Simpson v. Zeigler
| Decision Date | 21 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:11-0658 |
| Parties | CARL WALKER SIMPSON, Petitioner, v. JOEL ZEIGLER, Warden, FCI Beckley, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
On September 23, 2011, Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated at FCI Beckley, Beaver, West Virginia, and acting pro se, filed his Application Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State or Federal Custody.1 (Document No. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons [BOP] is improperly calculating his term of imprisonment. (Id.) By Standing Order, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Document No. 4.)
Petitioner was arrested by Kentucky State authorities on August 7, 2008, and released from State custody on August 28, 2008. (Document No. 15-1, p. 2.) On June 11, 2009, Petitioner was arrested by the United States Marshals Service and charged with Possession of Ammunition by a Convicted Felon. (Id., pp. 2 and 6.) Petitioner was released on bond from federal custody to thecustody of Kentucky authorities on June 22, 2009. (Id., pp. 3 and 7.) On August 20, 2009, Petitioner was borrowed pursuant to a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum from the State of Kentucky. (Id.) On November 13, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky imposed a 30 month term of imprisonment. (Id., pp. 3 and 9 - 14.) On February 16, 2010, Petitioner was returned to State authorities via return writ. (Id., pp. 3 and 7.) On April 9, 2010, the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Kentucky, imposed a 12 month term of imprisonment for Fourth Degree Assault and Second Degree Wanton Endangerment. (Id., pp. 3 and 16 - 18.) The Circuit Court ordered that Petitioner receive credit of 325 days towards service of the maximum term of imprisonment. (Id.) On June 14, 2010, Petitioner was released from his State sentence into the custody of the United States Marshal Service to commence service of his federal sentence. (Id., pp. 3, 7, and 21.)
On September 23, 2011, Petitioner filed an Application Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State or Federal Custody. (Document No. 1.) Petitioner alleges that the BOP is improperly calculating the term of his imprisonment. (Id.) Specifically, Petitioner appears to contend that the BOP is improperly denying him Federal credit for the time he served in State custody. (Id.) Specifically, Petitioner requests credit for "all time spent in official primary federal detention since his arrest by the U.S. Marshal Service in Lexington, KY, on June 11, 2009." (Id., p. 6.) Petitioner further argues that the BOP "has made a serious mistake in failing to properly designate the Fayette & Grayson County Detention Centers as a place of confinement for federal pretrial detention prisoners, such as Petitioner Simpson." (Id.) Petitioner, therefore, requests that this Court "issue an order directing the Federal Bureau of Prisons to grant Petitioner all time spent in federal official detention since his arrest on June 11, 2009, through a nunc pro tunc exercise and designation of the Fayette & Grayson Counties, Kentucky, as a federal pretrial detention." (Id., p. 8.)
By Order entered on April 23, 2012, the Court ordered that Respondent file an Answer to the allegations contained in the Petitioner's Application and show cause, if any, why the Writ of Habeas Corpus sought by the Petitioner in this case should not be granted. (Document No. 9.) On May 21, 2012, Respondent filed his Response to the Order to Show Cause. (Document No. 15.) Respondent argues that Petitioner's Petition should be denied based on the following: (1) "Petitioner's federal sentence commenced on June 14, 2010" (Id., pp. 4 - 6.); (2) "Petitioner is not entitled to prior custody credit" (Id., pp. 6 - 7.); and (3) "A nunc pro tunc designation is not appropriate in the instant case" (Id., pp. 7 - 8.).
In support, Respondent attaches the following Exhibits: (1) The Declaration of J. Scott Farr, Management Analyst (Document No. 15-1, pp. 2 - 4.); (2) A copy of the U.S. Marshals Service Form 129 (Id., pp. 6 - 7.); (3) A copy of Petitioner's Judgment and Commitment Order as filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in Criminal Case Number 5:09-0001 (Id., pp. 9 - 14.); (4) A copy of the "Judgment on Guilty Plea and Final Sentence of Imprisonment" Order as filed in the Circuit Court of Fayette County, Kentucky Petitioner's (Id., pp. 16 - 18.); (5) A copy of Petitioner's Federal Sentence Computation (Id., pp. 20 - 22.); (8) Copies of nunc pro tunc consideration documents concerning Petitioner (Id., pp. 24 - 32.); and (9) A copy of the following unpublished cases: U.S. v. Brown, 977 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1992), U.S. v. Goulden, 54 F.3d 774 (4th Cir. 1995), McCollough v. O'Brien, 2007 WL 2029308 (W.D.Va. July 10, 2007) (Document No. 15-2.).
On June 11, 2012, Petitioner filed his Reply to Respondent's Response. (Document No. 16.) Petitioner argues that "the City of Lexington, Kentucky, Police Department and the Fayette County Circuit Court abdicated primary custody of Petitioner Simpson on August 28, 2008, when allowing him to post bail after his arrest on August 7, 2008, when charged with Assault 4th Degree, DomesticViolence, and Wanton Endangerment." (Id., pp. 2 - 12.). Petitioner argues that "when the U.S. Marshal Service arrested Petitioner . . . on June 11, 2009, the federal government legally assumed principal jurisdiction over him." (Id., pp. 4 - 5.) Therefore, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to credit of time served in state custody and for "325 days prior jail credit to be applied to his 30 month sentence." (Id., pp. 7 - 12.)
As Exhibits, Petitioner attaches the following: (1) A copy of the U.S. Marshals Service Form 129 (Id., p. 16.); (2) A copy of the "Grayson County Detention Center Resident Requisition" (Id., p. 18.); and (3) A copy of a letter from the Probation Office for the Eastern District of Kentucky addressed to Ms. Maybelle Baker (Petitioner's sister) regarding her request that Petitioner be transferred to FMC Lexington (Id., p. 20.)
The undersigned finds that Petitioner's Section 2241 Application must be dismissed as moot. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that federal Courts may adjudicate only live cases or controversies. See Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Nakell v. Attorney General of North Carolina, 15 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 866, 115 S.Ct. 184, 130 L.Ed.2d 118 (1994). This means that the "litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. In the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, the writ "does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody." Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 1129, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). In this case, by virtue of Petitioner's release from custody, the Respondent can no longer provide the requested relief.Consequently, the Court can no longer consider Petitioner's Application under Section 2241.
An incarcerated convict's (or a parolee's) challenge to the validity of his conviction always satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement, because the incarceration (or the restriction imposed by the terms of the parole) constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Once the convict's sentence has expired, however, some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended incarceration or parole - - some "collateral consequence" of the conviction - must exist if the suit is to be maintained.
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are rendered moot by virtue of his release from custody and the absence of collateral consequences,2 and therefore, his Section 2241 Application must be dismissed. See e.g., Alston v. Adams, 178 Fed.Appx. 295, 2006 WL 1194751 (C.A.4 (Va.)); Alvarez v. Conley, 145 Fed.Appx. 428, 2005 WL 2500659 (C.A.4 (W.Va.); Smithhart v. Gutierrez, 2007 WL 2897942 (N.D.W.Va.). Notwithstanding the fact that Petitioner's claims are now moot, the undersigned will briefly consider the merits of his claims.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) provides that a Federal sentence does not begin to run until the defendant is received into custody for service of the sentence. Generally, the first arresting sovereign acquires primary jurisdiction United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1980). Primary jurisdiction can be relinquished by operation of law, such as bail release, expiration of sentence, or dismissal of charges. United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2005). In the instant case, Federal authorities arrested Petitioner on June 11, 2009. Accordingly, Federal authorities obtainedprimary jurisdiction on June 11, 2009. Federal authorities, however, released Petitioner on bond to State authorities on June 22, 2009. Thus, State authorities obtained primary jurisdiction on June 22, 2009. Petitioner was then temporarily transferred into Federal custody on August 20, 2009, pursuant to a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Prosequendum for proceedings upon his Federal charges and sentenced on November 13,...
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