Singleton v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 14 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 21-1914 (RJL) |
| Parties | TYRELL DIVONNE SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
(SEPTEMBER [DKT#11]
Following his arrest by District of Columbia police officers, plaintiff Tyrell Singleton (“plaintiff' or “Singleton”) filed suit against the District of Columbia (“D.C.”), the Chief of Police, two individual defendants (Sergeant Sotelo and Officer O'Shea), and other unnamed Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers (collectively “defendants”). See Complaint (“Compl.”) [Dkt. #1]. Plaintiff raises an assortment of constitutional, statutory, and common law claims alleging, in general, that defendants violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights and assaulted and battered him. Defendants now move to dismiss or, in the alternative for summary judgment, for a variety of reasons, including failure to state a claim, failure to serve, and qualified immunity. See Defs.' Memo, in Support of Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) [Dkt. #11].
Because each of plaintiffs claims fails for at least one of the reasons identified by defendants, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.
Plaintiff alleges that he “attend[ed] a protest in Washington, D.C.” in May 2020 “following the arrest and murder of George Floyd on May 25, 2020.” Compl. ¶ 11. He claims that, after he “sought cover inside ... Walgreens” on 7th Street N.W. after MPD officers sprayed tear gas, Officer O'Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and other unnamed MPD officers “forcibly removed” him from Walgreens and “dragged [him] through mounds of broken glass, hit him repeatedly with a baton, destroyed his phone and pinned him to the pavement after being put in handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 13-14. He further alleges that, despite his “pleas, assurances, proof and evidence that he was peaceably protesting and was not committing any crimes,” defendants “assaulted and battered” him. Id. ¶ 15. Officer O'Shea filed criminal charges against Singleton, alleging “Burglary II, Simple Assault and Resisting Arrest.” Id. ¶ 16. On February 9, 2021, the District filed a Notice of Nolle Prosequi and dismissed the charges. Id. ¶ 17.
Defendants reject plaintiff s account of the facts and submit body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage from Officer O'Shea, see Exhibit 2, Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“BWC”) [Dkt. #11-2], to support their account. According to defendants, MPD officers “responded to a radio bulletin about active looting taking place at the Walgreens” on 7th Street NW. MTD at 2. The footage shows Officer O'Shea approaching the Walgreens, with “no sign that chemical irritants have been deployed in the vicinity.” Id. Officer O'Shea enters the Walgreens through a broken window, which left broken glass on the sidewalk and inside Walgreens. Id. He encounters plaintiff, who “was carrying a garbage bag containing items” and “then slid[] legs-first through glass shards towards one of the broken windows.” Id. at 2-3. Through the broken window, plaintiff “encounters officers on the sidewalk, and a struggle ensues.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff “continues to resist” as the officers “try to detain” him. Id. “The officers are finally able to secure [p]laintiff in handcuffs,” and then “pull [him] over to an area near some MPD motorcycles.” Id. Officer O'Shea calls for a transport, and the officers eventually take plaintiff over to a curb to sit up and to re-handcuff his hands behind his back. Id. “Plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault on a police officer, second degree burglary, resisting arrest, and felony violation of the Riot Act,” and “was prosecuted for second degree burglary and assault on a police officer.” Id. The Superior Court dismissed the matter after a Notice of Nolle Prosequi by the U.S. Attorney's Office. Id.
On July 15, 2021, plaintiff filed his Complaint alleging nine counts: (1) violation of the First Amendment against D.C., Officer O' Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and unnamed officers; (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment against Officer O'Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and unnamed officers; (3) a Monell claim for municipal liability under § 1983 against D.C. and MPD; (4) battery against Officer O'Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and unnamed officers; (5) false arrest and illegal imprisonment against Officer O'Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and unnamed officers; (6) malicious prosecution against D.C., Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (‘TIED”) against D.C., Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo; (8) negligence against Officer O'Shea, Sergeant Sotelo, and unnamed officers; and (9) negligent supervision against MPD. See Compl. ¶¶ 29-78.
Defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See MTD. In support of their motion, defendants submitted the BWC footage, as well as screenshot images from the footage, the police offense report, the Superior Court docket, and the plaintiffs administrative notice to D.C. under D.C. Code § 12-309. See Exhibits, Defs. Mot. to Dismiss [Dkts. ##11-3, 11-4, 11-5, 11-6]. Defendants' motion is now ripe.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The allegations must allow the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Id. When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “assumes the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiffs favor.” Sissel v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Defendants argue that each of plaintiff s nine claims must be dismissed for a variety of reasons. At a minimum, defendants contend that the Chief of Police, Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to serve those defendants. See MTD at 7. And, defendants claim, plaintiffs claims of battery, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by the statute of limitations. See MTD at 8. Defendants further argue that plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim and that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs claim of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally MTD. Plaintiff disagrees on all counts and, in the alternative, suggests that the Court should provide leave for him to amend his Complaint. See generally Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp.”) [Dkt. #14], Unfortunately for plaintiff, I agree with defendants that all of plaintiffs claims must be dismissed and decline to grant plaintiff leave to amend.
First, defendants argue that this Court should dismiss the Chief of Police[1], Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo from the action because plaintiff failed to serve those defendants. MTD at 7.
Plaintiff had 90 days from the filing of his Complaint on July 15,2021 to serve those three defendants. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 4(m). Plaintiff failed to do so by the required deadline, October 13, 2021. Under Rule 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff- must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” In this Circuit, “good cause” is found “when some outside factor ...[,] rather than inadvertence or negligence, prevented service.” Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In his response to defendants' motion to dismiss the individual defendants based on failure to serve, plaintiff offers no explanation-let alone good cause-for his failure. See Opp. at 8-9. Plaintiff argues only that defendants “waived their right to contest adequate service” by filing their motion for summary judgment “attack[ing] the merits of [p]laintiff s complaint.” Opp. at 8. But that position is inconsistent with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and this Court's precedent. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), (g), (h); Wilson v. Prudential Fin., 332 F.Supp.2d 83, 89 (D.D.C. 2004).
Dismissal of the Chief of Police, Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo from plaintiffs suit is therefore appropriate. However, I nonetheless must address defendants' other arguments for dismissing each of the claims that plaintiff brought against the Chief of Police, Officer O'Shea, and Sergeant Sotelo because plaintiff also brought those claims against other defendants. Because, as explained below, each claim against the unserved defendants also fails for another reason, it will be efficient to address those claims as to the dismissed defendants regardless of the failure to serve. See McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 46, 68 (D.D.C. 2007) ().
Defendants next argue that the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claims of battery, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See MTD at 8.
Under D.C. law, actions for “battery” and ...
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