Singleton v. City of E. Peoria
| Decision Date | 08 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-1503 |
| Parties | LEON J. SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EAST PEORIA, JEFFREY A. BIEBER, MATTHEW BOLTON, and PATRICK PATTERSON Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Leon J. Singleton has filed a Second Amended Complaint against the East Peoria Police Department and three of its officers based on a traffic stop that occurred in late fall of 2015. He alleges that Defendants violated his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His previous two complaints (Docs. 1 and 5) were dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
This matter is currently before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 11) and Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 10). Plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis, but the Court will not recruit counsel at this time. In considering Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court has screened Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Some of Plaintiff's claims are sufficiently pleaded, but others must be dismissed. As the surviving claims could interfere with state charges that are currently pending against Plaintiff, this matter must be stayed until those proceedings reach a resolution.
Plaintiff Leon Singleton is a fifty-four year old Black man. (Doc. 9 at 4). In the fall of 2015, he worked as a "cook-partner" in the kitchen at the Sunnyland 1 Stop bar in East Peoria, Illinois. (Id.). On October 31, 2015, he was working, and the bar was open late and hosting a band. (Id. at 5). When he took a cigarette break at around 11 or 11:30 p.m., he noticed that Defendant Patrick Patterson's police car was parked at the entrance of the band's parking lot. (Id. at 5, 10). Patterson, an East Peoria police officer, had been "sitting" in the lot for an extended period of time that evening. (Id. at 10). The customers noticed, too: people coming outside to smoke began to leave and new customers stopped coming inside. (Id. at 5).
With business declining, Plaintiff and the bartender decided to stop the band around midnight. (Id.). Plaintiff moved his car, a 2000 Jaguar, so the band could load up its equipment more easily and leave. (Id. at 5, 7). Defendant Patterson left the parking lot just before the band left. (Id. at 5). However, he told Defendant Jeffrey Bieber, another East Peoria police officer, to "keep an eye" on Plaintiff's car, which he said was "suspicious." (Id. at 5, 10).
Plaintiff left the bar by car shortly after the band left, and began to return home to his apartment in Peoria. (Id. at 5). When he was three blocks into his drive, Defendant Bieber began following him in a police car. (Id.). Bieber continued to follow him as he drove toward East Peoria, got onto westbound Interstate 74, and then exited the interstate to take the fly-over ramp toward downtown Peoria, Illinois. (Id.).
As Plaintiff was exiting the fly-over ramp, Bieber activated his lights and pulled him over. (Id.). Plaintiff insists that there was no reason for Bieber to pull him over. He had been following all traffic laws, was not speeding, and signaled when required. (Id.). Bieber, however, told Plaintiff that he was "all over the ramp." (Id. at 6).
After pulling Plaintiff over, Bieber took his license and registration, and later asked him to step out of the car. (Id.). Bieber "patted [Plaintiff] down," and administered a breathalyzer test, which indicated that Plaintiff's blood alcohol content was below .08 percent. Defendant then began to give Plaintiff a battery of field sobriety tests. (Id.). When Plaintiff told Bieber that he could not "walk a line" because of a bad right knee and medications he had taken, Bieber placed him under arrest for driving under the influence. (Id.).
Other police officers arrived on the scene after Bieber pulled Plaintiff over, including Defendant Patterson. While Bieber was searching Plaintiff and administering field sobriety tests, Defendants Patterson and two other police officers searched his car and the trunk of his car. Before searching the trunk, Patterson said, "I hope there is something in here we can get him on." (Id.). The officers found a "cup . . . from home" in the car that "had a small amount of alcohol in it." (Id. at 7).
Officer Bieber took Plaintiff to a police station in East Peoria, where he questioned him repeatedly about "guys named Kevin or Brandon" and whether he knew "anything about drug activity at Sunnyland 1 Stop." (Id. at 6). During this interrogation, Plaintiff told Bieber that he believed he had been racially profiled.(Id. at 6-7). Bieber and Patterson laughed off this accusation. (Id.). Bieber then proceeded to issue Plaintiff with three citations: one for driving under the influence, one for improper lane usage, and one for illegal transportation of alcohol. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff was then released. (Id.). He picked up his impounded car the following day. (Id.). The citations remain pending.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), "any court of the United States may authorize the commencement . . . of any suit, action or proceeding . . . without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets . . . ." The same section instructs that courts "shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted." Id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Dismissals pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are treated in the same manner as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, the court must take "all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view[] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.
A plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient detail to give notice of the claim, and the allegations must "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative level.'" EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plausibility standard requires enough facts "to present a story that holds together," but does not require a determination ofprobability. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Though detailed factual allegations are not needed, a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Pro se complaints are to be liberally construed and "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per curiam).
As it must, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff is attempting to state five claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, he claims that Defendant Bieber stopped him without probable cause. Second, he claims that Defendant Bieber unreasonably searched him. Third, he claims that Defendant Patterson unreasonably searched his car. Fourth, he claims that Defendant Bieber racially profiled him, and that the East Peoria police department has engaged in a pattern and practice of racial profiling. Fifth, he alleges that Defendants Bieber, Patterson, and Michael Bolton engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. Plaintiff has stated a claim that Defendants Bieber violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably stopping him and patting him down, and that Defendant Patterson violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably searching his car. But he has failed to state any other claim on which relief can be granted.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bieber unreasonably stopped him. "An officer's temporary detention of an individual during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure of a person . . . and thus must be reasonable under the circumstances." Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 2014). If an officer has "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot," he "may conduct an investigatory stop of a person." Id. (quoting United States v. Riley, 493 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2007)). In order to have stopped Plaintiff, the officer must have had "a reasonable articulable suspicion that [he] had committed, [was] committing, or [was] about to commit an offense," including a traffic offense. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Bieber stopped him without any basis. Plaintiff asserts that he "followed all traffic laws," "did not speed," and "signaled when required." (Doc. 9 at 5). He also denies that he was "all over the bridge," contrary to the arresting officer's statements. (Id. at 6). These allegations sufficiently state a claim that the officer unreasonably seized him by pulling him over. See Huff, 744 F.3d at 1004.
Plaintiff also claims that Bieber subjected him to an unreasonable search when he patted him down and then required that he perform a number of field sobriety tests.
Plaintiff has stated a claim that Bieber violated the Fourth Amendment by frisking him prior to administering the sobriety tests. "In the context of a traffic stop, an officer may conduct a pat-down search when two conditions are met." Huff, 744 F.3d at 1009. "First, the investigatory stop must be lawful." Id. (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009)). Second, the officer "must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous." Id. (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327). Here, as Plaintiff has stated a claim that he was unlawfully stopped, his claim that he was unreasonably searched is also sufficient. See id. Moreover, nothing in the Second Amended Complaint suggests facts that would support a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was armed and dangerous. See id...
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