Sindall v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore
| Decision Date | 12 June 1901 |
| Citation | 49 A. 645,93 Md. 526 |
| Parties | SINDALL v. MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE et al. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from circuit court of Baltimore city; Henry Stockbridge Judge.
Injunction to restrain a tax by James W. Sindall against the mayor and city council of Baltimore and another. From a decree dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed in part, and affirmed in part.
Argued before McSHERRY, C.J., and BRISCOE, FOWLER, BOYD, PAGE PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, and JONES, JJ.
John P Poe and R.E. Lee Hall, for appellant.
Wm. Pinkney Whyte and Olin Bryan, for appellees.
McSHERRY C.J.
There are two questions presented by this record, and the solution of both of them depends on the construction which may be placed on section 19, c. 98, of the act of assembly of 1888, known as the "Annexation Act," or the act under which portions of the territory of Baltimore county were withdrawn from the outlines of the county, and added to the municipal limits of Baltimore city. As the whole section of the statute will have to be examined and considered in disposing of the questions involved, it will now be quoted in full. It reads as follows: The appellant is the owner of a parcel of land brought within the city limits by the act just referred to. The area within which this parcel of land is located is bounded on the north by New Boundary avenue, a dedicated, but unaccepted, ungraded, unpaved, and uncurbed street, laid out by one Clemens in 1889, on the south by a 6-foot private alley; on the east by the Old York road, which was a county highway long before the adoption of the annexation act; and on the west by the York turnpike road, which is owned and controlled by a corporation that charges and collects toll for the use of the road. Through the middle of this land owned by the appellant he opened in 1897 a street 40 feet wide, extending from the York road to the York turnpike, and called it "Franklin Terrace." This street has not been accepted by the city, nor was it constructed in conformity to section 840 of the city charter (Laws 1898, p. 560). On the north side of this 40-foot street he laid out 11 building lots, and on the south side 7 lots, upon all of which he erected houses. Four of the 18 houses and lots have been sold, but the remaining 14 are still owned by the appellant. Now, the two questions at issue in the cause are: First, is the appellant, as owner of these 14 houses and lots, liable to pay the current city tax rate on the assessed value of them, or is he still responsible only for the county rate of the year 1887, under the provisions of section 19 of the annexation act? Secondly, if he is liable for the full current city rate, does that liability apply to the taxes for the year 1900, or does it first begin in 1901?
The proviso at the end of the section gives rise to the first question. This proviso is a restriction on the power of the municipality to levy more than a designated rate of taxes on property annexed to the city limits until a prescribed condition shall be complied with. Like every other exemption from taxation, it must be strictly construed. The taxing power is never presumed to be surrendered, and therefore every assertion that it has been relinquished must, to be efficacious, be distinctly supported by clear and unambiguous legislative enactment. To doubt is to deny an exemption. It is contended that the condition prescribed in the proviso to section 19 requires the Baltimore county rate of taxation which had been fixed just before the annexation act took effect, to be adhered to for city purposes up to 1901, so far as the annexed property is concerned, and to be adhered to "until avenues, streets or alleys shall have been opened and constructed" through this then suburban locality, and, further, "until there shall be upon every block of ground so to be formed [that is to say, to be formed by avenues, streets or alleys to be opened and constructed] at least six dwellings or store houses ready for occupation." Is this the true meaning, not of the proviso taken by itself, but of the entire section which has been quoted? If we were dealing simply with the proviso, not as a mere proviso, but as an independent enactment standing alone, instead of considering it in its relation to the antecedent portion of the section to which it is attached, there would be great, and possibly conclusive, force in the position taken by the appellant, to the effect that the case of Valentine v. City of Hagerstown, 86 Md. 486, 38 A. 931, is decisive of the controversy. By section 194, art. 22, of the Code of Public Local Laws, concerning the city of Hagerstown, it was enacted that land within the city limits, and within the then newly-extended limits of Hagerstown, should not be assessed for purposes of municipal taxation "until a street shall be laid out and opened through the same; but when a street shall be laid out and opened through said real estate, the land abutting on said street, and improvements thereon, to a distance two hundred and forty feet back from the line of said street, shall be assessed and taxed for municipal purposes as other property in said town is now taxed." Valentine laid out into town lots a parcel of land, and caused a plat thereof to be recorded among the land records of the county. On this plat proposed streets, called "Carrollton Avenue" and "Carroll Street," were marked and defined. These streets, though thus dedicated to the public, were never accepted by the municipality, but were used as streets by the owners of the property abutting on them, and were generally considered streets of the town. Valentine was charged with municipal taxes on some of the lots abutting on these streets, but his lots were not within 240 feet of any street which had been laid out by municipal authority. He resisted payment of the tax exacted of him, and filed a bill in equity...
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