Singh v. August, Civil No. 365-1970

• Decision Date: 12 February 1974
• Docket Number: Civil No. 365-1970
• Citation: 10 V.I. 389
• Parties: DAVID MOHAN SINGH and RAMDOOLARIE MOHAN SINGH, et al., Plaintiffs v. LOUIS AUGUST and ERALD JAMES, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

10 V.I. 389

DAVID MOHAN SINGH and RAMDOOLARIE MOHAN SINGH, et al., Plaintiffs v. LOUIS AUGUST and ERALD JAMES, Defendants

Civil No. 365-1970

District Court of the Virgin Islands Div. of St. Croix

February 12, 1974

Action for damages arising from auto collision. District Court, Young, J., held that person who simply lent auto involved to driver involved was not liable for any negligence of driver.YOUNG, District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

[1] I have before me two motions in this action for damages arising out of an automobile collision. One possible defendant, the driver of the car, is not a party to the action because plaintiff inadvertently sued the wrong man and failed to discover his error until after the Statute of Limitations had run. Singh, et al. v. August, et al, Civil No. 365/1970, April 10, 1973. The remaining defendant, the owner of the car, has now moved for summary judgment of dismissal of the complaint as to him on the ground that, as a mere bailor, he is not liable for the negligence of his bailee. Plaintiff, perhaps anticipating that defendant's motion might be granted, has moved to add as additional defendants, the insurance company that insured the vehicle and the local agent of the said insurance company. I have concluded that defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as to him must be granted and plaintiff's motion to proceed against the insurance company and its agent be denied.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment is supported by his affidavit (and that of the driver) stating that he merely lent the car to the driver who was performing no business for him. There was no principal/agent or master/servant relationship; rather, it was a mere bailor/bailee arrangement. Plaintiff has submitted no countervailing affidavit showing that this factual issue is in dispute. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). Instead, he merely argues in his answer that "if the operator and the owner of the offending vehicle believed that by its mere operation the owner would be benefited, then perhaps the doctrine of agency does apply. ..." This hypothesis of counsel is insufficient, when faced with defendant's affidavit, to show that a genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. Given this undisputed factual setting, the law is quite clear. An automobile owner who simply lends the vehicle to another is not responsible for the latter's negligence in using it (absent negligent entrustment, which is not an issue in this case). Annotation, 100 A.L.R. 920, 921 (1936). See Smith v. Hertz, 6 V.I. 235, 377 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1967). Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.

[2, 3] It is equally clear the plaintiff's eleventh hour attempt to save his case by adding additional defendants cannot succeed. The affidavit of plaintiff's counsel asserts that the "real parties in interest" in the case are the insurer of the "offending car" and its adjuster. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) requires that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." "The effect of this passage is that the action must be brought by the person who, according to the governing substantive law, is entitled to enforce the right." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1543. It is obvious that the rule is designed to insure that...