Sinclair Refining Co. v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 23 December 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 9876.,9876. |
| Citation | 178 F.2d 214 |
| Parties | SINCLAIR REFINING CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Benjamin S. Adamowski, Corp. Counsel, L. Louis Karton, Sydney R. Drebin, Assts. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, Ill. (L. Louis Karton, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellant.
Sturtevant Hinman, Donald K. McIntosh, Chicago, Ill., Edward H. S. Martin, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before MAJOR, Chief Judge, and KERNER and DUFFY, Circuit Judges.
The sole question in this appeal is whether a certain amendatory zoning ordinance of the city of Chicago, as applied to plaintiff's property, is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to render it void.
Plaintiff, a Maine corporation, is the owner of lots 1 and 2 in block 24 in Ravenswood, a subdivision in the city of Chicago. Lot 1 is located at the southeast corner of Montrose and Hermitage Avenues. It is improved and operated as a gasoline filling station. Lot 2, immediately south of lot 1, is improved with a frame residence. In 1923 the city of Chicago enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Plaintiff purchased lot 1 in 1940 and lot 2 in January, 1946. At the time of the purchase of the respective lots, lot 1 was zoned for commercial purposes, and lot 2 for apartment house use. In March, 1946, lot 2 was rezoned for business use, and thereafter, on July 16, 1947, the City Council passed an ordinance zoning the south 42½ feet of lot 2 for apartment use. Under the terms of that ordinance the buildings that may be erected upon the south 42½ feet of lot 2 and the uses to which they may be devoted are restricted to residential and apartment uses, while the north 7½ feet are zoned for commercial purposes.
The gist of plaintiff's complaint is that lot 1, even with the addition of the north 7½ feet of lot 2, is too small in area for operation to the best advantage of a gasoline filling and greasing station; that in purchasing lot 2 plaintiff anticipated it would be zoned for business; and that the City Council, in the passage of the ordinance of July 16, 1947, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and not in the interests of the general public or the public health, safety and convenience, morals or welfare of the inhabitants of the city of Chicago.
The cause was tried by the court without a jury. On the hearing, the court heard the testimony of witnesses as to the character of the property in the vicinity of the lots. On behalf of plaintiff there was evidence that although lot 1 had been used as a filling station since 1928, in its present condition it is not suitable for the conducting of the station to the best advantage, and that plaintiff intends to improve the station by the erection of a modern station on both lots which would increase the assessed value of the lots about 200%.
On behalf of defendant there was testimony to the effect that the neighborhood south of Montrose on Hermitage Avenue was solidly apartments and residences, and that if lot 2 were improved as contemplated by plaintiff, it would diminish the value of the property south of lot 2. C. R. Steelberg testified that a Bible Institute and Seminary was located immediately south of lot 2, and that when the Bible Institute purchased its property in September, 1944, lot 2 and the other lots south of lot 2 had been zoned for residential or apartment house use. He also testified that plaintiff's station now has no driveway on Hermitage Avenue, and that if plaintiff erected the contemplated station with a driveway or driveways on Hermitage Avenue, the traffic would be closer to the Seminary and the students residing therein, and the possibility of injuring them would be increased.
Based upon the record thus made, the court held that the ordinance was null and void on the ground that the City Council, in passing the ordinance on July 16, 1947, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and not in the interests of the general public or the public health, safety, or welfare of the inhabitants of the city of Chicago.
Plaintiff asserts that the ordinance was passed solely for the purpose of excluding plaintiff from the enjoyment of its property for which it was naturally and properly adapted, and makes the point that the amendatory ordinance as applied to its property, offends the Federal and State constitutional guarantees of due process. On the other hand, defendant claims that the ordinance is reasonable, and not in contravention of any constitutional provision.
The principles applicable to cases of this nature have been considered by many courts. From these cases1 we learn that the owner of property possesses the right to use his property as he desires. This right, however, is not unqualified, but must yield to the higher and greater right of the interests of the people, and constitutional guarantees of private rights are subject to the qualifications that they may be cut down by government agencies acting under a proper exercise of the police power. The police power of the State is that power required to be exercised in order to effectually discharge within the scope of the constitutional limitations its paramount...
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