Singleton v. Roman

• Decision Date: 19 April 1950
• Docket Number: 110,111.
• Citation: 72 A.2d 705,195 Md. 241
• Parties: SINGLETON v. ROMAN. WHORTON v. ROMAN.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

72 A.2d 705

195 Md. 241

SINGLETON v. ROMAN.

WHORTON v. ROMAN.

Nos. 110, 111.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 19, 1950

Morgan C. Harris, Cumberland, and D. K. McLaughlin Hagerstown, for appellants.

Charles F Wagaman, Hagerstown (John Wagaman, Wagaman & Wagaman and Omer T. Kaylor, Hagerstown, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL JJ.

DELAPLAINE, Judge.

There two suits for damages were brought by Mrs. Genevieve Singleton and Miss Sadie Whorton, of Allegany County, against Lowndes W. Roman of Washington County, to recover for personal injuries which they sustained when defendant's automobile, in which they were riding as his guests, struck the concrete abutment of a culvert along the National Highway between Flintstone and Cumberland.

The accident occurred on December 18, 1948, about 8:30 p. m. On that evening defendant, while visiting Mrs. Singleton at her home north of Flintstone, offered to drive her and Miss Whorton in his new Ford sedan to a suburb of Cumberland about twelve miles away. Plaintiffs sat in the front seat with him. When he reached Flintstone he turned west toward Cumberland, and after he had driven about seven miles on the National Highway, he ran into the abutment along the north side of the road, causing the automobile to turn over on its side.

The cases were tried together before a jury in the Circuit Court for Washington County. Defendant claimed that he was driving his car with due care, but that he was blinded by the glare of the headlights of an eastbound car. Following the trial judge's charge, to which plaintiffs objected, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant in each case. Plaintiffs appealed from the judgments entered upon the verdicts.

First, we consider the instruction that the jury should disregard the testimony of the State trooper that there was a very slight odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. The judge instructed the jury to disregard this testimony in view of the other testimony of the officer and of the plaintiffs. The other testimony of the officer was as follows: 'I could not detect it very much because he was chewing so much chewing gum. He put a fresh stick in his mouth at least every five minutes. He did not seem to be intoxicated. He was steady on his feet. His speech was clear.' In support of the instruction, defendant argued that 'a very slight odor of alcohol' on his breath indicated that there was no intoxication such as would be sufficient to contribute toward the happening of the accident.

We think the instruction was improper. It is the province of the trial judge to state the law to the jury, while it is the province of the jury to determine the facts of the case from the evidence in accordance with the judge's instructions. It is the policy of the law to protect the province of the jury from invasion by the court. The court must not assume the power of judging the credibility of witnesses or determining the weight of testimony in case of discrepancy. While the trial judge may comment on the evidence whenever he thinks it necessary to assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion, and may draw their attention to those portions of the evidence which he considers important, yet he should make it clear to the jury in expressing his opinion upon the evidence that all matters of fact are submitted to their determination. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321; Synder v. Cearfoss, Md., 57 A.2d 786, 791. We have provided in our rules that the Court may sum up the evidence if it instructs the jury that they are to determine for themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be given to the witnesses. General Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 3, subd. 3 rule 6(b). Hence, an instruction is erroneous if it withdraws from the consideration of the jury any evidence, however weak, tending to establish material facts. B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Cumberland Dugan & Co., 106 Md. 587, 612, 68 A. 351, 14 Ann.Cas. 675.

The question whether the driver of a motor vehicle was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of an accident is relevant to the issue of his negligence. It is a serious criminal offense for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive a motor vehicle in this State. Code Supp.1947, art. 66 1/2, sec. 153. In determining whether or not a driver was under the influence of liquor in any degree, the jury should be left free to form their own judgment from the evidence. In Cumberland & Westernport Transit Co. v. Metz, 158 Md. 424, 450, 149 A. 4, the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that if the driver was only slightly intoxicated, but not drunk, such slight intoxication was not evidence from which the jury might infer want of ordinary care.

At the trial below, where there was testimony that there was a very slight odor of alcohol on the driver's breath, but he did not seem to be intoxicated, it was the province of the jury to determine whether he was actually under the influence of intoxicating liquor in any degree, however slight, and if he was, whether the intoxication contributed to the accident. There was in the case no separable issue of intoxication, which the judge might properly take from the jury by talling them to disregard the testimony, if the testimony was legally insufficient on such an issue. Influence of liquor, whether great or slight, was only a single fact relevant to the question of negligence.

Secondly, we consider the judge's refusal to grant an instruction that if the jury believed that defendant ran his car into the abutment because of the glare of the headlights of an approaching car, it was his duty to reduce his speed or stop so as to avoid colliding with objects which he could...