Singer Mfg. Co. v. Stanage

• Decision Date: 01 March 1881
• Citation: 6 F. 279
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. STANAGE.

6 F. 279

SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. STANAGE.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri.

March, 1881

Taylor & Pollard, for plaintiff.

Marshall & Barclay, for defendant.

TREAT D.J.

This is a suit for an alleged violation of plaintiff's trade-mark. It seems that the plaintiff has pursued its controversy on both sides of the Atlantic, generally with success. The decisions of the foreign and American courts have been cited and examined. While reference is made in many of them to actual or supposed patents, issued and expired, no one of said cases, except that by Judge Drummond, states with directness what should be the turning point in the controversy. The case of the plaintiff against Wilson (3 Appeal Cases, 376) turned more on questions of practice than on the rules by which the rights of the parties were to be ultimately determined. That case and others in England, and the great number of cases in American courts, (notably Manuf'g Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51,) ought to make clear the rules controlling this litigation. It would be tedious and unprofitable to review the many authorities cited. In the case from the English house of lords, (supra,) and in the case (supra) from the United States supreme court there were differing opinions on the merits. Each of the many cases cited has its distinctive peculiarities, and, while all courts agree that property interests in trademarks should be protected, there is a strange diversity of reasoning as to the true basis on which such interests should rest.

It is not necessary for the solution of the rights of parties litigant in this suit to enter upon so wide a field of analysis or discussion. At the opening of the argument this court directed the attention of counsel to what seemed to be a matter of large moment, but as the pleadings and evidence had been prepared in the light of leading English and American cases, the cause progressed at great length, calling for the remark that despite these cases a large amount of irrelevant testimony was presented; or, rather, that while counsel had been diligent in their preparation, not knowing what views this court might entertain, much of the evidence seemed to apply rather to infringements of patents than a violation of trade-marks. Still, many of the leading cases have taken that course, to what seems to be a confusion of rights.

This case furnishes an apt illustration. The plaintiff and its predecessors had, in connection with others, through patents a monopoly as to certain sewing machines, known as the 'Singer' machines. When these patents expired every one had an equal right to make and vend such machines. If the patentees or their assignees could assert successfully an exclusive right to the name 'Singer' as a trade-mark, they would practically extend the patent indefinitely. The peculiar machine which had become known to the public under that name during the life of the patents was so known as a specified article of manufacture, and at the expiration of the patent would still be known on the market by that designation, irrespective of the name of the special manufacturer. No one had an exclusive right to the use of the generic name. If one wished to acquire a trade-mark in connection therewith he could do so distinctively. The plaintiff accordingly adopted specific devices, including its own name, whereby its products could be distinguished. The defendant adoped a different device, its products could be distinguished. The defendant adopted a different device, with the name of his manufacturer, 'Stewart,' and advertised the sale sometimes of the 'Stewart' machines, and sometimes of the 'Stewart-Singer' machines, attaching his name as 'late general manager of the Singer Manufacturing Co.'

It is contended that, although he and others had an indubitable right...