Singh v. Joshi

Decision Date26 January 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–CV–5496–FB–VMS,15–CV–5496–FB–VMS
Parties Jaswinder Singh, Balbir Nagi, Man Singh and NYC Yellow Cab Drivers Association, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Meera Joshi, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, Bill De Blasio and the City of New York, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

For the Plaintiffs: DANIEL L. ACKMAN, ESQ., 222 Broadway, 19th Floor, New York, New York 10038, ANDREW ST. LAURENT, ESQ., Harris, St. Laurent & Chaudhry LLP, 40 Wall Street, 53rd Floor, New York, New York 10005

For the Defendants: ZACHARY W. CARTER, ESQ., Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, 100 Church Street, New York, New York 10007, By: SHERYL NEUFELD, ESQ., MICHELLE GOLDBERG-CAHN, ESQ., KAREN SELVIN, ESQ., SAMANTHA SCHONFIELD, ESQ.

For Amici Curiae The Taxis for All Campaign, The 504 Democratic Club, and Disabled in Action, DANIEL L. BROWN, ESQ., Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York 10112

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BLOCK

, Senior District Judge:

In December 2013, the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) settled a lawsuit challenging its compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by committing to “adopt regulations requiring that half of the city's more than 13,000 yellow cabs be accessible to people with disabilities within six years.” Benjamin Weiser & Matt Flegenheimer, City Agrees on Access to Taxis for Disabled, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2013, at A29. Adopted the following April, the regulations came at a cost. In the main, that cost is to be borne by the individual owners of the medallions required for the operation of a yellow cab.

Plaintiffs—three individual medallion holders and an umbrella organization representing others—argue that the regulations violate the Constitution and other applicable laws. They seek a preliminary injunction barring enforcement on the grounds that the regulations violate the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. For the following reasons, the Court disagrees and denies the request for preliminary injunctive relief.

I
A. Background to the Regulations

As noted, the challenged regulations owe their existence to a lawsuit. In January 2011, disabled individuals and advocacy groups filed a class action against TLC in the Southern District of New York. See Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, Case No. 11–CV–237, 2011 WL 121157 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 13, 2011). They alleged that wheelchair-accessible vehicles comprised only 1.8% of the city's yellow cab fleet, and argued that TLC was violating the ADA and other federal and local laws by failing to require more.

Title II of the ADA addresses disability discrimination in the provision of public services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131

–12165. The plaintiffs in Noel invoked two subsections of Title II: Part A applies to public services generally, and provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. § 12132. Part B applies that general prohibition to public transportation systems; it provides, in relevant part:

If a public entity operates a demand responsive system, it shall be considered discrimination ... for such entity to purchase or lease a new vehicle for use on such system ... that is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless such system, when viewed in its entirety, provides a level of service to such individuals equivalent to the level of service such system provides to individuals without disabilities.

Id. § 12144.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Daniels held that TLC was not subject to the public-transportation provisions of the ADA because it did not “operate” a transportation system. See Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 837 F.Supp.2d 268, 273–76 (S.D.N.Y.2011)

. However, he held that it was violating Part A's general prohibition. He reasoned that [t]he acknowledged lack of meaningful access is a direct result of the policies, practices, and regulations of the TLC,” id. at 278 —in particular, TLC's authority over the types of vehicles that can be used as yellow cabs, see id. (“The TLC has admitted that it has both the ability and authority to provide more wheelchair accessible vehicles, but it has chosen not to do so.”).

The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. See Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm'n, 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.2012). It held that TLC “does not violate the ADA by licensing and regulating a private taxi industry that fails to afford meaningful access to passengers with disabilities” because “TLC's control over the taxi industry, however pervasive it is at this time, does not make the private taxi industry a program or activity of a public entity.” Id. at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted). The circuit court further reasoned that TLC's failure to use its regulatory authority to require more wheelchair-accessible vehicles could not violate the ADA “because Title III [of the ADA] expressly exempts taxi providers from purchasing or leasing ‘accessible automobiles.’ Id. at 73. Thus, [i]f the TLC is required ... to ensure that the taxi industry provides a sufficient number of accessible taxis, then private taxi owners would be required to purchase or lease accessible taxis even though the ADA explicitly exempts them from such requirements.” Id. at 73–74.

On remand, the plaintiffs obtained leave to amend their complaint to allege that TLC's choice of vehicle as the “Taxi of Tomorrow” was a van and, therefore, outside the scope of the exemption relied on by the Second Circuit.1 TLC initially contested the allegation, but eventually reached a settlement with the plaintiffs. TLC promised to propose rules requiring 50% of the yellow cab fleet to be wheelchair-accessible by 2020. The settlement was entirely a product of negotiations between the Noel

plaintiffs and TLC; no medallion owners or taxi trade groups were invited to participate.

B. The Regulations and their Adoption

Understanding the regulations TLC undertook to adopt requires some context. TLC's regulatory authority extends to many types of for-hire vehicles. Three—conveniently color-coded—are relevant here.

First, TLC regulates New York City's iconic yellow cabs, of which there are currently about 13,500. Yellow cabs may accept street hails citywide, may not refuse a hail to any destination in the city, and operate on a fare schedule set by regulation.2 TLC designates the makes and models approved for use as yellow cabs, see supra note 1, and mandates that each yellow cab be retired and replaced with a new vehicle every three to seven years.

Yellow cab medallions come in two varieties. A “corporate” or “minifleet” medallion authorizes the holder to operate an unlimited number of yellow cabs, while an “independent” or “individual” medallion authorizes the holder to operate only one. Each variety is further subdivided into one of three classifications: An “unrestricted” medallion authorized—at least until the challenged regulations were adopted—the use of any TLC-approved vehicle. An “alternative fuel” medallion requires the use of a natural-gas or hybrid vehicle. An “accessible” medallion requires the use of a wheelchair-accessible vehicle.

The number of yellow-cab medallions is limited by law. As a result of their limited number, medallions are bought, sold and leased in a robust secondary market; pledged as collateral for purchase-money mortgages; and even transferred by inheritance and bequest. When authorized to do so, TLC sells new medallions at auction; it has always conducted separate auctions for each variety and classification.

Second, TLC licenses livery cabs, limousines and other so-called black cars. There is no fixed number of black-car licenses, and their number has drastically increased due to the popularity of services such as Uber. Black cars are forbidden from accepting street hails; transportation must be prearranged by the passenger through a central dispatcher. Fares are not regulated, but must be filed with TLC. TLC does not regulate the types of vehicle that may be used for black cars, but does require licensees to provide a wheelchair-accessible vehicle on request.3

Third are the green “boro cabs,” which first appeared in August 2013. See Matt Flegenheimer, All–Borough Taxis (Like Yellow Cabs, but Green) Hit the Streets, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2013, at A16. Boro cabs may accept prearranged fares like a black car, but they may also accept street hails in areas traditionally underserved by yellow cabs. The number of boro cabs is capped by law at 18,000, of which half will eventually be required to be wheelchair-accessible. See Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass'n v. New York, 21 N.Y.3d 289, 298–99, 970 N.Y.S.2d 907, 993 N.E.2d 393 (2013)

.

The regulations proposed and later adopted by TLC apply only to unrestricted yellow-cab medallion holders; they do not apply to either black cars or boro cabs. In addition, they apply differently to individual and corporate medallions. Holders of unrestricted corporate medallions will be required to replace 50% of their fleets with accessible vehicles on an alternating basis. In other words, the first car to come up for mandatory retirement will have to be replaced with an accessible vehicle; the second will not.

Half of the holders of unrestricted individual medallions will also have to replace their vehicle with an accessible vehicle. Since, by definition, individual medallion holders have only one vehicle, the system applicable to corporate medallion holders cannot apply. Instead, the regulations contemplate lotteries. All medallion holders whose vehicles will come up for mandatory retirement during a particular lottery period (January 1June 30 and July 1December 31 of each year) will...

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