Sinclair v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 03 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 22-CV-14215-RAR |
| Parties | CHECKINGSON SINCLAIR, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
DC # N60310
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging Petitioner's convictions and sentences imposed by the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for St. Lucie County, Florida, in Case No 2014-CF-003328A. See Petition [ECF No. 1] (“Pet.”). Respondent filed a Response to the Petition, see Response to Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 8] (“Resp.”), and Petitioner filed a Reply to that Response, see Reply [ECF No. 14]. Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Grounds Four, Five, and Six of the Petition and DISMISSES the remaining grounds as procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner was indicted by a St. Lucie County grand jury on three counts: killing an unborn child by injury to the mother, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 782.09(1)(a) (Count 1); first-degree murder with a firearm, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a) (Count 2); and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 918.13(1) (Count 3). See Indictment [ECF No. 10-1] at 4-5. The charges in this case stemmed from an altercation between Petitioner and his pregnant wife (the victim) after Petitioner allegedly discovered that his wife had committed acts of infidelity. See Petition to Determine Immunity [ECF No. 10-1] at 153. Petitioner admitted that he had shot and killed the victim, but argued that the Indictment against him should be dismissed under Florida's “Stand Your Ground” statute since he shot the victim in self-defense after she “grabbed a knife and began to chase [Petitioner] around the apartment.” Id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2) (). After holding a multi-day hearing on the “Stand Your Ground” issue, the trial court found that “the State demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence . . . that it was not necessary for the Defendant to use deadly force to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself” and denied the motion to dismiss. Order Denying Petition to Determine Immunity [ECF No. 10-1] at 217.
On December 7, 2018, a jury found Petitioner guilty of all three counts as charged in the Indictment. See Verdict [ECF No. 10-2] at 65-66. The trial court adjudicated Petitioner guilty in accordance with the jury's verdict and sentenced him to two consecutive life sentences on Counts 1 and 2, as well as time-served on Count 3. See Judgment and Sentencing Orders [ECF No. 10-2] at 77-85.
Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal (“Fourth DCA”), where he advanced three arguments: (1) the trial court erred in “admitting police statements made during [Petitioner's] interrogation” which indicated that law enforcement believed that Petitioner was guilty, Direct Appeal Initial Brief [ECF No. 10-2] at 115; (2) the trial court erred in “overruling [Petitioner's] objections to the prosecutor's misleading closing argument describing the [heat of passion defense,]” id. at 130; and (3) the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's “Stand Your Ground” motion since the “evidence in the present case was circumstantial and was likewise insufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of self defense[,]” id. at 142. On June 18, 2020, the Fourth DCA summarily affirmed the trial court in a per curiam, unwritten opinion. See Sinclair v. State, 301 So.3d 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).
On September 1, 2020,[1] Petitioner filed a “Motion for Postconviction Relief” pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. See Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 10-2] at 195-213. He then filed an “Amended Motion for Post-Conviction Relief,” see Amended Postconviction Motion (“Am. Postconviction Mot.”) [ECF No. 10-2] at 219-39, after the state postconviction court dismissed the original Postconviction Motion without prejudice since Petitioner failed to “elaborate as to how the outcome of the trial would have been different absent counsel's alleged ineffectiveness,” Order Dismissing Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 10-2] at 216.
The Amended Postconviction Motion raised five ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) “counsel was ineffective in failing to strike a weeping jury member who was obviously overwhelmed by the facts of the case and did not have the ability to be fair and impartial,” Am. Postconviction Mot. at 223; (2) counsel was ineffective when he failed to properly explain to Petitioner the ramifications of stipulating to the fact that the victim “was the mother of the unborn child[,]” id. at 224; (3) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to force the State to “amend its indictment and restructure its charging order of counts 1 and 2,” id. at 226; (4) counsel was ineffective “in failing to object to the prosecutor['s] improper closing arguments in the stipulation concerning count one[,]” id. at 228 (errors in original); and (5) “counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial,” id. at 231. The Amended Postconviction Motion also contained a sixth ground for relief, which alleged that Petitioner's right to equal protection was violated during jury selection since “all potential African-American jurors were stricken for cause and/or denied the right to participate as jurors after the prosecution had provided shallow race neutral reasons that were vague[.]” Id. at 236.
The state court denied Petitioner's Amended Postconviction Motion in a written order on January 4, 2021. See Order Denying Amended Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 10-2] at 265-68. The state postconviction court partially “adopted the State's reasoning” and partially provided its own reasoning in denying all six claims. See Id. at 266-67. Petitioner appealed the denial of the Amended Postconviction Motion to the Fourth DCA, but, on August 12, 2021, the Fourth DCA affirmed the state postconviction court in an unwritten opinion. See Sinclair v. State, 323 So.3d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). After denying Petitioner's motion for rehearing, see Order Denying Motion for Rehearing [ECF No. 10-2] at 296, the Fourth DCA's mandate issued on October 22, 2021, see Postconviction Mandate [ECF No. 10-2] at 298. The instant Petition was filed on June 3, 2022. See Pet. at 14. Based on this timeline of events, Respondent concedes that “[t]he instant Petition is timely per the time limit provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).” Resp. at 3.
“As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)], 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Some of the more restrictive limits are found in § 2254(d). Under that provision, a federal court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court's decision on the merits was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Consequently, § 2254(d) constructs a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings” because, after all, this standard “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).
“A state court's decision is ‘contrary to' federal law if the ” Consalvo v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000)) (brackets omitted). A state court's decision qualifies as “an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413) (cleaned up). “‘If this standard [seems] difficult to meet'-and it is-‘that is because it was meant to be.'” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).
By its own plain terms, § 2254(d)'s deferential standard applies only when a claim “was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (); Cone v Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) (). The summary denial of a claim with no articulated reasons presumptively serves as an adjudication on the merits subjecting the claim to § 2254(d)'s additional restrictions. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100 (“This Court now holds and reconfirms that §...
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