Sims v. Greene

• Decision Date: 04 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 9342.,9342.
• Citation: 160 F.2d 512
• Parties: SIMS v. GREENE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

160 F.2d 512 (1947)

SIMS v. GREENE.

No. 9342.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued February 13, 1947.

Decided March 4, 1947.

Raymond Pace Alexander, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Walter A. Gay, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Before BIGGS, GOODRICH and KALODNER, Circuit Judges.

BIGGS, Circuit Judge.

On December 2, 1946, the plaintiff, David H. Sims, filed a complaint against the defendant, Sherman L. Greene, alleging that he, Sims, is a citizen of Pennsylvania and a bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and that he was assigned by a General Conference¹ of the AME Church held in 1944 to the First Episcopal District² to serve as the presiding bishop of that district until the next General Conference to be held in 1948; that the defendant, another bishop of the same church, has appeared in the First Episcopal District and within the jurisdiction of the court below and has proclaimed that he is the presiding bishop of the First District and is attempting to function as such; that by reason of the foregoing the plaintiff's office and functions as presiding bishop and his salary and emoluments are threatened as is the administration of the church and its conferences³ in the district; and that irreparable injury will result to the church, to its property and to the plaintiff unless the defendant is enjoined from pursuing the course complained of. An affidavit supporting the allegations of the complaint was filed with it.

On December 2, 1946, the court below, ex parte, issued an order restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff as the presiding bishop of the district. The restraint originally imposed was continued by order for an additional ten days, to expire on December 22, 1946. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 381. On December 20 the defendant consented to the restraint being extended until January 14, 1947 and the court made an order to such effect on December 20, 1946. See note 7 infra.

On December 24, 1946 the defendant filed his answer and with it a counterclaim containing prayers for affirmative relief. He admitted the allegations of the amended⁴ complaint in respect to diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, but asserted that the plaintiff was no longer a bishop of the AME Church because he had been unfrocked by an extra session⁵ of the General Conference and by the Episcopal Committee⁶ meeting in Little Rock, Arkansas, about November 20, 1946; that he, the defendant, had been assigned by the extra session of the General Conference and by the Bishops' Council to the First Episcopal District as its presiding bishop; that by virtue of the foregoing he is the lawful presiding bishop of the district and his right to that office and its emoluments and his administration of the church and its property within the district are imperilled by the plaintiff's actions. The counterclaim ends with a prayer that the plaintiff be enjoined from interfering with the defendant.

On January 13, 1947 the court below extended the restraining order until January 24⁷ and proceeded to a hearing on the question of whether or not a preliminary injunction should be granted.⁸ This hearing continued from January 13 to January 17, inclusive, and twelve hundred pages of argument, colloquy and testimony were taken down and have been transcribed. On January 17, at the close of the day the defendant's counsel made a motion to dissolve the restraint. The court directed him to withhold his motion, stating that he would renew the order "in due time". The transcript shows that counsel for the defendant then said, "Your Honor, I ask for an extension sic of that order." In the notice of appeal defendant's counsel in a kind of addendum, states, "the correct word was `dissolution'". The record demonstrates that counsel meant to say "dissolution" or "vacation", and that at the time indicated he in fact made a motion to dissolve the restraining order.

On January 23, 1947 the defendant appealed to this court from the restraining order and moved for a stay of all proceedings in the District Court.⁹ We stayed the proceedings in the District Court and restrained the defendant from acting as the presiding bishop of the First Episcopal District pending the disposition of the appeal, setting February 13 as the day for argument.

The defendant contends that the court below was without jurisdiction or power to hear or determine the cause and that this appears not only from the pleading but also from the testimony. He asserts also that the plaintiff has alleged no facts upon which a finding of irreparable damage can be made and contends also, as we apprehend his argument, that the temporary restraining order, continued without the consent of the defendant after January 14, is in substance a temporary injunction issued illegally since no findings of fact and conclusions of law were made by the court below as required by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. The defendant contends also that the court below made no findings of fact and expressed no conclusions of law regarding the vital issue of whether or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.

The plaintiff asserts that the order of December 2, 1946, continued in effect as shown in note 7, supra, is only a temporary restraining order and as such is not appealable; that it was providently entered; and that the court below had jurisdiction not only of the parties but also of the subject matter, the court having made a finding to such effect. He contends that the appeal must be dismissed.

Jurisdiction in the case at bar is based on diversity of citizenship. It was incumbent upon the court below, as it is on this court, to apply the law of the forum, that is to say, the law of Pennsylvania. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477. The pleadings in the case at bar present a justiciable controversy to be determined by the law of Pennsylvania. Under that law the only question, procedural incidents aside, is whether the plaintiff was unfrocked as a bishop and the defendant was assigned as his successor to the First Episcopal District according to the Discipline of the AME Church.¹⁰

The law of Pennsylvania in this connection was well summed up by Mr. Justice Williams speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Krecker v. Shirey, 163 Pa. 534, 30 A. 440, 29 L.R.A. 476. For brevity's sake we paraphrase it here as follows. The power of a civil court, as distinguished from that of an ecclesiastical tribunal, in respect to disputes between warring church factions is limited to an ascertainment of the pertinent church law, to inquiry as to whether or not that law has been conformed with by the churchly tribunal or judicatory, and to the enforcement of the judgment or order of the religious tribunal or judicatory if the order or judgment of the tribunal or judicatory of the church has been reached in accordance with the law of the church. The principle of decision just enunciated is subject to a further limitation not here at issue, viz., that the canons of the ecclesiastical body may not be contrary to the law of the land.¹¹ See also Long v. Harvey, 177 Pa. 473, 35 A. 869, 34 L.R.A. 169, 55 Am.St.Rep. 733; Wallace v. Presbyterian Church, 201 Pa. 292, 50 A. 762; Ryan v. Dunzilla, 239 Pa. 486, 86 A. 1089; Furmanski v. Iwanowski, 265 Pa. 1, 108 A. 27; Canovaro v. Brothers of Hermits of St. Augustine, 326 Pa. 76, 86, 191 A. 140, 146; Post v. Dougherty, 326 Pa. 97, 102, 191 A. 151, 153. The general law indeed does not differ in any substantial respect from that of Pennsylvania. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 731, 20 L.Ed. 666; and Zollmann, American Church Law, Ch. 13, "Clergyman", Sections 448, 461, 462, 469, 470, 471, 473, 479 and 480.

The nature of some of the questions which the court below must answer on the issue of whether or not the churchly judicatories, such as the General Conference and the Episcopal Committee of the AME Church, have conformed with the rules laid down in the AME Discipline are suggested in the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in Mazaika v. Krauczunas, 229 Pa. 47, 49, 77 A. 1102, 1103, 31 L.R.A., N.S., 686. These questions include, but are not limited by the following. Was the plaintiff duly assigned to the First Episcopal District by the General Conference of 1944? Was the extra session of the General Conference which purported to unfrock the plaintiff called as required by the Discipline of the AME Church? Was the extra session held at a time and place required by the Discipline? Was the action of the Bishops' Council in accordance with the Discipline? The determination of these and like questions will determine the controversy in the case at bar in accordance with the law of Pennsylvania. Not pertinent to any issue presented by the pleadings is the moral character or fitness for ecclesiastical office of the respective contestants. Not pertinent are the records of the law suits which the plaintiff, the defendant or the AME Church have indulged in. No res judicata is pleaded. Not pertinent is the manner in which the plaintiff or defendant conducted themselves in the First District or elsewhere. Not pertinent is the manner or way in which the parties used the funds of the church. Not pertinent are the marital or domestic relations of the parties. Questions of moral fitness rest and will rest with the ecclesiastical tribunals and may not be tried in the court below.¹² This limitation should shorten the proceedings greatly.

We come next to questions respecting the nature and effect of the restraining order issued first upon December 2, 1946 and still in force. In extending the restraint the court below did not observe that provision of Rule 65(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which states, "The...