Singh v. Fahey
| Decision Date | 03 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-491 (JRT/LIB) |
| Parties | Shiv Saywack P. Singh, Plaintiff, v. Jessica Fahey, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and upon Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. [Docket No. 2].
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court recommends dismissing Singh's federal-law causes of action because the Complaint fails to state federal-law claims for which this Court can grant relief and dismissing Singh's state-law causes of action for lack of jurisdiction. Because these recommendations lead to this action's dismissal, the Court recommends denying as moot Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. [Docket No. 2].
Although the Court's review of his Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs demonstrates that Singh qualifies financially for IFP status, an IFP application will be denied, and an action dismissed, when an IFP applicant has filed a complaint that fails to state a cause of action on which relief may be granted. See, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see also, Carter v. Schafer, 273 F. App'x 581, 582 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, this Court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, McChesney v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 900 F.3d 578, 583 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Petrie ex rel. PPW Royalty Tr. v. Barton, 841 F.3d 746, 753 (8th Cir. 2016)). The complaint's factual allegations need not be detailed, but must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. In assessing a complaint's sufficiency, the court may disregard legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. See, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege enough facts to support the claims advanced. See, Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
While the particulars of the Complaint are less than clear, liberally construing it in his favor, the Complaint appears to concern events that led to two terminations from a job at the Grand Casino Hinckley in Hinckley, Minnesota. (See, Compl. [Docket No. 1]). Singh alleges that from February 2016, through June 2018, he was employed at the casino. (See, Id. at 2). However, he alleges that on June 17, 2018, casino officials informed him that they believed he was "using drugs and alcohol," and those officials subsequently discharged him. (Id.).
Singh asserts that in later proceedings, a "court found that there was no misconduct on his behalf," and the Grand Casino "failed to provide information and proof of misconduct concerning alcohol and drugs." (Id.). Singh states that he filed "charges of discrimination" against the casino with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (Id.).
In August 2018, however, the Grand Casino rehired Singh. (See, Id.). It appears that his job upon being rehired consisted of walking and patrolling the casino floor to assist casino patrons.(See, Id.). According to Plaintiff, on September 12, 2018, he attended a workshop for casino employees at which he was encouraged to express interest and "match energy levels" with casino guests. (See, Id.). On September 18, 2018, at the start of his shift, Singh interacted with two women, one of whom—"Jennifer"—Singh alleges he had known for some time because she was a frequent casino guest. (See, Id.). After a brief discussion, Jennifer left, and Singh "continued on his patrol" with the second woman. (See, Id.). At some point during the interaction, Singh alleges, he said "Hi" and "Hello" to the unidentified woman, asked how she was doing, and told her that Jennifer "was a very nice person to have as a friend." (See, Id.). The unidentified woman then allegedly told Singh that he should "mind his own business and that he should be patrolling the building rather than talking to her." (See, Id.). Singh alleges he apologized and then "continued on patrol." (See, Id.).
Approximately thirty minutes after the interaction with the unidentified woman, Singh alleges, he was told to report to the casino's "Med Office." (See, Id.). There he met Dan Clapper, the casino's director of security, who had termination papers "already typed and in possession." (Id.). Clapper allegedly stated that Singh's "eyes were bloodshot and that he was drinking." (Id. at 2-3). Clapper then allegedly "bragged" to Singh about how Singh had been suspended from June 17, 2018, through September 2018; Singh disagreed, insisting that he had actually been terminated after the June 2018 incident. (Id. at 3). Clapper also allegedly "further falsified [Singh's] employment record by stating that on June 14, 2018 that [Singh] was working and that [Singh] had hit his radio button and that [Singh] was heard saying 'he was going to caress somebody." (Id.) Clapper then allegedly ordered Plaintiff off the Grand Casino property, and he instructed Plaintiff not to return. (See, Id.).
Singh asserts that Clapper "falsified the events and incidents of September and said that incident took place on" September 16, 2018, as opposed to September 18, 2018. (Id.) Therefore, according to Singh, he was not paid for work performed on September 17, 2018, and September 18, 2018. (Id.) Singh also asserts that on January 25, 2019, various Defendants "lied under oath saying that [Singh] was on duty on June 14, 2018 and everybody heard [Singh]." (Id.).1
Based on these assertions, Singh raises four causes of action: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2); (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) what the Court liberally construes in Plaintiff's favor as a cause of action for defamation. (See, Id. at 3-4).2 As relief, Singh asks the Court to award him "[c]ompensatory and [p]unitive damages in the amount of five hundred thousand dollars," as well as, attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and "all court costs in bringing this civil action." (Id.).
Although Plaintiff purports to raise a claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), the Court's review of the Complaint demonstrates that Singh has failed to state a cause of action under § 1985(2). Section 1985(2) states:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or toinjure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
This statute—originally part of § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871—has two portions or clauses: the first bars conspiracies interfering with "the administration of justice in the federal courts," while the second portion bars "conspiracies to obstruct the course of justice in state courts." Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724-75 (1983) (discussing § 1985's history). Singh fails to allege a cause of action under either portion of § 1985(2).
To bring a claim under the first portion of § 1985(2), a plaintiff must target a conspiracy to interfere with proceedings in a "court of the United States"—i.e., a federal court. See, Coleman v. Garber, 800 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1986); Krutchen v. Zayo Bandwidth Ne., LLC, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1021 (D. Minn. 2008) (citing cases). Plaintiff's Complaint, [Docket No. 1], is devoid of any allegations concerning prior federal-court action. The first court proceeding that Singh discusses seems to involve a court dealing with Singh's unemployment insurance after being fired in June 2018. (See, Compl., [Docket No. 1], at 2) ( . The second proceeding that Singh notes concerns a court dealing with his claims about being fired in September 2018. (Id. at 3) ( ). None of these references refer to federal-court proceedings. As a result, the Complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of the first part of § 1985(2).
The second portion of § 1985(2)...
To continue reading
Request your trial