Singer Manuf'g Co. v. Sults

• Decision Date: 26 May 1897
• Citation: 17 Ind.App. 639,47 N.E. 341
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. SULTS.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

17 Ind.App. 639

47 N.E. 341

SINGER MANUF'G CO.

v.SULTS.

Appellate Court of Indiana.

May 26, 1897.

Appeal from circuit court, Noble county; J. W. Adair, Judge.

Action by the Singer Manufacturing Company against Bell Sults. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

L. W. Welker, for appellant. Thomas M. Eells, for appellee.

COMSTOCK, C. J.

This was an action brought by appellant against the appellee to recover possession of a sewing machine. Appellee answered the complaint by a general denial. Prior to bringing the action, to wit, on the 17th day of May, 1895, appellant, by written contract, had sold the machine in controversy, to appellee, by the terms of which contract the title to the machine was to remain in appellant until it was fully paid for, and, upon failure of appellee to pay for the same as provided in said contract, appellant was entitled to its immediate possession. The cause was submitted to the court for trial, and the court found that the machine was the property of appellee, and that she was entitled to the possession thereof. Appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was overruled and excepted to. This ruling is assigned as error. The written contract entered into between appellant and appellee for the sale and purchase of the machine was read in evidence. Appellee admitted that she had made but one payment, and that she refused to make any further payments. It was also admitted upon the trial that appellant made demand of appellee for the machine before the commencement of the action. Appellee was permitted, over the objection of the appellant, to testify that, before the written contract of sale was entered into, it was agreed between appellant and appellee that if appellee would purchase the machine, and her husband, who was absent, should be dissatisfied with the purchase, and would not approve of the same, the appellant would return an old machine it received in part payment for the machine in suit, and the money delivered by appellee to appellant, and take away the machine in controversy. After appellee had testified to this parol agreement, appellant moved to strike out that part of her testimony in regard to any verbal agreement made before or at the time of the making of the written contract, upon the ground that the entire agreement was merged in the written contract, and that the evidence would only tend to modify the terms of the written contract. The motion was overruled, and appellant excepted. The same objections were made to two other witnesses' testimony, stating the conversation that took place at the time of the execution of the written contract between the appellant and appellee. It is insisted by appellant that this ruling is erroneous; the contract is full in its terms, and free from ambiguity. In Hostetter v. Auman, 119 Ind. 7, 20 N. E. 508, the court say: “If there is one question better settled than another by numerous decisions of this court, that question is that, when a written contract is executed, all previous negotiations and understandings are merged in the writing, and parol evidence cannot be introduced to vary or control its legal effect. The writing which the witness Booker executed to the appellant evidenced a sale of one hundred and six oak trees on a certain tract of land by the said witness to the appellant. It stated the consideration and its payment. It was not competent to prove by the witness his understanding of the legal effect of the writing,-whether he understood it to be a receipt or a contract, nor to whom he supposed he was selling the timber; nor was it competent to prove by the appellee, either to contradict the writing or to control its legal effect, former negotiations which he had had with the appellant or with Booker.” See, also, Diven v. Johnson, 117 Ind. 512, 20 N. E. 428;Fordice v. Scribner, 108 Ind. 85, 9 N. E. 122, and authorities there cited. Where a contract is complete, it cannot be explained, modified, or changed by inserting any conditions by parol. Brunson v. Henry, 140 Ind. 455, 39 N. E. 256;Stevens v. Flannagan, 131 Ind. 122, 30 N. E. 898;Western Paving & Supply Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 128 Ind. 525, 26 N. E. 188, and 28 N. E. 88;Conant v. Bank, 121 Ind. 323, 22 N. E. 250;Pickett v. Green, 120 Ind. 584, 22 N. E. 737;Stewart v. Babbs, 120 Ind. 568, 22 N. E. 770. The claim is made by appellee that, just before the execution of the written contract, it was agreed that, if her husband should not be satisfied with the contract and sale, appellant was to return to appellee the old machine, and take the new one. This was a promise to be performed at a future time, and when the parties entered into the written contract all such negotiations...