Sims v. City of Seattle

• Docket Number: 2:22-CV-00483-TL
• Decision Date: 24 May 2023
• Parties: ANTHONY SIMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington

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ANTHONY SIMS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-CV-00483-TL

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle

May 24, 2023

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Tana Lin United States District Judge.

This is a civil rights action under 42 U.s.C. § 1983 for damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief stemming from an interaction between a seattle resident and seattle police officers. The matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief (the “Motion to Dismiss”). Dkt No. 22. Having considered Plaintiff's response (Dkt. No 25), Defendants' reply (Dkt. No. 27), and the relevant record, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have standing to pursue his claim for injunctive relief and therefore GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

The facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which the Court takes as true for the purposes of this Order, are as follows: Plaintiff Anthony Sims is an African American citizen of Washington State and a resident of Seattle, Washington. Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 2.1. Defendants Robert Brown, Gregory Nash, Garrett Follette, and Bradley Richardson are Caucasian male officers employed by the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”). Id. ¶¶ 2.3-2.6.

Plaintiff works as a delivery driver and was working on the morning of May 17, 2020. Id. ¶ 4.1. At that time, Defendant Brown followed Plaintiff for several blocks until Plaintiff parked in front of a 7-Eleven store in downtown Seattle. Id. ¶¶ 4.1, 4.3. While following Plaintiff, Defendant Brown relayed Plaintiff's license plate number to a dispatcher. Id. ¶ 4.4. Without waiting for the results of his inquiry, Defendant Brown detained Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 4.6. When Plaintiff exited his car to go into the 7-Eleven, Defendant Brown began issuing a series of commands over a public address system. Id. ¶ 4.7. He first commanded Plaintiff to return to his vehicle and wait, then to exit the vehicle, and finally to turn around and walk toward him. Id. ¶ 4.8. Plaintiff complied with each command. Id.

During Defendant Brown's interaction with Plaintiff, additional police units arrived, including Defendants Nash, Follette, and Richardson. Id. ¶ 4.9. Defendant Nash drew his firearm and pointed it at Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 4.11. Multiple officers did the same. Id. ¶ 4.12. Defendant Brown stated over the public address system, “I have no doubt that's probably your vehicle,” and “sometimes there's a misunderstanding.” Id. ¶ 4.10. While Plaintiff was detained, Defendants Nash, Follette, and Richardson searched Plaintiff's car. Id. ¶ 4.14. Officers also frisked and searched Plaintiff and continued to ask questions of him. Id. ¶¶ 4.15-4.16. Ultimately, a police dispatcher told Defendant Brown that Plaintiff's license plate had not been reported stolen and was clear. Id. ¶ 4.18. Plaintiff was released without arrest. Id. ¶ 4.19. When told of the incident later by Defendant Brown, Sergeant Patrick Moore “approved and condoned the actions” of the Defendant officers. Id. ¶ 4.20.

Plaintiff further alleges that the City of Seattle (the “City”) “failed to discipline any of the officers involved, and found their conduct consistent with City policy and practices.” Id. ¶ 4.29. In doing so, the City “relied on the assertion that Mr. Sims's license plate was a ‘near hit' with a different license plate.” Id. SPD “instructs officers to point their firearms at members of the public during so-called high risk vehicle stops.” Id. ¶ 4.31. A high-risk vehicle stop is defined as “any stop which poses a significant risk to the officer(s) when dealing with the occupant(s) of a motor vehicle.” Id. In response to a disciplinary complaint by Plaintiff, the City's Office of Police Accountability (“OPA”) recommended changes to the City's use of force training and policies. Id. ¶ 4.30. OPA's investigation of the stop of Plaintiff concluded that “[i]t it is up to the individual officer to articulate why they did or did not use that tactic.” Id. ¶ 4.31.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the City “has a policy, practice, or custom of conducting searches and seizures without probable cause or other legal justification, and of using excessive force.” Id. ¶ 4.32. These policies and practices “are part of the training and instruction the City of Seattle imparts to its police officers.” Id. Plaintiff notes that SPD is under supervision by the Western District of Washington pursuant to a Consent Decree following a United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigation. Id. ¶ 4.33. In a 2011 report, DOJ found that “Seattle police engage in a pattern or practice of excessive force due to the City's policies, training, and supervision.” Id. DOJ also found that “SPD officers exhibited confusion about the necessity of having reasonable suspicion in order to conduct investigatory stops.” Id.

Plaintiff also alleges that the City “has a practice or custom of engaging in unjustified stops, searches, arrests, and excessive use of force, disproportionately against African American and other non-white residents, as compared to white residents.” Id. ¶ 4.34. Plaintiff cites a January 2021 study by the Center for Policing Equity (“CPE”) that found “African Americans were subjected to the use of force more than seven times as often per capita as compared to Caucasians.” Id. The study also found that African Americans were stopped by police more than four times as often as Caucasians, and that Seattle police were “far more likely” to point or display a firearm when interacting with African Americans. Id.

In this action, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages. Id. ¶¶ 7.2-7.3, 7.5-7.8. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction “preventing Defendants from continuing to violate the Constitution and providing other equitable relief,” including “other declaratory and injunctive relief as the Court deems just and proper.” Id. ¶¶ 7.4, 7.9; see also id. ¶¶ 6.1-6.4.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the face of the FAC. Dkt. Nos. 22, 27. Plaintiff opposes. Dkt. No. 25.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss may be brought for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The Court must dismiss an action if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction “at any time.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either a facial attack (challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings) or a factual attack (presenting evidence contesting the truth of the allegations in the pleadings). See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). “When reviewing a [facial] dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . ., ‘we accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ], the non-moving party.'” DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quoting Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2017)).

Subject matter jurisdiction encompasses doctrines of justiciability under Article III of the Constitution, such as standing. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (“It goes without saying that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshhold [sic] requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution.”). Such threshold jurisdictional issues must be satisfied “separately for each form of relief sought.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)).

“To establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 608 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). To establish standing for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must allege “either ‘continuing, present adverse effects' due to [their] exposure to Defendants' past illegal conduct, or ‘a sufficient likelihood that [they] will again be wronged in a similar way.” Villa v. Maricopa Cnty., 865 F.3d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974), and Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111).

III. Discussion

A. Lyons and Injunctive Relief in the Ninth Circuit

A plaintiff who asserts civil rights violations and seeks injunctive relief must find a way to distinguish City of Los Angeles v. Lyons and its progeny, which courts have repeatedly cited in the last 40 years as the basis for denying such relief.^[1]Lyons has faced sustained criticism by courts, scholars, and the public.^[2]Nonetheless, it remains the governing law.

The story of Lyons has been told in more detail elsewhere,^[3]but a brief recounting is warranted here to understand the barriers that Plaintiff faces. On October 6, 1976, at 2 a.m., Mr. Adolph Lyons was stopped by Los Angeles police officers for a traffic or vehicle code violation. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97. Although Mr. Lyons did not resist the officers, threaten them, or otherwise provoke them, the officers seized him and applied a “chokehold” rendering him unconscious and damaging his larynx. Id. at 97-98.

Mr Lyons sued the City of Los Angeles for damages, declaratory relief, and-most important for the instant matter-injunctive relief barring the use of chokeholds except where officers are threatened with deadly force. Id. at 98. In support of his request for injunctive relief, Mr. Lyons alleged that

the city's

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