Singleton v. Doe

• Decision Date: 28 September 2016
• Docket Number: 14-CV-0303 (MKB)
• Citation: 210 F.Supp.3d 359
• Parties: Dwayne SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. Jane DOE, Housing Works Psychologist, Glenda Bubb, Parole Officer, and Denise Granum, Parole Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

210 F.Supp.3d 359

Dwayne SINGLETON, Plaintiff,

v.Jane DOE, Housing Works Psychologist, Glenda Bubb, Parole Officer, and Denise Granum, Parole Officer, Defendants.

14-CV-0303 (MKB)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 28, 2016

Dwayne Singleton, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

Mary Y. J. Kim, Office of NYS Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Dwayne Singleton, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated at Brooklyn Detention Complex, commenced this action on January 10, 2014 against Defendants Jane Doe, a Housing Works psychologist, and Glenda Bubb and Denise Granum, parole officers with the New York State Division of Parole, alleging violations of his constitutional due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl. 1, Docket Entry No. 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Jane Doe made a "false sex allegation" against him and, as a result of the false accusation, Bubb and Granum "ordered [him] to take a sex offender program" and confiscated his cellular telephone. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks one million dollars in compensatory damages and "potential earnings," and he seeks to have Defendants correct his parole record and return his cellular telephone.¹ (Id. at 5.) Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the special conditions of Plaintiff's parole were reasonably related to Plaintiff's designation as a "discretionary sex offender," which designation is based on Plaintiff's conduct in prison. (Def. Mot. for Summ. J., Docket Entry No. 32; Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def. Mem.") 3, Docket Entry No. 34.) Defendants further argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court grants summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claims for money damages and as to Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief from the sex offender program imposed as a special condition of his parole. The Court denies summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief from his designation as a discretionary sex offender and for injunctive relief from the cellular telephone restriction imposed as a special condition of his parole.

I. Background

Plaintiff's parole supervision began on or about August 6, 2010, when he was released from Elmira Correctional Facility. (Decl. of Glenda Bubb in Supp. of Def. Mot. for Summ. J. ("Bubb Decl.")² ¶ 3, Docket Entry No. 37.) Plaintiff was serving a twelve-year sentence for the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and bail jumping in the first degree. (Dep. of Dwayne Singleton ("Singleton Dep") 29:9–20, annexed to Decl. of Mary Kim in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Kim Decl.") as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 42.) While imprisoned, Plaintiff was issued four "tickets," or violations, for indecent exposure and lewd acts, and a fifth ticket for touching a nurse's buttocks. (Id. at 34:17–21, 35:3–7.) After a hearing regarding the violations, Plaintiff was found "guilty" of each count of misbehavior.³ (Id .) Defendants assert that as a result of Plaintiff's conduct in prison, he was designated a discretionary sex offender, although based on the record before the Court, it is unclear when, how and by whom Plaintiff was designated a discretionary sex offender.⁴ (Def. Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local R. 56.1 ("Def. 56.1") ¶ 5, Docket Entry No. 35.) According to Plaintiff, he agreed to attend a sex offender program prior to his release on parole in August of 2010. (Singleton Dep. 18:25–19:5.) As a further condition of early release, Plaintiff signed a "Certificate of Release to Parole Supervision," dated July 30, 2010, in which he agreed to "comply with all case specific sex offender conditions to be imposed by the [parole officer]." (Id. at 52:6–18; see Cert. of Release, annexed to Kim Decl. as Ex. C.) It is unclear from the record before the Court whether any case-specific sex offender conditions were imposed on Plaintiff immediately upon his release.

After his release, Plaintiff received court-ordered psychiatric therapy through the New York Center for Addiction Treatment Services ("NYCATS"). (See Def. 56.1 ¶ 11; Am. Compl. 4.) On October 18, 2010, an employee of NYCATS reported to Plaintiff's parole office that Plaintiff had attempted to sexually touch the feet of his female therapist, sued herein as Jane Doe, during a psychiatric evaluation.⁵

On or around November 10, 2010, Plaintiff's parole supervision was transferred to the office where Bubb and Granum work as parole officers. (Bubb Decl. ¶ 7.) On December 6, 2010, Plaintiff appears to have signed a document in which he agreed to comply with a number of "special conditions of release to parole supervision for sex offenders." (See Letter in Compliance with Court Order Dated Sept. 8, 2016 ("Def. Ltr."), Docket Entry No. 49.) Those special conditions directed Plaintiff to "participate and fully cooperate with the directives of sex offender treatment program," (id. ¶ 6), and directed Plaintiff not to "purchase or possess pornography or sexually explicit materials," (id. ¶ 11), "purchase, possess or engage in any way, the use of any sexually explicit materials or erotic magazines, tapes, pictures, films or digital images," (id. ¶ 14), "purchase or possess photographic or video equipment without prior and written permission of [his] parole officer," (id. ¶ 22), "possess [a cellular telephone] that is video or photo-capable," (id. ¶ 35), or "rent, operate or be a passenger in any vehicle without the permission of [his] parole officer,"⁶ (id. ¶ 32).

Plaintiff reported to the parole office on December 7, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 17.) During that visit, a parole officer found "pornographic photographs" on Plaintiff's cellular telephone and, consequently, confiscated the cellular telephone. (Id. ¶¶ 17–20; Bubb Decl. ¶ 8.) According to Plaintiff, although he knew that his parole conditions did not permit him to possess a cellular telephone with camera capability, he was simply memorializing his own consensual sexual acts with his girlfriend at the time. (Singleton Dep. 20:21–21:10; Pl. Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl. Opp'n") 3, Docket Entry No. 30.) Plaintiff states that he asked Defendants on multiple occasions to return his cellular telephone so that he could sell it or dispose of it, and that Defendants assured him that they would return it but never did.⁷ (Singleton Dep. 20:21–21:10; 21:17–22:12.) On December 9, 2010, Bubb and Granum reviewed Plaintiff's file and determined that, based on the report from NYCATS, "[P]laintiff's status as a discretionary sex offender [should be] continued, appropriate sex offender conditions were to be imposed, and [P]laintiff was prohibited from possessing a cellphone with a camera."⁸ (Def. 56.1 ¶ 13.)

On August 26, 2011, Bubb and Granum received a report that Plaintiff had been arrested for stealing a woman's purse while on the subway. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff was held in custody at Rikers Island until March 21, 2012, after which Plaintiff reported back to the parole office. (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 26, 2012, Bubb and Granum received a report that Plaintiff had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior during an intake interview at a residential transition home. (Id. ¶ 14.) Granum then reviewed Plaintiff's special parole conditions and noted in Plaintiff's file that the discretionary sex offender conditions "were still appropriate." (Id. ¶ 15.) On or about May 19, 2012, Bubb and Granum learned that Plaintiff had been arrested for walking through subway cars. (Id. ¶ 23.) As a result, Bubb and Granum imposed an additional condition of parole, directing Plaintiff to "sign a contract" that prevented him from traveling by subway except when traveling to and from parole appointments, mandated programs or employment. (Id. ¶ 24; Singleton Dep. 19:22–25.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Davis v. Shah , 821 F.3d 231, 243 (2d Cir.2016) ; see also Cortes v. MTA NYC Transit , 802 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir.2015) ; Tolbert v. Smith , 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir.2015) ; Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC , 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013). The role of the court "is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists." Rogoz v. City of Hartford , 796 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir.2015) (first quoting Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp. , 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir.2010) ; and then citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id . The court's function is to decide "whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party." Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000).

Finally, the court must "liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants" on a motion for summary judgment, reading such submissions "to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Bertin v. United States , 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir.2008) (first citing Cruz v. Gomez , 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir.2000) ; and then citing Burgos v. Hopkins , 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994) ); see also Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant , 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (noti...