Singh v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 17-35967,No. 17-35964,17-35964
• Citation: 925 F.3d 1053
• Parties: Harvinder SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. Harvinder Singh, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Soraya Motor Co. ; Arianna Motor Company Inc.; Hooman H. Bodaghi, dba Hinshaw’s Honda; Honda of Auburn; Hooman Honda; Hooman Motors Group; Hinshaw Acura ; Hooman Acura, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

925 F.3d 1053

Harvinder SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

Harvinder Singh, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Soraya Motor Co. ; Arianna Motor Company Inc.; Hooman H. Bodaghi, dba Hinshaw’s Honda; Honda of Auburn; Hooman Honda; Hooman Motors Group; Hinshaw Acura ; Hooman Acura, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35964

No. 17-35967

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 4, 2019 Seattle, Washington

Filed May 30, 2019

Robert Joseph Gaudet Jr. (argued), Karin Gaudet-Asmus, Seattle, Washington; Hardeep S. Rekhi and Gregory Wolk, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Sean Ashley Commons (argued), Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California; Aaron Paul Riensche (argued) and Jeffrey D. Dunbar, Seattle, Washington; Bruce Hamlin, Lane Powell PC, Seattle, Washington; Michael C. Andolina, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois; for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Ronald M. Gould and Richard A. Paez, Circuit Judges, and Cynthia A. Bashant,^* District Judge.

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Harvinder Singh purchased a new Honda Accord from Hinshaw’s Honda in Auburn, Washington. To finance his purchase, Singh obtained financing from Defendant-Appellee American Honda Finance Corporation ("AHFC").¹ Singh later brought this suit as a putative class action in Washington state superior court against AHFC and the Dealership Defendants. AHFC removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"). Singh moved to remand, but the district court denied that motion. Singh then amended his complaint to assert a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 – 1667f. After further motion practice and discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the Dealership Defendants and AHFC and dismissed Singh’s claims.

On appeal, Singh contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction at the time of removal and, for that reason, erred when it denied his motion to remand. Singh also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against him. Finally, Singh contends that the district court did not permit him sufficient discovery before granting summary judgment.

We hold that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over this action at the time of removal because CAFA’s home state exception barred the exercise of jurisdiction. However, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction at the time it rendered a final decision on the merits, because Singh voluntarily amended his complaint to assert a federal TILA claim. "To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administration of justice." Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis , 519 U.S. 61, 77, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). We decline to impose such a cost.

On the merits, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Dealership Defendants and AHFC. We also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s request for more time for discovery. We affirm the district court’s judgment in full.

I

In February 2016, Singh bought a new Honda Accord from Hinshaw’s Honda in Auburn, Washington. The Accord had two stickers. The first sticker listed the car’s standard features and a Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price ("MSRP") of $28,670.00.²

The other sticker listed a "dealer price" of $29,505.00, as well as individual costs for three dealer add-ons: "3M," "Pro Pak," and "New Car Detail & Dealer Prep" ("Dealer Prep").³ With the add-ons, the listed price of the car was $30,632.00.

Singh negotiated the price of his new Accord down to $27,356.97, before taxes and fees. Singh did not know what the add-ons were when he purchased the car, nor did anyone at Hinshaw’s explain them to him. Singh nonetheless thought he was paying for the add-ons because they were listed on the Dealer Addendum and he was not given the chance to decline them. To finance his purchase, Singh obtained financing from AHFC.

Singh signed three documents when he purchased his Accord: (1) a Purchase Order, (2) a Sales Contract, and (3) a Retail Installment Sale Contract ("RISC"). Singh also initialed a mandatory disclosure form. The Purchase Order listed the base price of the car as $27,356.97—the price Singh negotiated. Under the heading "ACCESSORIES," it stated, "sold w/ prep" and "pro pkg (muds, tray, locks)." The Sales Contract listed the "Base Price of Vehicle and Options" as $27,356.97. It did not list any items under the "Dealer Added or Deleted Options" heading. The RISC provided the terms of Singh’s financing agreement with AHFC and listed the total vehicle price of the Accord, including taxes, licensing, and other fees. The RISC did not list any add-ons. Finally, on the "Mandatory Disclosure Statement," Singh declined additional services and protections, including "Rock Guard Chip Protect."

Singh brought this putative class action in Washington state superior court.⁴ Singh claimed that Hinshaw’s did not provide him the three add-ons it promised on the Dealer Addendum—3M, Pro Pak, and Dealer Prep—and, if he had known what the add-ons were, he would have declined them and paid a lower price for his Accord. Singh claimed that the other Dealership Defendants engaged in similar unlawful practices. Singh further alleged that AHFC profits from the Dealership Defendants’ nondisclosures because the nondisclosures lead to higher car prices, which lead to higher interest payments to AHFC from financing agreements with vehicle purchasers. Singh asserted four causes of action against the Dealership Defendants and AHFC: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (3) negligent supervision; and (4) violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("WCPA").

AHFC removed the case to federal court under CAFA. Singh moved to remand, contending that either the home state or the local controversy exception to CAFA barred the exercise of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court rejected those arguments and denied Singh’s motion. Singh then amended his complaint to assert a federal TILA claim.

The Dealership Defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted that motion. On Singh’s breach of contract claim, the district court explained that the contract between Singh and Hinshaw’s consisted of "the Sales Contract ... RISC ... and possibly the Vehicle Purchase Order"—the documents Singh had signed. Because none of those documents mentions 3M, Pro Pak, or Dealer Prep, the district court held that those add-ons were not part of the bargain between Hinshaw’s and Singh and, for that reason, Hinshaw’s did not breach its contract with Singh even if it did not provide the add-ons.⁵ The district court granted summary judgment against Singh on his WCPA claim because (1) Hinshaw’s did not violate Washington’s Auto Dealer’s Practices Act⁶ and (2) Singh did not demonstrate injury insofar as he paid less than the MSRP of the car. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment against Singh on his TILA claim because the contract did not include any add-ons and therefore their costs did not need to be itemized in the RISC.⁷

Separately, AHFC moved to dismiss Singh’s claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As part of its motion, AHFC included a copy of the RISC. Singh had not attached the RISC to his complaint, so he objected to its consideration at the motion-to-dismiss stage. But Singh’s response included ninety-one pages of declarations and exhibits, which likewise were not attached to his complaint. Because each party cited materials outside the complaint, the district court converted AHFC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and "deferred consideration of the motion to allow Singh a reasonable opportunity to present all material that would be pertinent."

After further discovery, Singh objected that he had not received adequate time for discovery. The district court declined to permit Singh more time because Singh had propounded discovery requests on the defendants for two months, he attached a slew of documents obtained in discovery to his responses to the motions for summary judgment, and he did not point to any facts that he lacked.

On the merits, the district court granted summary judgment against Singh on his breach of contract claim because Singh could not show that AHFC violated any financing terms of the RISC, the only contract between AHFC and Singh.⁸ The district court granted summary judgment for AHFC on Singh’s WCPA claim because AHFC was not directly involved in the allegedly deceptive practice of displaying the Dealer Addendum on vehicles.⁹ Finally, the district court noted that Singh had abandoned his TILA claim against AHFC, although he reserved the right to seek reinstatement.

Singh filed timely notices of appeal. He contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this action at the time of removal and therefore erred when it denied his motion to remand. He asks that this case be remanded to Washington state court. In the alternative, Singh contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants, or that it erred in granting summary judgment without permitting him sufficient discovery.

II

We review de novo whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 651 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). We review any factual findings relevant to jurisdiction for clear error. Id.

We review de novo whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Dealership Defendants and AHFC. Hunt v. City of L.A. , 638 F.3d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the district court’s denial of Singh’s "request...