Singh v. McHugh

Decision Date12 June 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 14-1906 (ABJ)
Citation185 F.Supp.3d 201
Parties Iknoor Singh, Plaintiff, v. John McHugh, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Anisha Singh, Manmeet Singh Mehendiratta, United Sikhs, New York, NY, Arthur B. Spitzer, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Derrick Wayne Grace, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge

Plaintiff Iknoor Singh is a rising junior at Hofstra University and an observant Sikh. In accordance with his religion, plaintiff does not cut his hair or beard, and he wears a turban. He has endeavored to enroll in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps ("ROTC") program run by the United States Army at his university, but his religious practices do not conform to Army uniform and grooming standards. Plaintiff sought a religious accommodation that would enable him to enroll in ROTC with his articles of faith intact, but the Army denied the request. Plaintiff contends that the Army's refusal to accommodate his religious exercise violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq ., and he brought this lawsuit against John McHugh, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Army; Lieutenant General James C. McConville, in his official capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, United States Army; Brigadier General Peggy C. Combs, in her official capacity as Commanding General, United States Army Cadet Command; and Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Cederman, in his official capacity as Commander of the ROTC program at Hofstra University.

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants remind the Court of the doctrine that cautions judges to afford substantial deference to the judgment of military commanders and to decline to interpose their own views in matters involving the composition and training of military officers. In opposing defendants' motion and advancing his own, plaintiff points out that like all government agencies, the Armed Services are governed by the congressional determination—enshrined in RFRA—to tip the scale in favor of individual religious rights. He notes that even the military must be able to demonstrate that a policy that imposes a substantial burden upon an individual's ability to practice his religion furthers a compelling government interest, and is the least restrictive alternative available for furthering that interest. In other words, while the Court must accord the military a great deal of respect, particularly in its identification of the compelling interests involved, the defendants still bear the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence to satisfy the strict scrutiny inquiry: does the specific application of Army policy to this plaintiff further the asserted compelling interest and do so in the least restrictive manner?

The Court finds that defendants have failed to show that the application of the Army's regulations to this plaintiff and the denial of the particular religious accommodation he seeks further a compelling government interest by the least restrictive means. Therefore, and for the additional reasons set forth below, defendants' dispositive motions will be denied and judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff. The Court accords substantial deference to the Army's judgments concerning the essential role that uniformity plays in military training and effectiveness. But given the tens of thousands of exceptions the Army has already made to its grooming and uniform policies, its successful accommodation of observant Sikhs in the past, and the fact that, at this time, plaintiff is seeking only to enroll in the ROTC program, the Army's refusal to permit him to do so while adhering to his faith cannot survive the strict scrutiny that RFRA demands. This decision is limited to the narrow issue presently before the Courtplaintiff's ability to enroll in ROTC with his turban, unshorn hair, and beard—and it does not address plaintiff's eventual receipt of a contract or an Army commission.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Iknoor Singh is a rising junior at Hofstra University and an adherent of the Sikh faith. Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 32-2] ("Pl.'s SOF") ¶ 8; Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s SOF [Dkt. # 37-1] ("Defs.' SOF Resp.") ¶ 8. In accordance with his religion, plaintiff does not cut his beard or hair, and he tucks his unshorn hair under a turban. Pl.'s SOF ¶ 8; Defs.' SOF Resp. ¶ 8. Plaintiff maintains the sincere belief that if he cut his hair, shaved his beard, or abandoned his turban, he would be "dishonoring and offending God." Pl.'s SOF ¶ 8; Defs.' SOF Resp. ¶ 8.

The Army operates an ROTC program at Hofstra University that plaintiff has sought to join. Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 9, 13; Defs.' SOF Resp. ¶¶ 9, 13. Plaintiff hopes to serve in Military Intelligence, and he speaks Urdu, Hindi, and Punjabi, as well as English. Ex. 7 to Decl. of Pl. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 3-2, 27–28]. Plaintiff has participated in ROTC as an auditing student but he has not yet enrolled in the program because the Army demands that he first agree to abide by its grooming and uniform regulations by removing his turban, cutting his hair, and shaving his beard. Pl.'s SOF ¶¶ 9, 13; Defs.' SOF Resp. ¶¶ 9, 13. Plaintiff requested a religious accommodation that would permit him to enroll with his articles of faith intact, and that request has now been formally denied. Letter from Lieutenant General James C. McConville to Pl. (Dec. 19, 2014) [Dkt. # 18-1] ("McConville Letter") at 1.

The Army initially took the position that the would-be soldier was bound to comply with the grooming and uniform policies before he could enroll in ROTC and that it could not even consider a request for an accommodation until he did so. See Ex. C to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 21-2, 13–14]. On November 12, 2014, before the Army had agreed to consider plaintiff's accommodation request, plaintiff filed this action and sought: (1) a preliminary injunction requiring the Army to process the accommodation request and ordering a temporary accommodation and "provisional enlistment" if the request was denied; (2) a declaratory judgment that defendants' refusal to grant plaintiff a religious exemption to the Army's grooming and uniform standards would violate RFRA; (3) a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing the Army's standards insofar as they would require plaintiff to cut his hair, shave his beard, and remove his turban, and ordering defendants to allow plaintiff "to join" the Hofstra ROTC unit; and (4) attorney's fees and costs. Compl., Request for Relief ¶¶ a–d. The next day, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking the preliminary relief identified in the complaint. Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 3].

While the motion for a preliminary injunction was pending, defendants notified the Court that the Army had changed its position, and that it would process plaintiff's accommodation request. Defs.' Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Dkt. # 16] at 1. On December 19, 2014, the request was denied. Notice of Filing of Agency's Decision on Pl.'s Accommodation Request [Dkt. # 18] ("Decision Notice"); McConville Letter. In light of defendants' consideration and denial of plaintiff's request, the Court consolidated the motion for a preliminary injunction with the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Minute Order (Dec. 22, 2014).

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on January 20, 2015. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss and for Summ. J. (mistakenly labeled "memorandum in support") [Dkt. # 21] ("Defs.' Mot."); Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 21] ("Defs.' Mem."). They took the position that the complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because plaintiff, as a civilian, could not establish that the Army's decision substantially burdened his religious practice, and because requests for judicially-ordered enlistments are nonjusticiable.1 Defs.' Mem. at 1, 3. In the alternative, defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. Id.

On January 27, 2015, plaintiff responded to defendants' motion with a motion to take discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). Pl.'s Mot. for Disc. [Dkt. # 22]. The matter was fully briefed, and the Court issued an order granting the motion in part and denying it in part. Order (Feb. 3, 2015) [Dkt. # 25]. After the discovery was completed, plaintiff filed an opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, combined with a cross-motion for summary judgment, on March 21, 2015. Pl.'s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. # 33] ("Pl.'s Mot."); see also Pl.'s Mem. Opposing Defs.' Mot. and Supporting Pl.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 32]. Defendants filed a reply and cross-opposition on April 10, 2015, Defs.' Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. and Reply in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 37] ("Defs.' Reply"), and plaintiff filed a cross-reply on April 17, 2015. Pl.'s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. [Dkt. # 43] ("Pl.'s Reply"). The Court heard argument on the motions on April 29, 2015.

REGULATORY BACKGROUND
I. Army Uniform and Grooming Regulations
A. Religious Headgear

The Army's uniform regulations permit soldiers to wear religious apparel while in uniform, including religious "headgear," if the apparel is "neat and conservative" and it will not "interfere with the performance of military duties." Army Regulation ("A.R.") 600-20 (Nov. 6, 2014), Regulatory App'x to Defs.' Mot. [Dkt. # 21-4, 26] ("A.R. 600-20") at A024. Soldiers in uniform may wear religious headgear if:

1. The religious headgear is subdued in color ....
2. The religious
...

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