Sinclair v. Albertson's, Inc.

Citation975 S.W.2d 662
Decision Date11 August 1998
Docket NumberNo. 06-97-00105-CV,06-97-00105-CV
PartiesCharles SINCLAIR, Appellant, v. ALBERTSON'S, INC., Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Timothy G. Moore, Merriman, Patterson, Allison, Longview, for appellant.

J. Keith Mayo, Ken W. Good, Cowles & Thompson, Tyler, for appellee.

Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and GRANT and ROSS, JJ.

OPINION

GRANT, Justice.

Charles Sinclair appeals the county court's order dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction after determining that Sinclair failed to provide the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission (TWCC) with timely notice of his work-related injury and failed to show good cause for that untimely notice in compliance with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act.

Although the parties frame the sole issue in terms of whether the Mailbox Rule applies to the filings with the TWCC, we believe the sole issue is whether the failure to file a copy of the petition with the TWCC within forty days takes jurisdiction away from the district court when the actual notice or petition was timely filed with the district court.

Sinclair filed a claim alleging a work-related injury, which Albertson's contested. A hearing officer reviewed his case and ruled that Sinclair did not give timely notice of his injury and found that he did not show good cause for not giving timely notice. Sinclair appealed the decision to a Commission appeals panel, and it was affirmed on June 27, 1995. Sinclair then sought judicial review in the county court at law. Under Texas Labor Code Section 410.252(a), Sinclair had forty days from the date of the appeals panel decision to file suit in the county court. 1 Under Section 410.253, he also had that same forty days to file a copy of that petition with the TWCC. 2 On August 7, 1995, forty-one days after the date of the panel's decision, Sinclair filed his Original Petition with the court and mailed a copy of it to the TWCC. The statute provides that when the fortieth day falls on a Sunday, which is what happened in this case, the time tolls to Monday. The TWCC received the petition on Tuesday, August 9. Absent the required notice, the panel's ruling is final, and a district court has no jurisdiction to set aside the panel's decision. 3 After examining the pleadings, within which Albertson's asserted that Sinclair's copy of the petition was not timely filed with the TWCC, the trial court granted Albertson's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction because Sinclair had not met all jurisdictional requirements.

The trial court based its holding on the wording of the TWCC's filing rule. Specifically, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 102.7 (formerly 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 41.75, which contained substantially similar language, excluding the added wording, "Unless otherwise specified in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act or these rules") provides:

Unless otherwise specified in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act or these rules, forms, reports, and other documents required to be filed by a specified time will be considered timely only if received by the commission ... prior to or during business hours on the last permissible day of filing. When the last day of filing is a Saturday, Sunday, a legal holiday on which the commission is not required to conduct business, or any other day on which the commission or the appropriate office of the commission is not open for business, then the time is extended as described in § 102.3 of this title. 4

Two courts of appeals have held that this requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. 5

Sinclair contends that the trial court's ruling, which effectually found that the Mailbox Rule does not apply to the TWCC's filing rule because the rule requires the documents to be "received," not "mailed," is erroneous.

To support his assertion that the Mailbox Rule applies to filings with the TWCC, Sinclair relies primarily on the Texas Supreme Court case of Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 6 which was decided under the former workers' compensation statute. In that case, Ward, the injured worker, mailed her notice of intent to appeal with the Industrial Accident Board six days before the expiration of the statutory period. Because of the post office's error, that notice was returned to her. Ward mailed the notice again, but it was not received until two days after the expiration of the statutory period. To prevent an injustice, the Ward court modified the prior strict construction of Article 8307, section 5 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, which required that any party appealing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board must file notice with the Board within twenty days of that decision. 7 The Ward court then stated that this notice requirement of Article 8307, section 5 had previously been strictly construed to mean that in such a situation, the complainant had not complied with the notice provision, the rationale being that the post office was the sender's agent and, therefore, its negligence was attributable to the sender. 8

The Ward court rejected this strict construction because, in Ward's case, "a harsh and inequitable result" would occur. Under a strict construction of Article 8307, section 5, the post office's mistake, which was beyond her control, would deny Ward her day in court. 9 To reach an equitable result, the court determined that she had used a universally recognizable method of giving notice when she originally deposited it in the mail at a time when it should have reached the Board within the twenty-day statutory period. 10 Further, the court concluded:

[I]f the notice of intention to appeal from a ruling of the Industrial Accident Board is sent to the Board by first-class United States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped, and the notice is deposited in the mail one day or more before the expiration of the twenty-day statutory period and received by the Board not more than ten days after the expiration of the statutory period, then the notice shall be deemed timely filed. In the interest of uniformity, this construction of Section 5 of Article 8307 coincides with the notice provisions of Rule 5 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 11

When Ward was decided, TEX.R. CIV. P. 5 provided:

[I]f a motion for new trial, motion for rehearing, any matter relating to taking an appeal or writ of error from the trial court to any higher court, or application for writ of error is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in the mail one day or more before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time.... 12

One appellate court has determined that the rationale for the Ward decision was (1) to provide a liberal construction of the Workers' Compensation Act to effectuate the remedies that it grants and (2) to provide a uniform construction of Article 8307, section 5, which coincides with the notice provisions of Rule 5. 13

Sinclair asserts that despite the TWCC's clear rule requiring receipt by the due date, the Ward court held that receipt by the due date was not necessary so long as the complainant complied with Rule 5. Thus, the Texas Supreme Court intended the TWCC's filing requirements are to be read in conformity with Rule 5, not as an additional, more stringent requirement, as the trial court in the present case has ruled. Currently, TEX.R. CIV. P. 5 states

If any document is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited in the mail on or before the last day for filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time.

(emphasis added).

Sinclair asserts that once the provisions of Rule 5 are met, the post office becomes an agent of the TWCC's office for purposes of filing. Thus, because he mailed a copy of his petition on the last permissible filing date as prescribed by Rule. 5, his notice to the TWCC was timely filed.

However, unlike Ward, Sinclair mailed his notice on the last possible day to file. No third party, including the post office, can be blamed for the timeliness or untimeliness of his notice of appeal. 14

Although most courts that have applied Ward have either involved postal delivery problems or the timeliness of notice to the court clerk, not timeliness of notice to the TWCC or Industrial Accident Board, 15 the case of Tamez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n 16 clearly supports Sinclair's assertion. In Tamez, there was no problem with mail delivery. Tamez appealed an order dismissing his claim because his notice of appeal was not timely filed with the Industrial Accident Board. The appellate court did not agree with Tamez's assertion that the dismissal was error because he mailed his notice to the Board on the twentieth day after the Board's award, and it was received by the Board on the twenty-first day. The court interpreted Ward and found that Article 8307, section 5 was meant to coincide with Rule 5 and, because Tamez did not comply with former Rule 5, he did not fall within the ambit of Ward. Had Tamez mailed his notice to the Board at least one day before the last day of the requisite time period, which was consistent with Rule 5 at that time, and met the requirement that his notice be received within ten days after the twentieth day, which it was, then Ward would have applied.

Albertson's asserts that even if Ward were applicable in Sinclair's situation, the 1991 amendments that enacted 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 102.7 became effective after Ward and Tamez were decided. Unlike the Section's predecessor, Section 41.75, 17 Section 102.7 states that "[u]nless otherwise specified in the Act or these rules," documents sent to the TWCC...

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