Singhal v. Doughnut Plant, Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-3295 (ALC) |
| Parties | ANJALI SINGHAL, Plaintiff, v. DOUGHNUT PLANT, INC. ET AL. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Anjali Singhal brings this action against Defendants Doughnut Plant, Inc., Doughnut Plant Management Inc., The International Donut Plant LLC, (collectively, “Doughnut Plant”) and Mark Isreal for pregnancy discrimination sex discrimination, gender discrimination, familial status discrimination, interference, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.§ 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), the New York State Human Rights Law Executive Law, § 296 et seq. (“NYSHRL”), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§8-101 et seq. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is denied in part and granted in part.
When determining whether to dismiss a case, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011). The following facts, alleged in the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 25, are thus assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.[1]
Plaintiff served as outside legal counsel for Doughnut Plant. Am Compl. ¶ 14. On June 26, 2016, Doughnut Plant hired Plaintiff as its Chief Management Officer (“CMO”) and General Counsel (“GC”). Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff alleges that Doughnut Plant claimed they were unable to afford payroll taxes and employee benefits therefore, Doughnut Plant paid Plaintiff through an incorporated entity “Singhal & Associates, ” and required her to submit weekly timesheets in the same format she had submitted while working as outside legal counsel Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Doughnut Plant told Plaintiff this was a temporary arrangement and her benefits would accrue retroactively. Id. ¶ 24. Additionally, while Plaintiff was employed as GC, Doughnut Plant was Singhal & Associate's only source of income. Id. ¶ 25.
On February 14, 2018, Plaintiff informed Isreal, owner and Chief Executive Officer of Doughnut Plant, that she was pregnant and would need parental leave. Id. ¶¶ 12, 27. Isreal responded that he “could no longer afford to pay Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff told Isreal that termination of her employment due to her pregnancy was unlawful discrimination; Isreal then retreated and said that Plaintiff could work, but only on “specific urgent matters.” Id. ¶¶ 29-30. On February 27, 2018, Plaintiff confronted Isreal about another employee's raise in light of Plaintiff's “demotion” due to financial concerns, and Isreal told Plaintiff she could return to her normal workload and previous position. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
Subsequently, Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and harassment. She alleges, among other things, that she was subject to a hostile work environment and demoted in duties, hours, and pay. Id. ¶¶ 39-42. On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff submitted to Doughnut Plant's Human Resources coordinator a complaint stating that she was “singled out for discriminatory treatment because [she is] female, minority, and/or pregnant. Id. ¶ 43. The discrimination and harassment intensified after she submitted her complaint. Id. ¶ 44. For example, Doughnut Plant excluded Plaintiff from meetings, removed her responsibilities, and withheld information she needed to perform her duties. Id. ¶ 45. Doughnut Plant's non-pregnant employees did not experience this behavior. Id.
On April 4, 2018, Plaintiff met with Isreal and asked whether other similarly situated employees experienced adverse employment actions due to Doughnut Plant's financial issues, to which Isreal responded that the hours of a recently-hired dishwasher were reduced. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
On April 12, 2018, Defendants offered Plaintiff her previous job as outside legal counsel if she would sign a release and resign from her role as GC and CMO. Id. ¶ 53. She rejected the offer. Id. On April 20, 2018, Defendants insisted that Plaintiff attend a mediation session, attend without counsel, and sign a confidentiality agreement. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Plaintiff refused the request, instead offering the alternative of a mutually-arranged mediation in which she could be represented by counsel. Id. ¶ 55. Defendants did not follow up on her proposal. Id.
On May 3, 2018, Plaintiff asked Isreal for an update regarding her discrimination complaint. Id. ¶ 56. On May 4, 2018, Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment. Id. ¶ 57. On May 17, 2018, Defendants sent Plaintiff a letter, threatening to take action against her law license if she did not provide Defendants with certain information. Id. ¶ 58.
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 27, 2020. ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 6, 2020. ECF No 22. On October 21, 2020, Plaintiff amended her complaint. ECF No. 25. On November 11, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 28. On November 25, 2020, Plaintiff filed her memorandum of law in opposition. ECF No. 32. On December 9, 2020, Defendants submitted their reply memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. ECF No. 35.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “assume all ‘well-pleaded factual allegations' to be true, and ‘determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'” Selevan v. New York Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Allegations that are “no more than conclusions[ ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” and “ ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement' ” or “the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” are not sufficient to show that a plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 557 (2007)). Nor must a court accept as true “legal conclusions” or “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id.
Title VII, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the three-part burden shifting scheme the Supreme Court set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). See Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears an initial burden of “proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.” Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, a presumption of discrimination or retaliation arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Sharpe v. MCI Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 684 F.Supp.2d 394, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Stratton v. Dep't for the Aging, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir. 1997)). If the defendant is able to offer a legitimate basis for the decision, the plaintiff must then establish that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual and that the defendant's act was at least partially motivated by discrimination. Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2001).
Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of an “individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. To establish aprima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).[2] Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claims fail because she is an independent contractor, rather than an employee. Only employees, not independent contractors, are covered by Title VII. See Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). In general, “[determining whether a person is an employee under Title VII is a fact intensive determination.” Meyenhofer v. Larsen & Toubro Infotech Ltd., 503 F.Supp.3d 39, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). This determination is made by weighing the thirteen factors established in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989):
[1] the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished ... [;][2] the skill required; [3] the source of the instrumentalities and tools; [4] the location of the work; [5] the duration of the relationship between the parties; [6] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; [7] the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; [8] the method of payment; [9] the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; [10] whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; [11] whether the hiring party is in business; [12] the provision of employee benefits; and [13] the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52 (quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490...
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