Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 29 September 1953
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 45820
• Parties: SIMS v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 96

115 N.E.2d 96

351 Ill.App. 314

SIMS v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY.

Gen. No. 45820 Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

Sept. 29, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1953.

Thomas C. Strachan, Jr., James O. Dwight, Marion J. Hannigan, Arthur J. Donovan and John W. Freels, Chicago, for appellant.

Bruce Parkhill, Chicago, for appellee.

ROBSON, Justice.

This is an action for personal injuries by the plaintiff Vera Sims against the defendant, the Chicago Transit Authority. A jury trial resulted in a verdict of $25,000 against the defendant. The usual after verdict motions were made and overruled by the trial court and judgment was entered on the verdict.

Defendant's first contention for reversal is that plaintiff had no right to maintain her action since there had been no compliance with the statute requiring that notice be served on the defendant. Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, ch. 111 2/3, sec. 341. On August 1, 1947, when the accident occurred, the streetcar involved was operated by the Chicago Surface Lines. On June 8, 1948, when the complaint was filed, the Chicago Surface Lines had been succeeded by the Chicago Transit Authority. In the case of Barrett v. Chicago Transit Authority, 348 Ill.App. 83, 107 N.E.2d 859, this court held that the statute requiring that the Chicago Transit Authority be given six months notice before the commencement of a civil action against it for damages on account of injury to the person did not apply when such injury was caused by the Chicago Surface Lines prior to its acquisition by the Chicago Transit Authority. This case is directly in point and decisive of the issue.

It is necessary to a proper understanding of the other issues in this case to set forth the essential facts. On August 1, 1947, shortly after 4:00 p. m., plaintiff was riding on one of defendant's southbound streetcars as a passenger on her way to work at a restaurant located at the southeast corner of Clark and Superior streets. Superior street is one block south and Huron two blocks south of Chicago avenue. Defendant's streetcars stop at Chicago and Huron streets but not at Superior street. It was customary for plaintiff to get off at Huron street. On the day of her injury an accident had occurred on the southbound car tracks in Clark street about a hundred feet south of Superior street, which blocked the southbound tracks. The nature of this accident does not appear in the record but it is not ascribed to any fault of the defendant. Fifteen or more streetcars were lined up and the car in which the plaintiff was riding was stopped approximately a third of a block north of Superior. The north and south crosswalks at Clark and Superior were blocked, but east and westbound vehicular and pedestrian traffic moved freely through an opening that was left at Superior street. Two of plaintiff's witnesses who had crossed the street at this point with no difficulty testified to this effect. The southbound automobile traffic was not blocked and it moved freely. The plaintiff left the car from the front entrance. Two alternative routes to her destrination were presented. The first, to walk to the west sidewalk and then to Superior street, where she could cross at a street intersection, or the second, to walk east between the two southbound streetcars which were four to eight feet apart in the middle of the block, cross the southbound track, cross the northbound track and then cross the street to the east sidewalk. She hesitated for a moment and then turned east, taking the very dangerous second route. She walked over the southbound tracks and was between the two sets of tracks, where she came to a stop and then continued. At that time a northbound streetcar which had proviously slowed down at Superior street, was approaching at a speed variously estimated from six to twenty miles per hour. There is some dispute between plaintiff's and defendant's witnesses as to whether the streetcar had given any signal by the ringing of a bell or gong. Plaintiff was struck by the car and her body came to rest immediately in front of the southbound streetcar from which she had alighted. There is nothing in the record to show that she was struck by the front of the northbound streetcar. The northbound streetcar stopped abruptly in a distance estimated from four to ten feet. Some of defendant's witnesses said she was hurrying or running and was struck a glancing blow by the car. One of plaintiff's witnesses said that she came to a stop. One witness stated she saw plaintiff throw up her hand. There was a ventilator on the front of the northbound car which was open and projected from the west side of the car and was about four feet above the ground. After the accident it was found that her wrist was broken and her skull fractured. The steel ventilator of the streetcar was broken. It is plaintiff's theory that she was struck by this ventilator.

Plaintiff contends that at the time of the accident she was still a passenger. If she were, defendant owed her the highest degree of care commensurate with the practical operation of its streetcars to provide a safe place to alight and a safe passage from the streetcar. Instead, plaintiff contends that she was discharged by the defendant at a place of danger. This issue was submitted to the jury. The record shows that the plaintiff in the amergency was permitted to alight from the right side of the streetcar in the middle of the block at a point where there was no parallel track...