Singleton v. Chevron USA, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1199.
• Citation: 835 F.Supp.2d 144
• Parties: SINGLETON et al. v. CHEVRON USA, INC. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

835 F.Supp.2d 144

SINGLETON et al.

v.CHEVRON USA, INC. et al.

Civil Action No. 11–1199.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

July 21, 2011.

L. Eric Williams, Jr., Williams Law Office, LLC, Richard Julius Fernandez, Amber E. Cisney, Richard J. Fernandez, LLC, Metairie, LA, for Singleton et al.

Gary A. Bezet, Allison N. Benoit, Barrye Panepinto Miyagi, Carol L. Galloway, Gayla M. Moncla, Gregory M. Anding, Janice M. Culotta, Robert E. Dille, Sarah Katharine Weissman, Kean Miller, James F. d'Entremont, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Baton Rouge, LA, Anthony M. Williams, Kean Miller LLP, Barbara Lee Arras, Phelps Dunbar, LLP, Lawrence Emerson Abbott, Charles H. Abbott, Ryan C. Wallis, Cotten, Schmidt & Abbott, LLP, Tim Gray, Molly Marie Gattuso, Forman, Perry, Watkins, Krutz & Tardy, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Andrew D. Weinstock, Joseph G. Glass, Duplass, Zwain, Bourgeois, Pfister & Weinstock, Metairie, LA, for Chevron USA, Inc. et al.

ORDER AND REASONS

CARL J. BARBIER, District Judge.

Before the Court are Defendant Valspar Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 28), and Plaintiff's Opposition (Rec. Doc. 33). The motion is before the Court on supporting memoranda, without oral argument. Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 28) should be DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS:

The Plaintiffs' claims arise from Mr. William Singleton's alleged exposure to products containing benzene during his several jobs held while working with a number of paints, thinners, and other substances. Mr. Singleton worked at Evans Cooperage in Harvey, Louisiana in the 1950s, where he filled drums from barges with benzene, naphtha, and liquid asphalt. He was a painter from 1990 through 1997 at Avondale Shipyard and performed various tasks there, including painting and cleaning paint with benzene-containing products such as paints, solvents, primers, mineral spirits, and thinners. Mr. Singleton used Liquid Wrench from 1955 through 1978 while working on bikes, cars, lawnmowers, and scrap metal.

In 2009, Mr. Singleton was diagnosed with multiple myeloma. In April 2011, he learned that his illness could have been caused by his exposure to benzene-containing products. His exposure to benzene and benzene-containing products allegedly occurred daily over the course of his 42 years of work at various locations for various, unknown employers, while he labored as a painter, mechanic, construction worker, and drum filler.

On May 20, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a complaint (Rec. Doc. 1) against eight defendants, including Valspar. The complaint alleges causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and Louisiana Products LiabilityAct (“LPLA”) claims, for damages associated with Mr. Singleton's contraction of myeloma. The complaint alleges that the defendants, including Valspar, are manufacturers who knew or should have known that exposure to benzene causes leukemia and other blood disorders, and that Valspar failed to warn Mr. Singleton of the dangers of its benzene-containing products. Defendant Valspar filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

The issue is whether Plaintiffs have pled Mr. Singleton's personal injury claims with the requisite specificity demanded by Rule 8(a)(2), and relatedly, whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS:

Defendant Valspar's main defense is that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), specifically as interpreted under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, i.e., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' complaint contains little more than generalities and conclusory allegations, and that therefore the complaint states no cause of action. Specifically, Valspar argues that the complaint does not adequately specify which Valspar product, among the hundreds it manufactures, caused the alleged injury. The only specific reference in Plaintiffs' complaint to Valspar products is that Mr. Singleton used “Valspar plastic primers, paints and thinners” (Rec. Doc. 1, at 4, ¶ 7). Valspar also objects to the complaint's failure to specify where Mr. Singleton allegedly used Valspar products, and exactly when during the overarching 42–year–period of alleged exposure that such products were used.

In addition to labeling Plaintiffs' complaint as inadequate for failure to state the “what, when, and where” of Mr. Singleton's alleged benzene exposure, Defendant Valspar apparently argues that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the Rule 8 standard that requires facts that prove causation. Although acknowledging that the complaint does set out the hazards of benzene in causing myeloma, Valspar argues that the complaint utterly lacks any factual support to establish that the unidentified Valspar product contained benzene. It argues that it is unfathomable that Plaintiffs can assert that Valspar's product contained benzene, or that it lacked adequate warnings, because the complaint fails to even name the product that Mr. Singleton used. As to the negligence and strict liability claims, if Plaintiffs cannot allege the name of the Valspar product, there is no basis from which Plaintiffs can in good faith assert violation of a duty (in the case of negligence), or the defective or unreasonably dangerous nature of the product (in the case of strict liability). Further, Valspar states that the LPLA requires, at a minimum, that the complaint identify the allegedly unreasonably dangerous product. This argument is based on the fact that the four elements of an LPLA cause of action all presuppose that the manufacturer made a certain product. See Creighton v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 2008 WL 1746953, *2–3 (E.D.La.2008) (stating that the four elements are: (1) the defendant manufactured the product; (2) the damage was proximately caused by a characteristic of the product; (3) the product was unreasonably dangerous in one of the four ways provided for by the LPLA; and (4) the damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product).

As a secondary matter, Valspar argues that its motion to dismiss should be granted as to the negligence and strict liability claims because the LPLA applies to Mr. Singleton's exposure to the benzene-containing products. The LPLA establishes the exclusive theory of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.52. Thus, Valspar cites a line of cases holding that independent claims such as Plaintiffs' claims in negligence and strict liability are barred to the extent that Valspar's potential liability is governed by the LPLA.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that their complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2) in adequately setting forth a short and plain statement showing their entitlement to relief. Initially, Plaintiffs argue that one of Defendant's cited cases ( Rojas v. Qualitest Pharms., Inc., 2011 WL 334671, *2 (E.D.La.2011)) is inapplicable because the plaintiff in that case failed to oppose the motion to dismiss and to identify the manufacturer of the medication at issue. However, Plaintiffs' main argument is that the factual details demanded by Defendant are more properly learned through the discovery process. Plaintiffs argue that the complaint adequately states the factual information necessary to state a claim against Defendant Valspar, so as to avoid dismissal at this stage of the litigation.

As to whether claims in strict liability and negligence can coexist with LPLA claims, Plaintiffs point to the “significant exposure theory” that applies to long latency diseases such as myeloma, which states that the relevant events giving rise to such a disease are the repeated tortious exposures resulting in continuous, on-going damages. Plaintiff cites Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, which states that the LPLA applies prospectively only. Gilboy v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 582 So.2d 1263, 1264–65 (La.1991). If the significant exposure occurred prior to the effective date of the LPLA, then pre-LPLA law applies, which includes claims for negligence and strict liability. Plaintiff argues that prior to discovery, it is premature for the Court to decide when Mr. Singleton's alleged substantial exposure occurred, and therefore which body of law will apply to the resolution of Plaintiffs' claims.

In the alternative, Plaintiffs ask that if the Court grants the motion to dismiss, that they be afforded an opportunity to amend the complaint to include facts that the Court deems necessary.

DISCUSSION:A. Legal Standard

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005). The allegations “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d)(1).

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