Singleton v. Lockhart

• Decision Date: 28 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. PB-C-82-165.,PB-C-82-165.
• Citation: 653 F. Supp. 1114
• Parties: Charles Laverne SINGLETON, Petitioner, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas

653 F. Supp. 1114

Charles Laverne SINGLETON, Petitioner, v. A.L. LOCKHART, Respondent.

No. PB-C-82-165.

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division.

August 28, 1986.

Jeffrey M. Rosenzweig, Little Rock, Ark., for petitioner.

Jack Gillean, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, Ark., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EISELE, Chief Judge.

On October 30, 1979, petitioner was sentenced to death by electrocution for capital felony murder, and life imprisonment for aggravated robbery. The conviction and death sentence for capital murder were affirmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, but the aggravated robbery conviction and sentence were vacated on double jeopardy grounds. Singleton v. State, 274 Ark. 126, 623 S.W.2d 180 (1981). Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner then sought permission to proceed under Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Permission was denied by the Arkansas Supreme Court and an execution date was set for June 4, 1982. The Arkansas Supreme Court denied petitioner's request for a stay of execution. On June 1, 1982, this Court granted petitioner a stay of execution and petitioner's first petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended petition. The State of Arkansas responded. An evidentiary hearing was held to resolve the factual issues.

The facts of the case were stated by the Arkansas Supreme Court, 274 Ark. at 128-29, 623 S.W.2d 180, as follows:

The victim, Mary Lou York, was murdered in York's Grocery Store at Hamburg on June 1, 1979. She died from loss of blood as a result of two stab wounds in her neck.

The evidence of guilt in this case is overwhelming. Patti Franklin saw her relative Singleton enter York's Grocery at approximately 7:30 p.m. on the day of the crime. Shortly after he entered Patti heard Mrs. York scream, "Patti go get help. Charles Singleton is killing me." Patti then ran for help. Another witness, Lenora Howard, observed Singleton exit the store and shortly thereafter witnessed Mrs. York, who was "crying and had blood on her," come to the front door. Police Officer Strother was the first to arrive at the scene and found Mrs. York lying in a pool of blood in the rear of the store. The officer testified Mrs. York told him that Charles Singleton "came in the store, said this is a robbery, grabbed her around the neck, and went to stabbing her." She then told Officer Strother that "there's no way I can be all right, you know I'm not going to make it. I've lost too much blood." Mrs. York was taken to the hospital in an ambulance and was attended by her personal physician, Dr. J.D. Rankin. While enroute to the hospital, she told Dr. Rankin several times that she was dying and that Singleton did it. Mrs. York died before reaching the emergency room of the hospital. Officer Strother also testified that during examination of the premises, he found a money bag on the floor near the cash register which was empty, except for about $2.00 in change. He also stated that the cash register had only a small amount of change in it.

Petitioner's grounds for the writ are briefly summarized as follows:

1. Petitioner was denied a jury panel of a cross-section of the community because the jury panel was selected in a racially discriminatory manner.

2. Petitioner was denied a jury of a cross-section of the community because of the manner in which potential jurors were summoned.

3. The jury was "death qualified."

4. The trial court failed to grant petitioner's motion for a change of venue.

5. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel:

a. Failed to challenge certain veniremen for cause;

b. Failed to conduct an adequate voir dire re challenges for cause;

c. Wrongly assented to the exclusion of a potential juror under Witherspoon who should not have been excluded;

d. Failed to make an adequate appellate record for review of voir dire;

e. Did not rehabilitate, for Witherspoon purposes, potential jurors excluded under that case.

6. Petitioner's rights at the guilt phase of trial were violated by:

a. The proposition of inconsistent defenses;

b. Failure to seek additional psychiatric examination;

c. The admission of purported dying declarations of the victim;

d. Admission of certain photographs of the deceased.

7. Petitioner's arrest and the introduction of certain evidence seized from him violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

8. The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support a conviction.

9. The Arkansas statutory scheme is void for vagueness and violative of the Constitution because of the overlapping definitions of capital and first degree murder.

10. The Arkansas statutory scheme is impermissibly vague in its element of "extreme indifference to the value of human life."

11. Petitioner's constitutional rights were violated at the penalty phase of the trial by:

a. Counsel's failure to prepare or present evidence in mitigation;

b. Counsel's making an inadequate and improper closing argument;

c. The jury's ignoring evidence of mitigating circumstances;

d. The vagueness of the definition of the term "pecuniary gain."

e. The failure to comply with procedural requisites.

12. The death penalty in this case violates the Constitution in that:

a. It was imposed despite the absence of valid and non-vague aggravating circumstances in that only one aggravating circumstance was argued by the prosecution;

b. The sentence was not in proportion to other death sentences. More aggravating circumstances were involved in other cases where death sentences were not given;

13. The death penalty itself is unconstitutional.

14. Petitioner is not mentally competent to be executed and to execute him would violate the Constitution under these circumstances.

Most of the questions presented by Mr. Singleton's petition for habeas corpus are questions of law based upon an established record. The hearing was devoted principally to issues relating to Mr. Wellenberger's effectiveness as Mr. Singleton's attorney and with respect to the manner in which the jurors were originally placed on the list of 800 and, later, chosen to serve on the Singleton panel.

Apparently, Mr. Singleton is not seriously challenging Mr. Wellenberger's effectiveness during the actual trial of his guilt or innocence. He does, however, raise questions about his effectiveness in challenging the jury selection system, in voir diring the jury, and in the handling of the penalty phase of the trial.

The standard governing the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was recently articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court held:

A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

* * * * * *

When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers simply to counsel, not specifying particular requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. See Michel v. New York, 350 U.S. 91, 100-101 76 S.Ct. 158, 163-164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955). The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.

With respect to the element of "prejudice," the Court had the following to say, 104 S.Ct. 2067-2068:

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665, 667-668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.

* * * * * *

Accordingly, the appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, at 104, 112-113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, at 2397, 2401-2402 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of a witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, at 872-874, 102 S.Ct. 3440, at 3449-3450 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the judgment on

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