Simpson v. Union Oil Co of California

• Decision Date: 27 October 1969
• Docket Number: No. 419,419
• Citation: 396 U.S. 13,90 S.Ct. 30,24 L.Ed.2d 13
• Parties: Richard S. SIMPSON v. UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

396 U.S. 13

90 S.Ct. 30

24 L.Ed.2d 13

Richard S. SIMPSON

v UNION OIL CO. OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 419.

Decided Oct. 27, 1969.

Maxwell Keith, for petitioner.

Moses Lasky, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case represents the aftermath of our decision in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 84 S.Ct. 1051, 12 L.Ed.2d 98, where we held that a 'consignment' agreement for the sale of gasoline, required by Union Oil of lessees of its retail outlets, violated the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. The case was remanded for a hearing on other issues and for a determination of damages. The last sentence of the Court's opinion stated:

'We reserve the question whether, when all the facts are known, there may be any equities that would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the rule governing price fixing by the 'consignment' device which we announce today.' Id., at 24—25, 84 S.Ct. at 1058—1059.

On remand, the District Court interpreted this sentence as an invitation to determine if any 'equities' were present which would warrant precluding the imposition of damages on Union Oil. Its finding was that an application of the rule announced by this Court to the damages action would be unfair, on the ground that the decision in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362, gave Union Oil a reasonable basis for believing that its actions were entirely lawful. D.C., 270 F.Supp. 754. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 9 Cir., 411 F.2d 897.

The petition for certiorari presents the question whether in this case the principles we announced in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. should be made prospective in the present litigation. We grant the petition on that question and deny it on the other questions tendered; and we reverse the judgment below.

We held when the case was here before that on the facts of record the use of the 'consignment' device was within the prohibited ban of price fixing for non-patented articles, 377 U.S., at 16—24, 84 S.Ct., at 1054—1058, and that 'on the issue of resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act there is nothing left to try, for there was an agreement for resale price maintenance, coercively employed.' Id., at 24, 84 S.Ct. at 1058.

The question we reserved was not an invitation to deny the fruits of successful litigation to this petitioner. Congress has determined the causes of action that arise from antitrust violations; and there has been an adjudication that a cause of action against respondent has been established. Formulation of a rule of law in an Article III case or controversy which is prospective as to the parties involved in the immediate litigation would be most unusual, especially where the rule announced was not innovative. Since parties in other cases might be shown to have structured product distribution on quite different considerations, we reserved the question whether in some of those other situations equity might warrant the conclusion that prospective application was the only fair course.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice BLACK (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I wholeheartedly concur with the decision of the Court that both courts below were in error in holding that petitioner was not entitled to any damages in this case. I dissent, however, from the Court's denial of certiorari on another question that petitioner raises, the effect of which is to leave standing that part of the District Court's judgment setting aside petitioner's jury verdict as excessive and granting respondent a new trial on the issue of damages.

The District Court's grant of a new trial did not rest upon a finding that any of the evidence on the issue of damages was improperly admitted or that the instructions to the jury were erroneous. The judge granted the new trial on the ground that the $160,000 verdict 'is against the weight of the evidence, shocks the conscience, is grossly and monstrously excessive, is the result either of passion and prejudice or of consideration by the jury of factors irrelevant to the litigation, is speculative, conjectural and a miscarriage of justice.' Civil No. 37,344 (D.C.N.D.Cal., filed May 23, 1967).

I do not agree that under the facts of this case the verdict should have shocked the court's conscience. Certainly the $160,000 award does not shock my conscience, nor does it seem to me monstrous or the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Petitioner's growing filling station business was destroyed by respondent through conduct that this Court held to be in violation of the antitrust laws. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13, 84 S.Ct. 1051, 12 L.Ed.2d 98 (1964). At the time the cause of action arose petitioner's life expectancy was about 25 years. The jury had a right to believe that his business would have...