Sims v. Stanton

Citation706 F.3d 954
Decision Date16 January 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–55401.,11–55401.
PartiesDrendolyn SIMS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Mike STANTON, Defendant–Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

L. Marcel Stewart, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.

Peter J. Ferguson, Santa Ana, CA, for Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Jeffrey T. Miller, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:09–cv–01356–JM–WMC.

Before: STEPHEN REINHARDT, BARRY G. SILVERMAN, and KIM McLANE WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

The opinion filed on December 3, 2012 is hereby amended as follows:

1. At page 11, lines 11–12 of the slip opinion, delete .

2. At page 11, line 16 of the slip opinion, after insert .

3. At page 11, line 17 of the slip opinion, after the sentence ending insert the following sentence the facts of this case warrants a departure from our general rule that an underlying misdemeanor offense justifies a warrantless entry in only “the ‘rarest’ cases.” Id. (citations omitted).>.

4. At page 11, line 21 of the slip opinion, after insert .

5. At page 11, lines 26–27 of the slip opinion, delete district court erroneously applied this precedent.>.

6. At page 12, line 10 of the slip opinion, after and before delete .

7. At page 12, lines 10–11 of the slip opinion, after delete and insert “rarest” cases justifying>.

8. At page 12, at line 11 of the slip opinion, between and insert .

With these amendments, Judges Reinhardt, Silverman, and Wardlaw vote to deny the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The full court was advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. No judge requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc are DENIED. No future petitions for rehearing or petitions for rehearing en banc will be entertained.

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Drendolyn Sims suffered serious injuries as a result of officer Mike Stanton's act of kicking down the front gate to her small, enclosed yard. Sims was standing directly behind the gate when it swung open, knocking her down and rendering her temporarily unconscious, or at least incoherent, causing a laceration on her forehead and an injury to her shoulder. Stanton unreasonably believed that his warrantless entry into the curtilage of Sims's home was justified by his pursuit of Nicholas Patrick, who had committed at most a misdemeanor offense by failing to stop for questioning in response to a police order. Sims filed an action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by Stanton's warrantless entry into her front yard and seeking damages for her injuries.

The district court found that Stanton was entitled to qualified immunity and granted his motion for summary judgment. Reviewing that decision de novo, we must determine whether Stanton violated Sims's Fourth Amendment right to be free from a warrantless entry into her front yard and whether the contours of that right were sufficiently established at the time that a reasonable officer would have been aware that his conduct was unconstitutional. We conclude that Stanton's actions amounted to an unconstitutional search. We hold that the law at the time of the incident would have placed a reasonable officer on notice that his warrantless entry into the curtilage of a home constituted an unconstitutional search, which could not be excused under the exigency or emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Stanton was, therefore, not entitled to qualified immunity.

BACKGROUND 1

On May 27, 2008 at approximately one o'clock in the morning, Officer Stanton and his partner responded to a radio call regarding an “unknown disturbance” in the street involving a baseball bat in La Mesa, California. The officers were driving a marked car and wearing police uniforms. Stanton was familiar with the area as one “known for violence associated with the area gangs,” and he “was also aware of gang members being armed with weapons such as guns and knives.” Still, when the officers arrived, they observed nothing unusual.

The officers noticed three men walking in the street. Upon seeing the car, two of the men turned into a nearby apartment complex. The third, who turned out to be Patrick, crossed the street about twenty-five yards in front of the police car and walked quickly toward Sims's home, which was located in the same direction as the police car. Neither officer saw Patrick with a baseball bat or any other possible weapon. The officers had no information that would link Patrick to the disturbance. Nor did the officers observe any conduct on Patrick's part that would suggest that he had been involved in the disturbance that they had been called to investigate.

According to Stanton's version of the facts, he exited the patrol car, announced “police,” and ordered Patrick to stop multiple times in a voice that was loud enough that all persons in the area would have heard his commands. Whether Patrick heard the commands or not, he did not stop. Instead, he entered the gate to Sims's front yard and the gate shut behind him. Believing that Patrick was disobeying his lawful order (a misdemeanor offense under California Penal Code § 1482) and “fearing for [his] safety,” Stanton made a “split-second decision” to kick open the gate to Sims's yard. Sims was standing behind the gate when it flew open, striking her and sending her into the front stairs. She was temporarily knocked unconscious, or at least became incoherent, as a result of the blow and sustained a laceration on her forehead, an injury to her shoulder, and was taken to the hospital.

The gate Stanton kicked open is part of a fence made of “sturdy, solid wood” that is more than six feet tall, enclosing the front yard to Sims's home. Sims lives in a manufactured home with a small front yard that abuts the house. She states that she “enjoy[s] a high level of privacy in [her] front yard.” Her fence, which was built for “privacy and protection,” ensures that her outdoor space is “completely secluded” and cannot be seen by someone standing outside the gate. Additionally, the front yard is used for talking with friends, as Sims was doing on the evening of the incident, and for storing her wheelchair, which she keeps parked inside the fence.

Sims's complaint against Stanton alleged unconstitutional arrest, search, excessive force, and additional state law tort claims. Stanton moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, finding that (1) Stanton did not use excessive force; (2) exigency and a lesser expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding Sims's home justified the warrantless entry;and (3) no clearly established law put Stanton on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional and therefore he was entitled to qualified immunity. Sims appeals the district court's decision on her unconstitutional search claim and the grant of qualified immunity to Stanton.3

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from entering an enclosed front yard—curtilage—without a warrant, to the same extent that it prohibits them from entering a home. See United States v. Perea–Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir.2012). Thus, we first must determine whether Sims's front yard was curtilage. If so, Stanton's warrantless entry is unconstitutional unless it meets the requirements for an exception to the warrant rule.

We next review the facts presented to the district court to determine whether Stanton's warrantless entry meets either the exigency or emergency exceptions to the warrant requirement. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir.2009). Because both exceptions turn on the seriousness of the underlying offense, we ultimately conclude that Stanton's warrantless entry cannot be justified by his pursuit of Patrick, who committed, at most, only a misdemeanor. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 908 n. 6 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (exigency exception); LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 958 n. 16 (emergency exception).

Curtilage

Before analyzing the exceptions to the warrant requirement, it must be determined whether Sims's yard is curtilage and therefore entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections as her home.

It is well-established that [t]he presumptive protection accorded people at home extends to outdoor areas traditionally known as ‘curtilage’—areas that, like the inside of a house, harbor the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a person's home and the privacies of life.” United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 738 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). “Because the curtilage is part of the home, searches and seizures in the curtilage without a warrant are also presumptively unreasonable.” Perea–Rey, 680 F.3d at 1184 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). The district court recognized that Sims's front yard was curtilage, but erred in finding that its status as curtilage entitled Sims to a “lesser expectation of privacy ... as opposed to the home itself.”

Sims's small, enclosed, residential yard is quintessential curtilage. [A] small, enclosed yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood [ ] is unquestionably such a ‘clearly marked’ area ‘to which the activity of home life extends,’ and so is ‘curtilage’ subject to the Fourth Amendment protection.” Struckman, 603 F.3d at 739 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. 1735). Because Sims's front yard obviously meets the definition of curtilage, the district court did not need to analyze it under the factors announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. at 294, 107 S.Ct. 1134. These factors serve as “useful analytical tools” to ensure that ...

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