Simpson v. Tofany

• Decision Date: 13 January 1969
• Citation: Simpson v. Tofany, 296 N.Y.S.2d 845, 58 Misc.2d 843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)
• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Parties: Hammie I. SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. Vincent L. TOFANY, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Page 845

296 N.Y.S.2d 845

58 Misc.2d 843

Hammie I. SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. Vincent L. TOFANY, as Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens County, Part I.

Jan. 13, 1969.

[58 Misc.2d 844] Bessie D. Goldberg, Rockville Centre, by Arthur Bart Cohn, Arverne, as counsel, for Legal Aid Society, Arverne, for petitioner.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of State of New York, New York City, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM

J. IRWIN SHAPIRO, Justice.

Petitioner, who had been the holder of a chauffeur's class 2 license to operate motor vehicles, brings this Article 78 proceeding to 'reverse the decision of respondent (Commissioner of Motor Vehicles) which denies petitioner the opportunity to renew his license * * *.'

In support of the application, petitioner alleges, Inter alia, that on December 24, 1965 he had a minor accident while operating his automobile; that he reported this accident to the Department of Motor Vehicles but not to his insurance company because there was no damage to his automobile; that he made an arrangement to pay to the owner of the other automobile the cost to repair it and carried out that agreement; and that he heard nothing further about this accident until September 4, 1968, when he received a notice from respondent denying his application to renew his chauffeur's license because of an outstanding order dated August 17, 1966 revoking that license. Petitioner also alleges that he then ascertained, upon making inquiry at the Motor Vehicle Bureau and the Home Indemnity Company, that his insurance had been cancelled on October 11, 1965, and that therefore he was uninsured at the time of the accident. It is undisputed that petitioner had been driving his automobile until September 4, 1968, during which period his license was under order of revocation although he claims that he was unaware of that fact.

As the predicate for the relief he seeks, petitioner contends that the order of revocation dated August 17, 1966 was for a period of one year; that it was effective from the date it was issued; and that therefore by its terms expired on August 17, 1967. Petitioner concludes that in view of the expiration of the time during which his license was revoked respondent's determination constitutes a failure to renew the license pursuant to Section 501(1)(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law and that such denial was improper because respondent did not perform his statutory duty of 'examining' petitioner before denying the renewal. Petitioner also claims that the denial by respondent is improper because respondent is prohibited from fixing an exact date in the future when petitioner may apply for renewal.

Respondent, in his answer, alleges that on November 16, 1965, there was received from petitioner's insurer notice of termination of the insurance covering the operation of petitioner's automobile; that he then notified petitioner that pursuant to Section 318 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law his registration was revoked for failure to carry liability insurance at all times and that he must immediately surrender the certificates, plates and validation sticker of his registration; that petitioner never reported an accident he had on December 24, 1965, while operating his automobile; that subsequently, on August 17, 1966, pursuant to Section 318, he revoked petitioner's registration and chauffeur's license and petitioner was directed to surrender his automobile registration and driver's license immediately upon receipt of that order; and that proper notice of such action was given to petitioner. Respondent's contention in opposition to the petition is, in sum, that petitioner is barred from obtaining a new license until he complies with the outstanding order of revocation that he surrender his registration stubs, number plates (and tab) and/or both stubs of his driver's license to the Department of Motor Vehicles.

For the following reasons I agree with respondent:

In resolving the question presented, it is the Court's function to achieve a result consonant with the public policy which underlies the unmistakable scheme and intent behind the enactment by the legislature of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. That policy is 'to protect the public on the highways against the operation of motor vehicles by financially irresponsible persons * * *' (Bookbinder v. Hults, 19 Misc.2d 1062, 1063, 192 N.Y.S.2d 331, 333). As was stated in Stevens v. Hults, 41 Misc.2d 168, 170, 245 N.Y.S.2d 425, 427, 'The supervening public interest that attaches to the contract of...