Singletary v. Manor Healthcare Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 40808–2–II.,40808–2–II.
• Citation: 271 P.3d 356
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Glenda SINGLETARY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. MANOR HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, and Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington, Defendants/Respondents.

271 P.3d 356

Glenda SINGLETARY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.MANOR HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, and Department of Labor and Industries of the State of Washington, Defendants/Respondents.

No. 40808–2–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Feb. 28, 2012.

Karla Elizabeth Rood, Vail, Cross & Associates, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.

Brad G. Garber, Lawrence Edward Mann, Wallace Klor & Mann PC, Lake Oswego, OR, Steve Vinyard, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for Respondents.

WORSWICK, A.C.J.

¶ 1Glenda Singletary, an injured worker who previously worked for Manor Healthcare Corporation, appeals a superior court order granting summary judgment on her appeal of a Department of Labor and Industries(Department)Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals(Board) decision.Singletary contends that because she did not receive notice of the order closing her claim, the Department, Board, and superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to further adjudicate her claim.We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Singletary suffered a shoulder injury on June 16, 2001 during the course of her employment with Manor.^1,2She filed a benefit application with the Department a month later.The Department allowed her claim, and Singletary received workers' compensation benefits.Then on June 26, 2002, Manor issued an order ending time loss compensation as paid to August 3, 2002, and closing the claim effective June 26, 2002 without any further award for time loss or permanent partial disability.But Manor incorrectly addressed its closing order, and Singletary never received it.

¶ 3 Despite never receiving Manor's 2002 order closing her claim, Singletary filed an application with the Department to reopen her claim for aggravation of her injury on June 20, 2003.In her application to reopen her claim, Singletary stated that her claim was closed on June 27, 2002.The Department reopened her claim effective June 12, 2003 for treatment.

¶ 4 Then, two years later, on July 29, 2005, the Department closed the claim with time loss compensation as paid to January 23, 2004, but without a further award for time loss or permanent partial disability.Singletary filed a protest and request for reconsideration of this order, which the Department denied in December 2005.Singletary filed an appeal with the Board from the Department's December order denying reconsideration of its July 2005 closing order.

¶ 5 The Board scheduled two hearings for early December 2006, to allow Singletary to present evidence supporting her appeal.However, before the scheduled December evidentiary hearings, Singletary moved the Board to remand to the Department, claiming that the Board did not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of her claim because she never received Manor's 2002 closing order.Based on Singletary's motion, the Board scheduled a November 9 jurisdictional hearing.Then, Singletary moved to strike the December evidentiary hearing dates pending the outcome of the jurisdictional hearing, which the Board denied.On interlocutory review, an industrial appeals judge (IAJ) found that the Board had jurisdiction over Singletary's appeal of the Department's December 2005 order.The IAJ concluded that Singletary likely received Manor's 2002 closing order because Manor used the correct zip code, the postal service did not return it to Manor, and Singletary closely approximated the actual closing date in her 2003application to reopen her claim.

¶ 6 Instead of presenting evidence to support her claim at the December evidentiary hearings, Singletary notified the Board that she intended to rest on her jurisdictional argument.Although Singletary attended the evidentiary hearings, she declined to present any evidence whatsoever.The Board dismissed the appeal because Singletary failed to present any evidence.Singletary moved for reconsideration, but the Board denied that request.

¶ 7 Singletary then appealed the Board's order denying reconsideration to the superior court.Manor then filed for summary judgment, and Singletary filed a cross motion.Manor argued that the Board properly dismissed Singletary's appeal.Singletary argued that, because she never received the 2002 order closing her claim, all subsequent Department action was void, and neither the Board nor the superior court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a void 2005 Department order.

¶ 8 After hearings on the matter, the trial court ultimately entered an order reversing the Board's order dismissing Singletary's appeal for failing to present evidence and remanding the case to the Board to allow Singletary to present additional evidence on her entitlement to benefits for the period of time between the date Manor said her claim was closed in 2002 and the effective date her claim was reopened for treatment in 2003.In making this order, the superior court acknowledged that Singletary “did not previously seek benefits for the time post-closing order to June 2003 and since the closing order was not properly communicated to her, [Singletary] would still be entitled to seek benefits from that time until the time when the claim was reopened.”Clerk's Papers(CP)at 100.Singletary now appeals.Neither Manor nor the Department filed a cross appeal.

ANALYSIS

¶ 9 Singletary raises two primary arguments on appeal.First, she argues that Manor's failure to properly communicate the closing order to her deprived the Department of jurisdiction over all future related claims.Second, as an extension of the jurisdictional argument, she disagrees with the trial court's order giving her the opportunity to present evidence to the Board on her entitlement to benefits for the time period between the closing of her original claim and its reopening in 2003.Singletary asks us to reverse the superior court and to remand to the Department with instructions for it to properly communicate the 2002 closing order to her.The Department, although it did not file a cross appeal, encourages us to reverse the trial court and simply affirm the Board's decision that found jurisdiction and dismissed Singletary's claim for failure to present evidence.Because the Department did not cross-appeal, we decline to grant the Department's request for affirmative relief in accordance with RAP 2.4(a).Rather, we affirm the superior court order.

I.Standard of Review

¶ 10 When a superior court reviews a board decision, it relies only on the certified board record but considers issues de novo.Malang v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,139 Wash.App. 677, 683, 162 P.3d 450(2007).On review in superior court, the party challenging the board's decision bears the burden of proof because the board's decision is presumed correct.Ruse v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,138 Wash.2d 1, 5, 977 P.2d 570(1999).Because this dispute was resolved by summary judgment in which the material facts are undisputed, the questions presented are all questions of law.SeeHill v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,161 Wash.App. 286, 292, 253 P.3d 430(2011).Since the issues on appeal are limited to questions of law, our review is de novo.Hill,161 Wash.App. at 292, 253 P.3d 430.

II.Jurisdiction

¶ 11 Singletary first contends that the Department, Board, and superior court all lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Manor failed to properly communicate its June 26, 2002 closing order to her.She argues that all action on her claim after 2002 was void.³We disagree.

¶ 12 The Department concedes that Manor's failure to properly communicate the 2002 closing order to Singletary means that the 2002 closing order is not a final order.We accept the Department's concession.⁴

¶ 13 Under the Industrial Insurance Act (IIA),⁵ the Department errs if it reopens a workers' compensation claim for further treatment based on worsening of the injury before there is a final order closing the worker's claim.SeeReid v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,1 Wash.2d 430, 436–38, 96 P.2d 492(1939).However, even if the Department enters a legally incorrect order, that order becomes final and binding on all parties if they do not appeal it within the specified time frame.Marley v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,125 Wash.2d 533, 542–43, 886 P.2d 189(1994).

¶ 14 The only way a claimant can avoid an unappealed final order is if that order was void when entered.Marley,125 Wash.2d at 539–41, 886 P.2d 189.Legal errors in unappealed orders do not render that order void.Kingery v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,132 Wash.2d 162, 170, 937 P.2d 565(1997).Orders are only void when entered if the Department, Board, or court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.⁶Marley,125 Wash.2d at 541, 886 P.2d 189.

¶ 15 A tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction only if it ventures to decide a “type of controversy” over which it lacks authority.Marley,125 Wash.2d at 539, 886 P.2d 189.The type of controversy over which an agency or tribunal has subject matter jurisdiction refers to the general category of controversies it has authority to decide and is distinct from the facts of any specific case.Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor and Indus.,150 Wash.2d 310, 317, 76 P.3d 1183(2003).Moreover, neither the Department nor a tribunal “lack subject matter jurisdiction solely because it may lack authority to enter a given order.”Marley,125 Wash.2d at 539, 886 P.2d 189.“Obviously the power to decide [a type of controversy] includes the power to decide wrong, and an erroneous decision is as binding as one that is correct.”Marley,125 Wash.2d at 543, 886 P.2d 189(quotingDike v. Dike,75 Wash.2d 1, 8, 448 P.2d 490(1968)).

¶ 16 In establishing subject matter jurisdiction, our inquiry focuses on the “type of controversy” because, if it is within the tribunal's given subject matter jurisdiction, all other errors “go to something other than subject matter jurisdiction.”Dougherty,150 Wash.2d at 316, 76 P.3d 1183(quotingMarley,125 Wash.2d at 539, 886 P.2d 189);Sprint Spectrum, LP v. Dep't of Revenue,156 Wash.App. 949, 964–65, 235 P.3d...