Singleton v. State

• Decision Date: 05 April 2022
• Docket Number: 145-2021
• Parties: AL DWAYNE SINGLETON v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

AL DWAYNE SINGLETON v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 145-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

April 5, 2022

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 119035010

Kehoe Nazarian, Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION^[*]

Kehoe J.

On January 4, 2019, hotel security guard Al Dwayne Singleton appellant, assisted an intoxicated guest to her room. Shortly thereafter, an assailant using an authorized key card entered her hotel room and sexually assaulted the guest.

Although the guest reported to police that she "could not remember what took place due to her being highly intoxicated[, ]" she recalled being strangled until she lost consciousness. Based on her account and physical injuries, the condition of her room, security video and records, and statements made by Mr. Singleton, he was charged with first-degree assault, first-degree rape, and related offenses.

On the day trial was scheduled to begin in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Mr. Singleton pled guilty to one count of first-degree rape. Eleven months after sentencing, the prosecutor received an email from the victim, expressing uncertainty about the rape conviction. In addition, she revealed that she had not disclosed to the prosecutor that she made prior false police reports accusing two men of violence. The prosecutor forwarded a copy of the email to Mr. Singleton's counsel.

Mr. Singleton moved for a new trial under Md. Rule 4-331(c), arguing that the email was newly discovered evidence containing material information that he could not, with due diligence, have obtained before entering his guilty plea. The State filed a written opposition, asserting that "relief requested by the defendant is unavailable" because he pleaded guilty and that, in any event, both the victim's uncertainties and her prior reports of sexual assault were known and discoverable by the defense before Mr. Singleton entered his plea.

Based on those pleadings, the circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. We will focus our analysis solely on the first argument presented by the State and shall hold that the relief that Mr. Singleton is seeking-a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence-is not available to a defendant whose conviction resulted from a guilty plea.

Background

Mr Singleton's guilty plea and conviction

On the scheduled trial date of October 4, 2019, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Singleton sought to plead guilty to one count of first-degree rape, with a sentence of 60 years with all but 20 suspended, plus five years of supervised probation, a no contact order, and sex offender registration and supervision. At the same time, Mr. Singleton accepted the State's offer to plead guilty to second degree rape in another case that was scheduled for trial on November 14, 2019, with a sentencing recommendation of five years consecutive to this and any other outstanding Maryland sentences.

During a thorough plea advisement, conducted by the court and defense counsel, Mr. Singleton repeatedly acknowledged that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty. Specifically, defense counsel advised his client that "when you tender a guilty plea, [you] are not going to be able to put on [y]our factual or legal defenses on the record." Counsel also advised Mr. Singleton that he would not

have an opportunity to ask questions of all of the State's witnesses. Those questions would be designed to challenge their credibility, challenge their observations, challenge their memory of what is alleged to have occurred on these dates. . . . Those witnesses would come to court, they would take the stand, they would be placed under oath, and your attorneys would be able to ask them questions. And if there [were] any questions that you wanted us to specifically ask during trial, we would ask those questions.

When defense counsel pointed out that "because you're tendering a guilty plea, you are taking on the highest form of incrimination" and "you're not going to have the right to cross-examine the State's witnesses," Mr. Singleton stated that he understood.

Next, Mr. Singleton acknowledged that to prove first-degree rape, "the State has to prove" nonconsensual penetration "while strangling was going on" and agreed that "the State's version of the facts in this case" was sufficient to establish that he committed first-degree rape "by committing the act of strangulation of the victim." In addition, defense counsel and the court pointed out that if the case went to trial, the State would have asked "for a jury instruction . . . that the victim was either mentally incapacitated or physically helpless[, ]" such that she "was incapable of giving . . . consent because of her state" of "alcohol intoxication." When the court asked Mr. Singleton whether he understood that the State was proffering that "she was incapable of consenting[, ]" he answered, "I do understand."

Finally, the court expressly advised Mr. Singleton that "because you're pleading guilty, you no longer have the automatic right to appeal" and have only a "very narrowly tailored basis upon which you could ask for permission to appeal." Defense counsel identified those "four very limited grounds" as lack of jurisdiction, illegality of the sentence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and involuntariness of the plea.

When asked by the court whether, "knowing all these rights that . . . you're giving up, and knowing all of the consequences," Mr. Singleton intended to waive those rights and accept those consequences, he answered that he did. Likewise, when asked whether he understood that he was "waiving or giving up the very important right that you would've otherwise had, which would be to complain about any mistakes, or errors, or irregularities or defects in the State's cases against" him, Mr. Singleton again answered, "Yes, I understand, Your Honor." Moreover, Mr. Singleton specifically stated he understood that all pending defense motions, including "any motions to compel discovery" would be "withdrawn as a result of [his] guilty plea today[.]"

After Mr. Singleton reaffirmed that he wished to plead guilty in both cases, the prosecutor presented a detailed proffer of what the State's evidence would be if this case had proceeded to trial.

The prosecutor told the court that the State would have presented evidence that, on the day in question, Ms. G.^[1] had driven to Baltimore for business purposes. After those matters were concluded, she went to a restaurant and became extremely intoxicated. She decided that it would not be safe for her to attempt to drive home. Another patron at the restaurant escorted Ms. G. to a nearby hotel. Because she was intoxicated, a security guard-Mr. Singleton-was tasked with escorting Ms. G. to her room. Ms. G. then fell asleep on the bed with her clothes on. Later, she was awakened by an unknown man who sexually assaulted her. In the course of the assault, her assailant strangled her until she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness:

she bolted the door. And after assessing her situation, [Ms. G.] decided to wait to report the incident at the front desk because she was afraid that whoever had entered her room must have worked for the hotel. And she wanted to wait until whoever that person was had left for work and their shift was over. When she noticed that it was beginning to be light outside, she went downstairs to the reception desk to report the incident.

The police were called and responded to the location. The officers who arrived on the scene . . . noticed visible injuries on Ms. [G.]. . . . Ms. [G.] was briefly interviewed, and then she was taken to Mercy Hospital for a SAFE exam.

The prosecutor proffered that the SAFE nurse would have testified that Ms. G.'s injuries, as well as other physical evidence recovered from the hotel room, were consistent with her having been beaten, strangled, and sexually assaulted. Mr. Singleton's DNA was recovered from Ms. G's neck. Investigating police officers would have testified that they reviewed security camera footage from the hotel from the night in question. This footage would have shown that Ms. G. was very intoxicated. Employees of the hotel would testify to the same effect. Further, the security camera footage would reveal that Mr. Singleton escorted Ms. G. to her room. The proffer continued:

Now, . . . on the 5th of January of 2019, a key card interrogation was performed by . . . the assistant director of security at the hotel. And that . . . showed that there was an entry to the room number 8095, Ms. [G.'s] room, at 9:48 p.m. And then there was another key card entry that was recorded at 10:09 p.m.

[Ms. G.'s testimony would be that] in the morning, when [she] woke up . . . she only had one card with her. Now, Mr Singleton was interviewed by [the BPD sex offense detectives]. And he stated that Ms. [G.] was given two key cards, and that he took her to her room, and that she allowed him to have one key card . . . to go downstairs and obtain toothbrush and toothpaste for Ms. [G.]. And that the idea was that he would come back, use that key card to enter her room, and she would receive the toothpaste and toothbrush from him.

His further statement . . . was that he actually got that toothpaste from housekeeping, went back to Ms. [G.'s] room and entered using her key card. His further testimony to them was that, at that time, he sat down on her bed and had a discussion with Ms. [G.]. And then Ms. [G.] made . . . sexual advances, and that they had sexual contact. . . .

Mr. Singleton stated that Ms. [G.] was highly intoxicated. And, even though he said in his statement . . . that Ms. [G.] gave her consent to all of the sexual contact, he also said that he strangled her twice during the

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