Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. State Commission of Revenue and Taxation
Citation | 181 Kan. 310,311 P.2d 342 |
Decision Date | 11 May 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 40490,No. 5,5,40490 |
Parties | SINCLAIR PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee, v. STATE COMMISSION OF REVENUE AND TAXATION; Roy N. McCue, Ira C. Watson, and John L. MacNair, as Members of and Composing Said Commission; Board of County Commissioners of the County of Montgomery; City of Independence, Kansas; Board of Education of the City of Independence of the State of Kansas, Also Known as School Districtof Montgomery County, kansas; A. M. Eckelberry, County Treasurer of Montgomery County, Kansas; and The State of Kansas, Appellants. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Under the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-2005 when taxes are assessed, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 79, Article 7, G.S.1949, and subsequently placed upon the tax rolls of a county to be collected by that governmental agency as other county taxes, a taxpayer has the right to pay such taxes under protest and thereafter maintain an action for their recovery in the district court of the county in which they are paid against the person charged with the duty and obligation of holding the money so paid in a separate fund until the validity of the tax protest is determined.
2. The record in an action of the character described in the first paragraph of this syllabus is examined and, based on what is said in the opinion, it is held: (1) Such action cannot be regarded as a suit against the State; (2) the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, as well as the taxing units to be affected by its determination, are proper parties to the action; (3) the trial court properly overruled the motions to quash service of summons and the demurrers of all defendants, except the State of Kansas; and (4) the motion to quash service of summons on such defendant should have been sustained.
Michael A. Barbara, Topeka, and Tom Crossan, County Atty., Independence, argued the cause, and John Anderson, Jr., Atty. Gen., Paul Wilson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul Hurd, Dean Burkhead, Joseph H. French, Topeka, were with them on the briefs for appellants.
William Gough, Jr., Independence, argued the cause, and Harold Medill, Independence, was with him on the briefs for appellee.
The names of the parties in the court below appear in the title and will not be repeated. All parties defendant, except the City of Independence and the Board of Education of such city who answered, appeal from orders overruling motions to quash service of summons and demurrers.
Identical statements of the facts relied on by appellants to sustain their respective positions are set forth in the combined abstract and their four separate briefs. They read:
'This action was brought by the appellee to recover taxes paid under protest. The appellee is assessed on its property in this state by the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation sitting as the State Board of Appraisers, pursuant to the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-701, et seq. The appellee timely filed its ad valorem rendition for the year 1955 with the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation and subsequently appeared for a hearing before the State Board of Appraisers requesting that certain changes be made in the assessment of moneys and credits of the appellee. On June 15, 1955, the State Board of Appraisers denied the changes asked for by the appellee.
'When appellee's taxes became due and payable on November 1, 1955, a portion thereof was paid under protest to the County Treasurer of Montgomery County. The sufficiency of the protest is not questioned. Pursuant to the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-2005, the appellee requested a hearing on said protest of taxes before the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation.
Said hearing was had and the appellee was denied relief. Within thirty days after receipt of the order of the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation denying relief, the appellee brought this action in the District Court of Montgomery County, Kansas.
A similar situation prevails with respect to appellate questions involved which are stated thus:
'(1) Did the District Court err in finding that it had jurisdiction of the appellants and of the subject matter under G.S.1949, 60-503?
'(2) Did the District Court err in overruling the motion of appellants to quash service of summons?
'(3) Did the District Court err in overruling the demurrer of this appellant?'
With respect to questions raised by appellants it should be stated, at the outset, that our examination of the record discloses nothing to warrant the assumption, inherent in question 1, that the trial court, in making the rulings complained of, found that it had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the appellants under G.S.1949, 60-503. For that reason, since it appears such question is based on an entirely erroneous concept as to the basis on which the involved orders were made, such question falls of its own weight and requires no further discussion. However, the remaining two questions do raise the jurisdictional question which, as appellants clearly point out in the third paragraph of their heretofore quoted factual statement, depends wholly on venue and is the sole issue involved.
In approaching the problem thus presented it is neither necessary nor required that we here labor the procedural steps under which, by virtue of the provisions of chapter 79, article 7, G.S.1949, the taxes in question were assessed against the appellee and thereafter placed upon the tax rolls of Montgomery County to be collected as other taxes.
For purposes here pertinent it suffices to say all parties concede that having been so assessed and placed upon the tax rolls of such County the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-2005, relating to payment of taxes to the County Treasurer under protest and proceedings for the recovery of taxes so paid became applicable; and that having paid such taxes under protest the appellee, under and by virtue of the terms and provisions of such statue, is now entitled to maintain an action for their recovery in some court of competent jurisdiction, based on that protest.
From what has been stated up to this point it becomes apparent the provisions of G.S.1949, 79-2005 are highly important. Therefore portions thereof, some underlined for purposes of emphasis, having particular application under the existing facts and circumstances will be quoted: They read:
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