Singh v. United States
| Decision Date | 01 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-4872-SAC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | AMARPREET SINGH, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES ("USCIS"); U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE; and MICHELLE E. PERRY, FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR, KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE OF USCIS, Defendants. |
The case comes before the court on the defendants' (collectively referred to as "USCIS") motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief. (Dk. 21). The plaintiff Amarpreet Singh ("Singh") filed his action pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) seeking de novo review of the denial of his naturalization application. The USCIS denied his application in a written opinion on March 21, 2014, on the ground that Singh had "been convicted of an aggravated felony on or after November 29, 1990," which made him "permanently ineligible for naturalization." (Dk. 22-3, p. 3; see Dk. 1, Petition, ¶ 11). Singh now seeks review arguing that his conviction is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N), as it does not relate to alien smuggling.
The defendants assert they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the following statutes and admissions by the plaintiff. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), an applicant for naturalization must be "a person of good moral character." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). The INA provides that "[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good moral character who . . . at any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony (as defined in subsection (a)(43))." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8). The INA's definition of "aggravated felony" at subsection (a)(43) includes:
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or (2)] (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (an no other individual) to violate a provision of this act;
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N). In his petition, Singh admits his 2009 felony conviction of "the offense for concealing and harboring aliens for commercial advantage and private financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)." (Dk. 1, ¶ 7). The USCIS concludes this admission establishes that Singh has an aggravated felony conviction as defined by statute and, therefore, he lacks the good moral character required for an applicant seeking naturalization. Singh latches onto the parenthetical phrase, "relating to alien smuggling," found in the aggravated felony definition of § 1101(a)(43)(N) and reads it as an necessary element for the definition. Thus, Singh seeks review arguing that his offense of conviction does not relate to alien smuggling for he was charged and convicted ofemploying at his restaurant three individuals who were not authorized to work in the United States.
After reading, researching, and considering all the arguments and issues raised in the plaintiff's petition (Dk. 1), his memorandum of law in support of his petition (Dk. 3), and the parties' briefs submitted for this motion proceeding (Dks. 21, 22, 25 and 26), the court concludes its de novo review is controlled by a question of law, namely the construction of § 1101(a)(43)(N), and its decision is subject to Tenth Circuit precedent. The court can and will address the plaintiff's conclusions of law argued in all of his memoranda to the extent pertinent in the court's analysis. The plaintiff has conceded it is a "legal conclusion" whether his "conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony." (Dk. 25, p. 4). His factual allegations over the character of his felony conviction are not an issue in deciding the defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that as a matter of law it cannot grant the relief requested in the plaintiff's petition.
STANDARDS FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Cop. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court accepts as true "all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view[s] these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Smith v. UnitedStates, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir.2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1148 (2010). On a motion to dismiss, courts apply the general rule of considering only the contents of the complaint. Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir.2010). Exceptions to this rule include the following: documents expressly incorporated by reference in the complaint; documents referenced in and central to the complaint, when no party disputes authenticity; and "'matters of which a court may take judicial notice.'" Id. (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). The defendants have submitted copies of documents principally referenced in the plaintiff's petition, and there appears to be no dispute over their authenticity.
PLEADED AND UNDISPUTED FACTS FOR RULING ON MOTION
Amarpreet Singh ("Singh") is a native and citizen of India who entered the United States in October of 1997 under an entertainment visa and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in March of 2001. He is married to a naturalized United States citizen. He has two children who are both United States citizens by birth.
A judgment of conviction was entered against Singh on December 3, 2009, finding him guilty on three counts of concealing and harboring an alien for commercial advantage and private financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The superseding federal indictment alleged that Singh employed three individuals in his Topeka restaurant whowere not authorized to work in the United States. He was sentenced to a concurrent term of two years of imprisonment on these counts with two years of supervised release. He was released from prison in May of 2011.
Upon release, Singh was placed in removal proceedings where he filed an application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals granted the adjustment upon finding that his "crime did not relate to alien smuggling for inadmissibility purposes under INA section 212(a)(6)(E)." (Dk. 1, p. 5). The Board's decision reads in part:
On November 25, 2013, Singh applied for naturalization and appeared for his naturalization interview on February 20, 2014. The written decision dated March 21, 2014, denied his application and stated in part:
To be eligible for naturalization, you must demonstrate that you are a person of good moral character. Because you have been convicted of an aggravated felony on or after November 29, 1990, you are permanently ineligible for naturalization. See INA 316(a)(3) and 101(f)(8) and Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations (8CFR), section 316.10(b)(1)(ii).
(Dk. 1, ¶ 11; Dk. 22-3, p. 3). Singh's request for a hearing was denied, and the denial decision was affirmed. (Dk. 1, ¶ 12).
DISCUSSION
As already summarized above, the INA requires an applicant for naturalization to have "good moral character" which is defined, in part, as not having an aggravated felony conviction for any of the listed criminal offenses which includes 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A). Because of Singh's 2009 felony conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A), the USCIS found Singh permanently ineligible for naturalization. Singh now seeks judicial review.
Following the immigration hearing officer's denial of his application for naturalization, the applicant may seek judicial review in the United States District Court. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). "Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on application." Id. In seeking citizenship, the alien applicant has the burden "to show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect." Berenyi v. District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967). The applicable regulation places the burden of proof on the applicant "of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she meets all of the requirements for naturalization." 8 C.F.R. § 316.2(b). The Supreme Court has said that in this context, "doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant." Berenyi, 385 U.S. at 637.
A ruling at this stage of the proceedings is proper because the parties dispute only the scope of the governing statute and the legalconsequences flowing from it. There is no dispute that Singh was convicted of an offense in violation 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) which is a listed "aggravated felony" that prevents him from meeting his burden of proving "good moral character." The only dispute here is with this particular definition of "aggravated felony" at subsection (a)(43)(N):
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of section 274(a) [8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A) or (2)] (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abetting, or aiding only the...
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