Sims v. Warren
| Decision Date | 22 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-7321 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | TOMANGO SIMS, Petitioner, v. CHARLES WARREN, et al., Respondents. |
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Tomango Sims ("Petitioner" or "defendant") filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a judgment of conviction filed in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, on March 10, 2006. The State has filed an Answer with the state court record, and Sims has filed a Reply. After carefully reviewing the arguments of the parties and the state court record, this Court will deny the Petition with prejudice and deny a certificate of appealability.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
In a five-count indictment, Petitioner Tomango Sims was charged with felony murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count one); aggravated manslaughter, in violation ofN.J.S.A. 2C:11-4 (count two); aggravated arson, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a) (count three); arson, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b) (count four); and aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(8) (count five). The charges stemmed from the destruction, by fire, of the Walter J. Conley Elks Lodge, located in Freehold Borough, during the early morning hours of July 20, 2003. The body of the lodge's caretaker, Elijah Jenkins, Jr., who was the grandfather of two of defendant's children, was found in the kitchen area of the second floor.
The day after the fire, Patrolman Otlowski was contacted by an individual who claimed to have knowledge regarding the Elks Lodge fire. That person, who wished to remain anonymous, stated that Petitioner had started the fire. When the Police spoke with Sims, he waived his Miranda rights, and he admitted to setting the fire. He said he was sorry and that he did not know anyone was in the building. Sims told the police he just wanted to set a small fire because he "had some issues with the Elks Lodge." Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress his statement to police. The trial court held a Miranda hearing centered on the voluntariness of Sims' statement to police and denied the motion and hearing testimony from three officers involved in Sims' questioning.
Petitioner proceeded to trial represented by counsel, after his counsel had unsuccessfully moved to withdraw. Sims testified at trial. He was acquitted of aggravated manslaughter and aggravated arson, but he was found guilty of the lesser-included offenses of reckless manslaughter and arson. The jury also found defendant guilty of the remaining charges, including felony murder for causing the death of Elijah Jenkins, Jr. After merging the counts in accordance with state law, the trial court sentenced defendant to a thirty-year prison term for felony murder with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1).Defendant received a concurrent five-year term on count five for knowingly or purposely starting a fire which resulted in bodily injury to a fireman.
In an unreported opinion, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. State v. Simms, No. A-5104-05, 2009 WL 587014 (App. Div. Mar. 10, 2009).2 The New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Sims, 199 N.J. 515 (2009). In June 2009, defendant timely filed a pro se PCR petition. On April 19, 2010, through assigned counsel, defendant filed an amended PCR petition. Following oral argument on June 11, 2010, the same trial judge who presided over petitioner's trial denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing and memorialized the denial in an order on the same date. (See ECF No. 7-14.) On December 15, 2011, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner's PCR in an unpublished opinion. State v. Simms, 2011 WL 6219532 (App. Div. Dec. 15, 2011). On July 12, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. 211 N.J. 607 (2012).
Petitioner's habeas Petition ("Petition") was docketed on November 21, 2015 and raises five grounds for relief that mirror grounds raised in his direct appeal and his PCR. (ECF No. 1.) The Petition is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
III. DISCUSSION
Section 2254(a) permits a court to entertain only claims alleging that a person is in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner has the burden of establishing each claim in the petition. See Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 ("AEDPA"), federal courts in habeas corpus cases must give considerable deference to determinations of the state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010).
Section 2254(d) sets the standard for granting or denying a writ of habeas corpus. The statute reads as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Where a state court adjudicated petitioner's federal claim on the merits,3 a federal court "has no authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the [state c]ourt's decision 'was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,' or 'was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.'" Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). The petitioner carries the burden of proof, and review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was beforethe state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (2011).
A court begins the analysis under § 2254(d)(1) by determining the relevant law clearly established by the Supreme Court. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004). "[C]learly established law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of t decisions," as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). A decision is "contrary to" a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) if the state court "contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or if it "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Under the "'unreasonable application' clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id., 529 U.S. at 413. With regard to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court must confine its examination to evidence in the record. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-81 (2011).
Where a petitioner seeks habeas relief, pursuant to § 2254(d)(2), on the basis of an erroneous factual determination of the state court, two provisions of the AEDPA necessarily apply. First, the AEDPA provides that "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and] [t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005). Second, the AEDPA precludes habeas relief unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonabledetermination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Petitioner first asserts that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on causation because (1) the trial judge gave the complete charge for causation when charging the jury on felony murder but did not give the full charge for causation when charging the jury on aggravated manslaughter, reckless manslaughter, or arson, and because (2) the instruction for felony murder causation instruction was not tailored to the facts. (ECF No. 1, Pet. at 12.) Petitioner presented this claim on direct appeal, and contended that that the failure to give the causation instructions violated both State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2 (1990) and State v. Green, 318 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div. 1999). (ECF No. 7-15, Pet. App. Br. at 8-15.) Petitioner's heading in his appellate brief on direct appeal states that that the jury instructions also violated Defendants right to Due Process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, but the brief does not identify any precedent or arguments supporting the alleged constitutional violation. The New Jersey Appellate Division, reviewing the instructions for plain error, noted that Sims conceded that the trial court gave the model charge for felony murder:
Defendant also argues that his convictions should be reversed because of erroneous jury instructions. Although defendant concedes the trial court "gave the model jury charge for felony murder which...
To continue reading
Request your trial