Singleton v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., Civil Action No. 16-2585 (PGS)
| Decision Date | 05 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 16-2585 (PGS) |
| Parties | ELIJAH SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff Elijah Singleton ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner currently incarcerated at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey, seeks to bring this civil rights action in forma pauperis. Based on his affidavit of indigence, the Court grants Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and orders the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint. (ECF No. 15.)
At this time, the Court must review Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice in part and allowed to proceed in part.
The following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff's allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about December of 2012, while incarcerated at Northern State Prison, he started experiencing complications in his vision due to his diabetes. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff made "numerous requests" to the medical department and, after "weeks of procrastinating," was sent to see a specialist for his vision. (Id.) Plaintiff was sent to see Defendant Zarbin at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey ("UMDNJ"), who examined Plaintiff and determined that Plaintiff needed surgery. Plaintiff alleges that he was never told that the surgery Defendant Zarbin proposed was "risky," or that it could result in total blindness. (Id.) Plaintiff elected to have the surgery and did, in fact, lose all vision in his left eye.
Plaintiff next alleges that, as a result of Defendant Lois Fiore's1 deliberate indifference, it is too late to treat his right eye and he will ultimately lose total vision in that eye as well. (Id. at 6.) Defendant Fiore was "well aware" of Plaintiff's condition and still postponed his optometry appointments past the time period in which Plaintiff could have been adequately treated. After losing total vision in his left eye, Plaintiff refused to be sent back to Defendant Zarbin and requested another doctor. Defendant Fiore told Plaintiff that this was impossible because the Department of Corrections ("DOC") was not in a contractual relationship with any otheroptometrists. (Id.) After Plaintiff was transferred to East Jersey State Prison, where he is currently incarcerated, he found out "this was a lie." (Id.)
After Plaintiff's transfer, he was sent to two different optometrists not named in this action. Both optometrists told Plaintiff that the damage in his right eye was "too far along" for anything to be done, and that he should have seen them earlier. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff was told he will be totally blind by November of 2017. Plaintiff now brings this action against Defendants DOC, University Hospital, Dr. Zarbin in his official and individual capacities, and Lois Fiore in her official and individual capacities.
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e. The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent.
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "a pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim2, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n. 17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivationwas committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
To start, the Court notes that to be liable within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a defendant must be a "person." The Supreme Court held in Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), that a State, a State entity, or an official of a State acting in his or her official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. However, state officials and those acting under color of law sued in their individual capacities are considered "persons" for purposes of § 1983 liability. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Even so, a plaintiff must show that an individual official's conduct caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). More particularly, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in the deprivation. See West, 487 U.S. at 48. This is to say that § 1983 liability cannot be premised solely on a theory of respondeat superior. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
For the sake of logic and coherence, the Court will begin with Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Zarbin and Fiore in their individual capacities. Against them, Plaintiff pleads an Eighth Amendment violation based on a theory of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show (1) deliberate indifference by prison officials to (2) the prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). "To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk ofserious harm." Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where the prison official "(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; ... (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment; and (4) where the prison official persists in a particular course of treatment in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury." McCluskey v. Vincent, 505 F. App'x 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In order to find deliberate indifference, "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). However, "[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law." U.S. ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., Pa., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Claims of negligence or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference. See Thomas v. Adams, 55 F.Supp.3d 552, 576 (D.N.J. 2014) (internal citations omitted); Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Zarbin "lied to [him] and blinded [him]." (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Though it seems plausible, from the face of the Complaint, that Plaintiff may have stated a cause of action against Defendant Zarbin rooted in medical malpractice, such a claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation3. S...
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