Singh v. Carter
Decision Date | 03 March 2016 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-399 (BAH) |
Citation | 168 F.Supp.3d 216 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Simratpal Singh, Plaintiff, v. Ashton B. Carter, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense, et al., Defendants. |
Eric S. Baxter, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Pending before the Court is a motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin an order from the United States Army's senior command to the plaintiff, Captain Simratpal Singh, a decorated Sikh Army officer, requiring him to undergo several days of specialized testing, under expert supervision, at a cost of over $32,000, with his “army combat helmet” and “army protective mask” for the purpose of ensuring that his Sikh articles of faith, namely a cloth head covering and unshorn hair and beard, will not interfere with the helmet's ability “to withstand ballistic and blunt forces” and the mask's ability “to provide protection from toxic chemical and biological agents.” At first blush, the challenged order appears to reflect a reasonably thorough and even benevolent decision by the Army to fulfill its duty of protecting the health and safety of this particular Sikh officer.
Yet, that is far from the complete picture. Thousands of other soldiers are permitted to wear long hair and beards for medical or other reasons, without being subjected to such specialized and costly expert testing of their helmets and gas masks. Moreover, other Sikh soldiers have been permitted to maintain their articles of faith without such specialized testing. In fact, just this week, the plaintiff, who maintains the Sikh articles of faith, passed the standard gas mask test administered to his unit and given routinely to soldiers. Nonetheless, the plaintiff has been ordered to undergo additional specialized testing as part of the Army's review of his request for a religious accommodation and exception to the Army's regulations regarding grooming and appearance. As the Supreme Court has stressed, in evaluating claims of discriminatory governmental action implicating the important First Amendment right to the Free Exercise of religion, “context matters.” Cutter v. Wilkinson , 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger , 539 U.S. 306, 327, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003) ); see Holt v. Hobbs , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 853, 867, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ().
Courts should be reluctant, as the defendants point out, “to interfere with legitimate Army matters,” Kreis v. Sec'y of Air Force , 866 F.2d 1508, 1511 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby , 345 U.S. 83, 93–94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) ), since “great deference” should be given “to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest,” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger , 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) ); see also Chappell v. Wallace , 462 U.S. 296, 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) (); New v. Cohen , 129 F.3d 639, 643 (D.C.Cir.1997) ( “[T]he military justice system must remain free from undue interference, because the military is a specialized society separate from civilian society with laws and traditions of its own developed during its long history.” (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman , 420 U.S. 738, 757, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975) ). At the same time, the Supreme Court “has never held ... that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service,” Chappell , 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. 2362, and “military interests do not always trump other considerations,” Winter , 555 U.S. at 26, 129 S.Ct. 365. The context of this case raises such significant questions about the lawfulness of the Army command's order to the plaintiff to undergo specialized testing that, pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et seq ., judicial intervention is required.
The plaintiff is an honors West Point graduate, with an advanced Master's degree in engineering, a Ranger, and a Bronze Star recipient for his service while being forward-deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. Verified Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 76, 79, 82, 90, ECF No. 1; Compl. Ex. 2 (West Point academic record), ECF No. 1- 1; Compl. Ex. 6 (Bronze Star Medal documentation), ECF No. 1-1. He is also a practicing Sikh, Compl. ¶¶ 46–56, a religion that requires him to wear external “articles of faith,” including unshorn hair (kesh ), a beard, and a turban (dastaar ) or smaller traditional cloth head covering (patka ), id. ¶¶ 2–4, 36–42, 100. As a Captain in the United States Army, the plaintiff is bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which requires hairstyle and grooming standards in conflict with his faith. See generally U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 670–1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia (Apr. 10, 2015).
Throughout his youth, the plaintiff maintained the Sikh articles of faith, wearing a turban and never cutting his hair or shaving. Compl. ¶¶ 47–50. Upon graduation from high school, however, the plaintiff, who long desired to serve in the military, attained the opportunity to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point. Id. ¶¶ 67–70. Before his induction into West Point, the plaintiff inquired about obtaining a religious accommodation for his articles of faith from Army personnel who “expressed doubt” and “gave vague responses.” Pl.'s Combined Mem. Supp. Appl. TRO & Appl. Prelim. Inj. (“Pl.'s Mem.”) at 8–9, ECF No. 2-1; see Compl. ¶¶ 69–70. During the induction process, “and before Captain Singh fully understood what was happening, he found himself in the barbershop with the other cadets to be trimmed and shaved.” Compl. ¶ 71. “[B]elieving he had no other option” but to risk losing the opportunity to attend West Point and serve this country, the plaintiff “succumbed under pressure and made the difficult decision to remove his turban, cut his hair, and shave his beard.” Id. ¶ 72.
Though “[e]xperiencing significant shame and disappointment in himself” for violating the Sikh religious requirements, id. ¶ 74, the plaintiff graduated from West Point in 2010 with a B.S. degree in electrical engineering with Honors, id. ¶ 76; see Compl. Ex. 2, and, thereafter, has continuously served this country with notable excellence. He has received high praise from his commanders, Compl. ¶¶ 78, 80–81, attended and graduated from Ranger School, id. ¶¶ 78–79, and served as platoon leader in a deployment to Afghanistan from April 2012 to January 2013, id. ¶¶ 79–80, for which “exceptional and meritorious service” the plaintiff was awarded a Bronze Star Medal, id. ¶ 82; see Compl. Ex. 6. In November 2013, the plaintiff received an Army Achievement Medal for his performance during a joint training exercise with the South Korean Army, Compl. ¶ 83; see Compl. Ex. 7 (Army Achievement Medal documentation), ECF No. 1-1, and, in November 2014, he received an Army Commendation Medal for his service as a Brigade Assistant for a “rapidly deployable ... Combat Team,” Compl. ¶¶ 84–85; see Compl. Ex. 9 (Army Commendation Medal documentation), ECF No. 1-1.
In the Spring of 2015, the plaintiff met several Sikh soldiers who maintain their articles of faith at a celebration of the Sikh New Year hosted by the Pentagon and, “for the first time,” saw “a viable path” to obtaining a religious accommodation. Compl. ¶¶ 88–89.
Later that year, on October 16, 2015, around the time the plaintiff completed a Master's degree in engineering and began a one-month leave, the plaintiff informed his new immediate commander, Lieutenant Colonel (“LTC”) Julie Balten, that he intended to report to his next-ordered post, the 249thEngineer Battalion Prime Power at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, on the date ordered, November 16, 2015, donning his articles of faith—wearing a turban, unshorn hair, and a beard. Id. ¶¶ 90–92. LTC Balten represented to the plaintiff that his articles of faith “would have no adverse impact on [his] ability to fulfill his responsibilities and promised to recommend that he be granted an accommodation.” Id. ¶ 92. Shortly thereafter, on October 21, 2015, the plaintiff submitted a “Request for Religious Accommodation and Exception to Wear and Appearance Regulations Pursuant to AR 600-20 and AR 670-1” (“Pl.'s Request”), Defs.' Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. TRO () , Appendix () at A19, Pl.'s Request at 1, ECF No. 9-1, pursuant to Army Regulation 600-20, which provides that “[i]n accordance with [RFRA] ..., the Army will approve requests for accommodation of religious practices unless accommodation will have an adverse impact on unit readiness, individual readiness, unit cohesion, morale, good order, discipline, safety, and/or health,” U.S. Dep't of Army, Reg. 600–20, Army Command Policy (Nov. 6, 2014), ch. 5–6(a). In his request, the plaintiff detailed how he would “conform [his] religious requirements in a way that ensures consistency with the Army's need to maintain uniformity and safety standards,” including maintaining his “hair and beard in a neat and conservative manner at all times;” wearing a...
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