Singer Mfg. Co. v. Greenleaf

• Decision Date: 30 November 1893
• Citation: 14 So. 109,100 Ala. 272
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. GREENLEAF.

14 So. 109

100 Ala. 272

SINGER MANUF'G CO. v. GREENLEAF.

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 30, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Russell county; J. M. Carmichael, Judge.

Action by Luke Greenleaf against the Singer Manufacturing Company for trespass in wrongfully taking seed cotton belonging to plaintiff. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Smith &amp Henry, for appellant.

STONE C.J.

The suit in this case was instituted against the Singer Sewing Machine Company, a corporation. Before entering upon the trial, the plaintiff asked and obtained leave of the court to strike from the name of the defendant, in the summons and complaint, the words "Singer Sewing Machine," and insert in lieu thereof the words "Singer Manufacturing," so as to show the suit was against the Singer Manufacturing Company. This was objected to as being an entire change of the party defendant, and, the objection being overruled, the defendant excepted. We think there is nothing in this exception. There was not an entire change of party, but only a correction of a part of the corporate name which had been misconceived. We do not think the change was calculated to deceive or mislead. The case is not brought within the principle of Railway Co. v. McCall, 89 Ala. 375, 7 So. 650, nor our other rulings. Railroad Co v. Mallon, 57 Ala. 168; Railroad Co. v. Davis, 66 Ala. 578.

The tort alleged was that the agent of defendant, without authority or permission from plaintiff, had entered upon the latter's premises, and had taken and carried away a small lot of seed cotton, the property of the latter. The defense consisted in part of alleged license to do the act complained of, and in part of waiver and ratification of the act now complained of as a trespass. The alleged ratification consisted in the fact that after the cotton was taken ginned, and sold, the agent of defendant had given to plaintiff a receipt against part of a debt plaintiff owed the defendant, for the amount realized in the sale of the cotton. This receipt was received by the plaintiff, and was produced by him in court while giving his testimony to the jury. It went to make up the $32 he claimed to have paid on the sewing machine he had bought from defendant, and which left a balance still unpaid. The receipt was for $6.10. The plaintiff, while testifying, stated "that he did not know how he paid the $6.10, that he could not read, but that he supposed it was for the cotton; that he never agreed to receive a receipt for the cotton; and that he had paid $32 on the machine. The receipt read as follows: "Jan. 2nd, 1892. Received of Luke & A. Green $6 10/100 dollars to apply on contract No. 6,110, in regard to sewing machine No. _____. Promptness in future payment is required. [Signed] The Singer Manufacturing Co. Per W. H. Sutton, Manager." The alleged tort was committed in November, 1891, and this suit was brought in March, 1892. There was also testimony tending to show that Anna, wife of plaintiff, and comaker with Luke of the contract regarding the sewing machine, was present when the cotton was taken, and consented thereto. But there was conflict in the testimony as to the consent. On the question...