Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1906,No. 90-1905,90-1906,Nos. 90-1905,90-1905,s. 90-1905 |
| Citation | 1991 A.M.C. 2341,935 F.2d 599 |
| Parties | , 59 USLW 2769, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,839 Terry Lee SINCLAIR v. SONIFORM, INC.; Harsco Corporation; Sherwood Company Division; Hill-Loma, Inc., d/b/a Hill Acme Company; Ray Murray, Inc.; William G. Fryling, individually and d/b/a Blue Water Divers; David S. Madden, Jr.; Glen Hicks, Soniform, Inc., Harsco Corporation, Sherwood Company Division, and Ray Murray, Inc., AppellantsTerry Lee SINCLAIR v. SONIFORM, INC.; Harsco Corporation; Sherwood Company Division; Hill-Loma, Inc., d/b/a Hill Acme Company; Ray Murray, Inc.; William G. Fryling, individually and d/b/a Blue Water Divers; David S. Madden, Jr.; Glen Hicks, Glen Hicks, Appellant |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Edward B. Joseph (argued), Goldfein & Joseph, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants in No. 90-1905, Soniform, Inc., Harsco Corp., Sherwood Corp. Div. and Ray Murray, Inc.
Lawrence D. Wright (argued), Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant in No. 90-1906, Glen Hicks.
Richard L. Kremnick (argued), Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee Terry Lee Sinclair.
William G. Fryling, pro se.
David S. Madden, Jr., pro se.
Before SLOVITER, Chief Judge, COWEN and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
The issue before us is whether an action arising from injuries sustained during a scuba diving excursion in navigable waters falls within federal admiralty jurisdiction. Plaintiff Terry Lee Sinclair alleges that he contracted and continues to suffer from the effects of decompression sickness due to a defect in the buoyancy compensator vest he wore while diving, as well as the failure by the crew of the vessel that transported him to the dive site to detect his symptoms and administer proper care. Alleging subject matter jurisdiction in admiralty pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(1) (1988), Sinclair filed this action in district court against the ship's crew and the manufacturers of the vest. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We hold that Sinclair's claims against the crew fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction since the crew was engaged in a quintessential maritime activity affecting commerce--the transport and care of paying passengers. Because the claims against the manufacturers of the vest arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact as do his claims against the crew, they fall within the district court's supplemental jurisdiction.
On August 16, 1987, Sinclair and three other passengers chartered the Destitute to transport them to a dive site approximately nine miles off the coast of New Jersey. The crew consisted of its owner and captain, David S. Madden, Jr., and a dive master employed by Madden to supervise the dive, Glen Hicks.
After being transported to the dive site, Sinclair and a partner dove to a depth of approximately 75 feet, where they remained for about twenty-seven minutes. As he began to ascend, Sinclair initially used the "finger dump valve" on his buoyancy compensator vest to control the rate of his ascent. Noticing that he was rising faster than his partner, Sinclair pulled the "shoulder dump/rapid exhaust valve" to expel the air from his vest to slow his ascent. The rapid exhaust valve failed, and Sinclair continued to rise at an increasing rate.
Upon reaching the water surface, Sinclair needed assistance to reboard the Destitute. Once aboard, he began to exhibit the symptoms of decompression sickness. Commonly referred to as "the bends," decompression sickness is a disorder caused by the release of nitrogen bubbles in the tissues and blood after returning from high pressure to atmospheric pressure too rapidly. His symptoms included nausea, vomiting, dizziness, and shortness of breath. The crew administered no medical care to Sinclair, continued the dive, and did not transport Sinclair back to shore until two and one-half hours after he surfaced.
Sinclair alleges that he developed and continues to suffer from painful, disfiguring, and disabling injuries attributable to decompression sickness as a result of the defect in his buoyancy compensator vest valve and the failure of the crew to detect his symptoms and administer the appropriate care. He filed actions against the crew of the Destitute and the manufacturers/distributors of the vest 1 in federal district court and the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.
The federal action was filed pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(1). The district court initially stayed the federal action pending resolution of the state actions, in accordance with a stipulation of the parties. Upon motion by one of the defendants, the district court lifted the stay. Sinclair thereafter moved for dismissal on three grounds: (1) lack of admiralty jurisdiction, (2) voluntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a), and (3) his right to pursue a concurrent state remedy under the "saving to suitors" provision of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333. 2 The district court granted Sinclair's motion to dismiss on the grounds that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction over the action, finding that an isolated recreational scuba diving excursion was unrelated to traditional maritime activity. The district court did not reach Sinclair's two other grounds for dismissal. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988). Our review of the district court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. York Bank and Trust Co. v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp., 851 F.2d 637, 638 (3d Cir.1988).
The statutory basis for federal admiralty jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1333, which provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
The task of determining exactly what "admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" means has been left to the courts.
Until the 1970's courts looked only to the locality of the wrong to determine the existence of admiralty jurisdiction. A wrong was actionable in admiralty if it occurred on navigable waters. See generally, Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253-54, 93 S.Ct. 493, 497, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (). Over the past two decades, however, the inquiry has become more sophisticated as the Supreme Court has refined the test for determining admiralty jurisdiction. Under current doctrine, the incident must have a potential impact on maritime commerce and bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity, in addition to occurring on navigable waters.
These two additional requirements were established primarily through a trilogy of cases, beginning with Executive Jet. There the Court held that federal admiralty jurisdiction did not lie in an action arising from an airplane crash into navigable waters when the plane flew predominantly over land, because the incident did not "bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." 409 U.S. at 268, 93 S.Ct. at 504. In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982), the Supreme Court extended Executive Jet beyond the aviation context, but held that a maritime activity need not bear a substantial relationship to a commercial activity so long as it had a potential impact on maritime commerce. Id. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2658. The Court held that the collision of two pleasure boats on navigable waters was cognizable in admiralty because it implicated the traditional maritime concern of navigation and could possibly disrupt maritime commerce.
The most recent case in this trilogy, Sisson v. Ruby, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), held that federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to an action arising from a fire that began in the washer/dryer unit of a private yacht moored in a marina. The Court emphasized that a potential impact on maritime commerce remained a distinct requirement for admiralty jurisdiction because the "purpose underlying the existence of federal maritime jurisdiction is the federal interest in protection of maritime commerce," but held that the potential impact on commerce must be judged in terms of the general characteristics of the activity, not the particular facts of the incident or the actual effect it had. Id. 110 S.Ct. at 2896. The Court also held that activities other than navigation, such as the storage and maintenance of vessels at a marina on navigable waters, bear substantial relationships to traditional maritime activity. Id. at 2897-98.
In Sisson, the Supreme Court declined to provide more explicit guidance for determining whether an activity is substantially related to traditional maritime pursuits. Id. at 2897-98 n. 4. We will therefore rely on the four criteria we have previously adopted to guide this inquiry: (1) the functions and roles of the parties, (2) the types of vehicles and instrumentalities involved, (3) the causation and type of injury, and (4) traditional concepts of the role of admiralty law. Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping Inc. Cie. Chambon Maclovia S.A., 562 F.2d 215, 221 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034, 98 S.Ct. 767, 54 L.Ed.2d 781 (1978) () (citing Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969, 94 S.Ct. 1991, 40 L.Ed.2d 558 (1974)).
Having examined the general principles governing federal admiralty jurisdiction, we now turn to the issue before us--whether Sinclair's action against the crew of the Destitute and the manufacturers of...
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