Singer v. Sheppard

• Decision Date: 09 January 1978
• Parties: Richard J. SINGER et al., Plaintiffs, v. William J. SHEPPARD et al., Defendants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 1007

381 A.2d 1007

33 Pa.Cmwlth. 276

Richard J. SINGER et al., Plaintiffs, v. William J. SHEPPARD et al., Defendants.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 15, 1977.

Decided Jan. 9, 1978.

[33 Pa.Cmwlth. 278] David S. Shrager, Philadelphia, for plaintiffs.

Gerald Gornish, Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, for defendants.

Before BOWMAN, President Judge, and CRUMLISH, Jr., WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS and BLATT, JJ.

OPINION

BLATT, Judge.

This is a class action within our original jurisdiction ¹ seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act ² (No-fault Act). The plaintiff is Richard J. Singer, who brings the action individually and on behalf of all residents, taxpayers, pedestrians, motor vehicle owners and occupants of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The defendants are various Commonwealth officials ³ charged with the administration and implementation of the No-fault Act. We are here concerned with the cross motions of the parties for judgment on the pleadings.

The No-fault Act was signed into law by the Governor on July 19, 1974 with a provision that all sections of the Act would be effective within twelve months. ⁴ The plaintiff initiated action in this Court in November 1974, seeking to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the Act and petitioning for a declaratory judgment on its constitutionality. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later assumed plenary jurisdiction ⁵ for the limited purpose of determining the constitutionality of Section 301(a) ⁶ of the Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a), and, while upholding the constitutionality of that section, it remanded the case to this Court for further action consistent with its opinion as filed. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975). The count of the plaintiff's complaint sounding in equity has become mooted by the passage of the Act's effective date. Remaining for disposition at this time, therefore, is the plaintiff's petition for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of various sections of the Act other than Section 301(a).

The No-fault Act was adopted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly in response to widely perceived deficiencies in the recovery of damages by victims of motor vehicle accidents who sought traditional tort remedies. Its stated purpose is "to establish at reasonable cost to the purchaser of insurance, a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims and the survivors of deceased victims". ⁷ It implements this purpose by requiring that accident victims be paid benefits irrespective of fault through a compulsory first party insurance system in which the victim is usually paid for economic loss directly by his own insurance company or by the company insuring the owner of the vehicle. It significantly limits the availability of traditional tort remedies. ⁸ The plaintiff here maintains that the No-fault Act violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and Pennsylvania and also that the Act's title violates Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The defendants raise preliminarily the issues of whether an action for declaratory judgment is an appropriate vehicle to raise the arguments of the plaintiff and secondly, if it is, whether the plaintiff has the standing required to maintain this action.

The defendants argue that a declaratory judgment is not appropriate here because the plaintiff's action does not conform to the requirements of Section 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ⁹, 12 P.S. § 836. Section 6 provides in pertinent part:

"Relief by declaratory judgment or decree may be granted in all civil cases where (1) an actual controversy exists between contending parties, or (2) where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation . . . and the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment or decree will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."

The defendants argue that there is no actual controversy present here between the contending parties and that there are no antagonistic claims present which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation. We disagree.

The stated purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. ¹⁰ It is remedial legislation and is to be liberally construed and administered. ¹¹ Section 2 of the Act, 12 P.S. § 832, provides in pertinent part "Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."

We believe that antagonistic claims clearly do exist between the parties here which, if left unresolved, would lead to imminent and inevitable litigation. We also believe that the issues raised by the plaintiff here indicate that uncertainty and insecurity exist with respect to rights under the No-fault Act and that an expedient determination of these issues would be consonant with the clear and explicit legislative intent expressed in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. We hold, therefore, that a declaratory is appropriate in this case.

As to the standing required for the plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of the No-fault Act, we note that Section 2 of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides, that "(a)ny person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . statute . . . " may obtain a declaration of his rights thereunder. In this case, we believe that the rights of the plaintiff and of the class of individuals represented by him are sufficiently affected by the provisions of the No-fault Act to provide standing for a challenge of its constitutionality.

The burden assumed by the plaintiff here, however, is a heavy one, for a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared otherwise unless it "clearly, palpably and plainly" violates the Constitutions of the Commonwealth or of the United States. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 393, 346 A.2d 897, 900 (1975); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963). And the burden, of course, is on the party alleging the constitutional infirmity, with all doubts to be resolved in favor of sustaining the legislation. Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 659, 198 A.2d 840, 843 (1964).

The plaintiff argues initially that the No-fault Act is so vague in critical respects that the penal provisions and economic burdens imposed by it constitute a violation of due process of law. It is true that legislation can be so vague as to deny due process in its enforcement when it limits the ability of those to whom the statute is directed to understand that which is prohibited or mandated. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 571, 305 A.2d 868, 870 (1973). The plaintiff alleges that numerous sections of the Act ¹² are so vague and inconsistent as to be impossible of execution and that the entire No-fault Act should, therefore, be declared unconstitutional. We believe, however, that, although the No-fault Act is admittedly complex and some of its provisions do appear to contain some ambiguities, complexity and possible ambiguity in themselves do not support a conclusion of unconstitutionality for reasons of vagueness.

The plaintiff has postured his argument here as to vagueness in terms of twelve hypothetical situations which allegedly illustrate the vagueness of each of the sections he attacks. We must, however, decline his request that we construe and apply these sections in the situations he posits. To do so would amount to construing them in a vacuum, and Declaratory Judgments are not to be employed for the determination of rights in anticipation of an event or events which may never occur or for the consideration of moot cases or as a medium for the rendition of advisory opinions. In re Johnson's Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 488-89, 171 A.2d 518, 524 (1961). Our examination of these sections leads us to conclude that none are so vague or inconsistent on their face as to deny due process in their enforcement. ¹³ We believe, therefore, that judicial construction of these sections must await cases which properly present those questions.

The plaintiff also asserts that Sections 203 ¹⁴ and 206 ¹⁵ of the No-fault Act, 40 P.S. §§ 1009.203, 1009.206, violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a discriminatory classification among purchasers of no-fault policies. Section 203 provides that an individual insured by a no-fault policy who has voluntarily purchased collateral insurance protection may elect to designate that collateral insurance as the primary source of coverage required by the No-fault Act. Any insured who makes such an election is entitled by Section 203(c) to a reduction in the cost of his no-fault policy designed to "reflect the anticipated reduction in basic loss benefits payable by the insured by reason of the election of the owner or operator to provide substitute security . . . ." Section 206 provides that benefits for loss which are available to an accident victim from certain statutorily mandated sources ¹⁶ must be substituted before benefits are payable to the victim from a no-fault insurance policy. The No-fault Act does not provide for a reduction in the cost of no- fault insurance for individuals who are covered by these statutorily mandated collateral sources of protection.

The plaintiff contends that those two sections establish an unlawful classification of motor...