Sinegal v. City of Chad

• Decision Date: 05 November 2019
• Docket Number: EP-19-CV-107-KC
• Citation: 414 F.Supp.3d 995
• Parties: Albert SINEGAL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EL PASO, Chad Corpuz, Peter G. Fonte, H. Enciso, R. Hernandez, D. Mendoza, and R. Lincon, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

414 F.Supp.3d 995

Albert SINEGAL, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF EL PASO, Chad Corpuz, Peter G. Fonte, H. Enciso, R. Hernandez, D. Mendoza, and R. Lincon, Defendants.

EP-19-CV-107-KC

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division.

Nov. 5, 2019

Joshua Cody Spencer, Attorney at Law, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff

Anelisa Benavides, Oscar Guillermo Gabaldon, Jr., City Attorney's Office, James O. Darnell, Cris Estrada, Jim Darnell P.C., James (Jeep) O. Darnell, Jr., Jim Darnell, P.C., Eric M. Brittain, Windle Hood Norton Brittain & Jay LLP, Abbie Laine Mullin, El Paso, TX, for Defendants

ORDER

Kathleen Cardone, District Judge

On this day, the Court considered Defendant Raymond Licon, Jr.'s Motion to Dismiss,¹ ECF No. 4; Defendant Peter G. Fonte's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 27; Defendant Ricardo Hernandez's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 28; Defendant Chad Corpuz's Motion to Dismiss, ECF. No. 30; Defendant Holden Enciso's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 31; Defendant Denisse Mendoza's Motion to Dismiss, ECF. No. 32 (collectively, the "Officers' Motions"); and Defendant City of El Paso's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 22 (the "City's Motion").

For the reasons set forth below, the City's Motion and the Officers' Motions are GRANTED in part. All of Plaintiff's claims are dismissed. However, some, and possibly all, of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims may be viable if re-pleaded appropriately. As such, these claims are dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is given leave to file an Amended Complaint on or before December 2, 2019.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Albert Sinegal filed this action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA").

Compl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 1. The following facts are derived from the Complaint and are taken as true for the purposes of adjudicating the Motion to Dismiss. See Calhoun v. Hargrove , 312 F.3d 730, 733–34 (5th Cir. 2002).

Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on April 8, 2017, Plaintiff was traveling along East San Antonio Street in El Paso, Texas. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff's brother, who was behind him in another vehicle, was pulled over to the side of the street by an unnamed police officer on a bicycle. Id. Plaintiff pulled over to the opposite side of the street and exited his car. Id. At this point, it appears that at least two officers were on the scene, because Plaintiff alleges that "[o]ne officer insisted he stay back and he complied." Id. Shortly thereafter, some or all of the individual Defendants named in this lawsuit (the "Officers") had arrived, surrounded Plaintiff's brother, and taken him into custody. Id. Plaintiff "did not interfere with the police officers' duties." Id. ¶ 13.

Some or all of the Officers eventually crossed the street and approached Plaintiff, who "asked as to why the officers had taken such excessive and unnecessary actions against his brother." Id. ¶ 13. While asking these questions, Plaintiff remained on the far side of the street and did not attempt to interfere with the Officers' seizure of his brother. Id. "[N]onetheless, Defendants unlawfully used excessive and unreasonable force to seize Plaintiff's person, and several Defendants tased Plaintiff attacking him and tackling him to the ground." Id. Plaintiff was taken "immediately" to an unnamed hospital following the incident. Id. Plaintiff was eventually arrested by one or more of the Officers on unspecified charges arising from these events. See id. ¶ 17.

On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the Officers and the City of El Paso, Texas (the "City"). Between May 6 and May 15, 2019, the various Defendants filed their Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 4, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32. On June 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Response, ECF No. 35, to which Defendants each filed Replies, ECF Nos. 37–42, 47. On July 8, 2019, the case was stayed pending resolution of the Motions to Dismiss. Order, ECF No. 44.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Calhoun , 312 F.3d at 733 ; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ); Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd. , 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do."

Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Colony Ins. Co. , 647 F.3d at 252. Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations [in the complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal citation omitted). Nevertheless, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ " Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ).

2. Qualified immunity

The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability "so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Lincoln v. Turner , 874 F.3d 833, 847 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) ). When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defense does not apply. Id. A plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show "(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Id. at 847–48 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ).

A clearly established right is one that is "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 848 (quoting Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ). This inquiry "does not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." Id. (quoting al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 ). The law can be clearly established despite "notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights." Id. (quoting Flores v. City of Palacios , 381 F.3d 391, 399 (5th Cir. 2004) ).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff's causes of action include 1) a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against the Officers in their individual capacities, 2) a § 1983 claim for the use of excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against the Officers in their individual capacities,² 3) a § 1983 claim for "inadequate training and supervision" against the City of El Paso and the Officers in their official capacities, and 4) a claim against the City of El Paso—and possibly the Officers as well—under the TTCA. Each of the Officers' Motions advances similar arguments for dismissal of all four of Plaintiff's claims. The City of El Paso is not implicated in the first two claims and argues for dismissal of claims three and four. The Court addresses whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief as to each cause of action, in turn.

1. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false arrest claim

In the Officers' Motions, each individual Defendant raises two arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. First, Defendants ask the Court to assume that a state magistrate judge found that there was probable cause to support Plaintiff's arrest. Based on this assumption, they argue that the independent intermediary doctrine demands dismissal of the false arrest claim. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations against the Officers, collectively, lack the specificity required to hold any one of them liable, individually.

a. The Officers' independent intermediary argument

In order to succeed on his Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, Plaintiff must ultimately prove that the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. See Sam v. Richard , 887 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ). Moreover, "[e]ven law enforcement officers who ‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ are entitled to [qualified] immunity" from a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. Mendenhall v. Riser , 213 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant , 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ).

Police officers are also immunized from false arrest claims where an independent intermediary was presented with the facts supporting the arrest and found probable cause. Curtis v. Sowell , 761 F. App'x 302, 304 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Taylor v. Gregg , 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. ...