony showed the person assaulted was on the Georgia side of the main current of the river.
2. Under the evidence introduced in behalf of the state, and which the jury evidently believed to be true, the accused shot twice at the prosecutor, intending the balls from the pistol used to take effect upon him. At the time of the firing the prosecutor was in a boat upon the Savannah river, and within the state of Georgia, and the accused was standing upon the bank of the river in the state of South Carolina. It was conceded that if either or both of the balls bad struck the prosecutor an offense of some kind would have been committed in Georgia, upon the idea that the act of the accused took effect in this state; but it was contended that, inasmuch as the prosecutor was not struck, no effect whatever was produced in Georgia by the act in question. This contention is not well founded in point of fact, for the evidence shows conclusively that, although the prosecutor was not injured, the bails did strike the water of the river in close proximity to him, within this state, and therefore it is certain that they took effect in Georgia, although not the precise effect intended, assuming that the verdict correctly finds it was the deliberate purpose of the accused to actually shoot at the prosecutor. What the accused did was a criminal act, and it did take effect in this state. Mr. Bishop says: "The law deems that a crime is committed in the place where the criminal act takes effect. Hence, in many circumstances, one becomes liable to punishment in a particular jurisdiction while his personal presence is elsewhere. Even in tills way he may commit an offense against a state or county upon whose soil he never set his foot. " . ...
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