Singer Mfg. Co. v. McCollock

• Decision Date: 02 September 1884
• Citation: 24 F. 667
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. MCCOLLOCK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

24 F. 667

SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. MCCOLLOCK.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Arkansas.

September 2, 1884

E. W Kimball, for plaintiff.

CALDWELL J.

Under the equity rules, the plaintiff is entitled to a final decree of foreclosure of a mortgage on real estate, executed since the passage of the act of March 4, 1875. The only question in the case is whether the decree shall in terms give the defendant the right to redeem the mortgaged premises within 12 months after the sale under the decree. Section 2696 of Gantt's Digest, enacted in 1868, reads as follows:

'When any real estate, or any interest therein, is sold under execution, the same may be redeemed by the debtor from the purchaser, or his vendees, or the personal representatives of either, within 12 months thereafter.'

Other sections provide the mode of making the redemption. This section was held not to apply to sales under decrees of foreclosure of mortgages. In this state of the law the legislature, on the fourth of March, 1875, passed the following act:

'That it was and is the true intent and meaning of sections numbered two thousand six hundred and ninety-six, (2696,) two thousand six hundred and ninety-seven, (2697,) two thousand six hundred and ninety-eight, (2698,) two thousand six hundred and ninety-nine, (2699,) and two thousand seven hundred (2700) should and does apply to all sales of real estate, made and had under, and by virtue of, decrees of chancery courts, in the same manner as they did to sales under executions at law.'

It is said that this act is a nullity because it is a legislative construction of a prior statute, and an invasion by the legislative department of the government of the functions that belong to the judicial department. It must be conceded that the powers of the three departments of the state government--legislative, executive, and judicial-- are clearly separated and sharply defined by the constitution and under this division of power it is unquestionably the function of the legislature to make, and of the courts to construe, the laws. The judicial power cannot legislate, nor can the legislative power act judicially. But it would hardly be just to impute to the legislature passing this act the deliberate intention to usurp the functions of the judicial department. Such a construction would be hypercritical and captious, and legislative acts are not to be interpreted by the courts in that spirit. When an act of the legislature admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the other presses it beyond, their constitutional authority, the courts will adopt the former construction. In the construction of statutes the rules of grammar are less important than the intention of the legislature. And the sense and spirit of the statute prevails over the strict grammatical construction of its words, 'for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. ' This is a remedial statute, and the words of such a statute are always to be construed largely and beneficially; and it is not unusual to extend the enacting words of a remedial statute beyond their literal import and effect, in order to include cases within the same mischief. Dwar.

St. 64. And a construction will not be put upon a statute which will render it nugatory, if it is susceptible of a construction that will give it a reasonable operation and effect. It was not competent for the legislature to give this statute a retrospective operation, so far as relates to sales under mortgages, (Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595; Brine v. Insurance Co. Id. 627,) and if it does not operate prospectively, then it was enacted in vain. It was obviously the intention of the legislature to apply sections 2696-2700 Gantt's Dig., to all sales under decrees of chancery courts. It was competent for the legislature to have said this in terms, and the act would have been effectual. And when they said 'that it was and is the true intent and meaning of' those sections that they...