Singleton v. State, No. 23929

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Nancy C. McCormick, of South Carolina Protection and Advocacy System, for the Handicapped, Inc., Jacqueline D. Belton, of Mental Health Ass'n in South Carolina; TOAL; Powell; Powell; HARWELL, C.J., CHANDLER and FINNEY, JJ., and BRUCE LITTLEJOHN
• Citation: 313 S.C. 75,437 S.E.2d 53
• Parties: , 4 NDLR P 328 Fred SINGLETON, Respondent, v. The STATE, Petitioner. . Heard
• Decision Date: 08 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 23929

Page 53

437 S.E.2d 53 313 S.C. 75, 4 NDLR P 328 Fred SINGLETON, Respondent,
v.
The STATE, Petitioner. No. 23929. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard Dec. 8, 1992.
Decided Aug. 30, 1993.

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[313 S.C. 76] Nancy C. McCormick, of South Carolina Protection and Advocacy System, for the Handicapped, Inc., Jacqueline D. Belton, of Mental Health Ass'n in South Carolina, J. Steedley Bogan, of South Carolina Ass'n of Head Injury Groups, and Elizabeth G. Patterson, of South Carolina Psychiatric Ass'n, Columbia, for amici curiae.

T. Travis Medlock, Atty. Gen., Donald J. Zelenka, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., and Delbert H. Singleton, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, for petitioner.

John H. Blume, of S.C. Death Penalty Resource Center, and Thomas W. Bunch, II, of Robinson, McFadden & Moore, Columbia, for respondent.

[313 S.C. 77] TOAL, Justice:

The State appeals from an order, issued at a post conviction relief hearing on Respondent's sanity, which vacated a death sentence and re-sentenced the Respondent to life imprisonment. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

Facts

Respondent, Singleton, was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, burglary, larceny of a motor vehicle, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. We affirmed both the conviction and sentence on direct appeal in State v. Singleton, 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E.2d 153, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2346, 85 L.Ed.2d 863 (1985). Respondent, in August 1985, filed a petition for post conviction relief in Newberry County which

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was denied, on May 21, 1986. Singleton appealed, and we denied certiorari and dismissed the appeal.

Singleton's execution was stayed pending the filing of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Failing to timely pursue the petition for certiorari, we issued an order to the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, on August 17, 1987, directing Singleton's execution.

Prior to the imposition of sentence, Singleton filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, on September 14, 1987. The District Court dismissed Singleton's petition without prejudice and required his return to state court to exhaust all state claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in an unpublished opinion. Singleton v. McKellar, 873 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 1989) (unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 210, 107 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989).

Singleton filed a second application for post conviction relief in Newberry County, in March 1990. In this latest petition, Singleton alleged that he was not competent to be executed. The PCR court conducted a hearing on November 13, 1990 to determine the proper standard to be utilized in assessing Singleton's competency to be executed. The PCR court adopted the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard (A.B.A. Standard) proposed by Singleton in an order dated November 19, 1990.

[313 S.C. 78] After an evidentiary hearing, in December 1990, the PCR judge issued an order holding Singleton incompetent to be executed under either the A.B.A. Standard or the standard set forth in Justice Powell's concurring opinion inFord v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). The PCR court's order, dated May 8, 1991, vacated Singleton's death sentence and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. It is from this order that the State appeals.

Law/Analysis

The State asks us to find error on two primary issues. First, the State contends that the PCR court erred in adopting the A.B.A. Standard of incompetency rather than the standard set forth in Justice Powell's concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright, supra. Second, the State contends that the PCR judge erred in vacating Singleton's sentence and imposing a life sentence as a remedy, where the effect of the decision is to judicially commute a sentence in violation of Article IV, Section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution. A third and equally critical question is inherent in both of the issues raised by the State, and that is whether the State can employ forced medication to facilitate a prisoner's competency for execution.

The Applicable Competency Standard for Execution

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the PCR court erred in adopting the A.B.A. Standard of incompetency rather than the standard set forth in Justice Powell's concurrence in Ford. The Respondent relies on the A.B.A. Standard which is set forth in the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-5.6, as:

a. Convicts who have been sentenced to death should not be executed if they are currently mentally incompetent. If it is determined that condemned convict is currently mentally incompetent, execution should be stayed.

b. A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the punishment or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand[313 S.C. 79] any fact which might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or the court.

Id.

This A.B.A. Standard sets forth a two-pronged test when inquiring into the competency of a defendant subject to execution. The first prong can be characterized as the cognitive prong, which is defined as the ability to recognize the nature of the punishment

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and the reason for the punishment. The second prong is characterized as the assistance prong, which is defined as the ability to assist counsel, or the court, in identifying exculpatory or mitigating information.

In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986) (Powell, concurring), the United States Supreme Court in a plurality opinion held that the execution of an inmate who becomes incompetent or insane after conviction and sentencing is violative of the Eighth Amendment. The plurality did not, however, set forth what standard was applicable in the determination of incompetence or insanity. Justice Powell, the swing vote in the opinion, proposed such a standard when he stated in his concurrence that, "I would hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." Id. at 422, 106 S.Ct. at 2608, 91 L.Ed.2d at 354.

Justice Powell was a voice of one, yet the standard he posited was embraced by some courts as the constitutional minimum. Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061, 107 S.Ct. 2207, 95 L.Ed.2d 861 (1987). ¹ The A.B.A. Standard reflects the Powell formulation in the cognitive prong of its test. Justice Powell in his concurrence discussed the rationale behind the Eighth Amendment prohibition of executing the insane.

[313 S.C. 80] [T]oday as at common law, one of the death penalty's critical justifications, its retributive force, depends on the defendant's awareness of the penalties existence and purpose. Thus, it remains true that executions of the insane both impose a uniquely cruel penalty and are inconsistent with one of the chief purposes of executions generally....

....

A number of States have more rigorous standards, but none disputes the need to require that those who are executed know the fact of their impending execution and the reason for it.

Id. 477 U.S. at 421-422, 106 S.Ct. at 2607-2608, 91 L.Ed.2d at 354.

Justice Powell then addressed the states with more rigorous standards in footnote 3 of his concurring opinion.

[a] number of States have remained faithful to Blackstone's view that a defendant cannot be executed unless he is able to assist in his own defense.... Modern Case authority is sparse, and while some older cases favor the Blackstone view, those cases largely antedate the recent expansion of both the right to counsel and the availability of federal and state collateral review.... Under these circumstances, I find no sound basis for constitutionalizing the broader definition of insanity, with its requirement that the defendant be able to assist in his own defense. States are obviously free to adopt a more expansive view of sanity in this context than the one the Eighth Amendment imposes as a constitutional minimum.

Id. at 422 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 2608 n. 3, 91 L.Ed.2d at 354 n. 3 [emphasis added] [citations omitted]. This "more expansive" view is in full accord with the second prong of the A.B.A. Standard; however, Justice Powell rejected it.

As we decide the appropriate standard for South Carolina, it is helpful to review the development of the "assistance" prong. There is a significant common law background for the requirement that a defendant to be able to assist in his defense, even after conviction. "And it seems agreed at this Day, that if one who has committed a capital Offence, become Non Compos ... after [a] Conviction, that he shall not be executed[313 S.C. 81] ." 1 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 2 (1716). In Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 HOW. St.Tr. 474 (1685), the Solicitor-General commented:

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for nothing is more certain in Law, than that a Person who falls mad ... after judgment, he shall not be executed: tho I do not think the reason given for the Law in that Point will maintain it, which is, that the End of Punishment is the striking a Terror into others, but the execution of a Madman had not that effect; which is not true, for the Terror to the living is equal, whether the Person be mad or in his Senses.... But the true reason of the Law I think to be this, a Person of non sana Memoria, and a Lunatick during his Lunacy, is by an Act of God ... disabled to make his just Defence, there may be Circumstances lying in...