Singleton v. Cnty. of Riverside
| Decision Date | 28 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | EDCV 21-2164 AB (PVC) |
| Parties | DEVIN SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 29, 2021, Plaintiff Devin Singleton, a California resident proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (“Complaint, ” Dkt. No. 1). On January 6, 2022 the Court granted Plaintiff's application for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. (Dkt. No. 5). The Court dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend on March 11, 2022 due to pleading defects. (“ODLA, ” Dkt. No. 6). On April 11, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant First Amended Complaint. (“FAC, ” Dkt. No. 7).
In civil actions where the plaintiff is proceeding IFP, Congress requires district courts to dismiss the complaint if the court determines that the complaint, or any portion thereof, (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While the First Amended Complaint addressed some of the defects in the original Complaint and reflects that Plaintiff made a concerted effort to follow the Court's directions in the ODLA, it still suffers from several pleading deficiencies. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, the First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend.
Plaintiff sues the Riverside County D.P.S.S. (Department of Public Social Services) and one of its employees, social worker Dion Williams. (FAC at 3). Williams is sued in his official capacity only.[1] (Id.).
The First Amended Complaint is very short on detail and appears to assume familiarity with facts that are not clearly alleged. Plaintiff states that on February 17, 2015, Williams falsely stated in an otherwise unidentified investigative report/dependency affidavit that Plaintiff had had sex with his former girlfriend when she was sixteen years old. (Id. at 5). Williams apparently repeated that falsehood in a court proceeding on June 30, 2021, even though Plaintiff expressly told him that he “never did such an act with this individual at anytime as a minor.” (Id. at 3, 5). Plaintiff maintains that the Riverside County D.P.S.S. is liable because when its “personnel act on behalf of the County for an investigation, the County is essential in the investigation.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff contends that Williams is liable because “social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity from claims that they fabricated evidence during an investigation or made a false statements [sic] in a dependency petition that they signed under penalty of perjury.” (Id. at 6).[2]
The First Amended Complaint appears to raise a single cause of action. Plaintiff claims that he suffered a “deprivation of Civil Rights” due to Defendants' “violation of [his] 14th amendment” rights. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages of $750, 000. (Id.).
When screening a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it states a claim upon which relief can be granted, courts apply the pleading standard set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (). To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); see also Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 2013). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (). Similarly, courts will not “accept any unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 2017) (); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) ().
Pro se pleadings are “held to less stringent standards” than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Where a plaintiff is appearing Pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, courts construe pleadings liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). However, even in giving liberal interpretation to a complaint, courts “‘may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.'” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Before dismissing a Pro se civil rights complaint, a plaintiff should be given “notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint” with “an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear [the deficiencies] cannot be cured by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1998) (). However, Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Where amendment of the pleading would be futile, leave to amend is properly denied. Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2010).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint due to defects in pleading. Pro se litigants in civil rights cases, however, must be given leave to amend their complaints unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. Accordingly, the Court grants leave to amend.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Rule 8 may be violated when a pleading “says too little, ” and “when a pleading says too much.” Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). A complaint violates Rule 8 if a defendant would have difficulty understanding and responding to the complaint. See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058.
Here the First Amended Complaint violates Rule 8(a) because it says too little. There are almost no factual details to give context to Plaintiff's assertions. For example, the FAC contains references to an “investigative report/dependency affidavit, ” (FAC at 4), and a “dependency petition, ” (id. at 6), which at least suggest that Plaintiff's claims arise from dependency proceedings that potentially concerned the custody of a child. At no point, however, does the FAC ever state that Plaintiff is the father of a child, or identify the mother of the child, or describe the circumstances that necessitated an investigation into the child's custody or the court proceedings in which Williams purportedly testified. The FAC also does not explain what Williams' 2015 “report” was, how it was used, or when and how Plaintiff came to learn of its existence. The FAC does not even state with any precision what Williams' false statements were. Although the FAC summarily asserts that Williams falsely stated that Plaintiff had slept with his former girlfriend when she was still a minor, it is not clear whether Williams affirmatively concluded following his investigation that Plaintiff had slept with his girlfriend while she was underage, or whether he was simply reporting what Plaintiff's...
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