Singleton v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 25 August 2021
• Docket Number: 2:20-CV-99-WKW [WO]
• Parties: JONATHAN SINGLETON, RICKY VICKERY, and MICKI HOLMES, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HAL TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, and DERRICK CUNNINGHAM, in his official capacity as Sheriff for Montgomery County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

JONATHAN SINGLETON, RICKY VICKERY, and MICKI HOLMES, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. HAL TAYLOR, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, and DERRICK CUNNINGHAM, in his official capacity as Sheriff for Montgomery County, Defendants.

No. 2:20-CV-99-WKW [WO]

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

August 25, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W KEITH WATKINS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Jonathan Singleton, Ricky Vickery, and Micki Holmes are residents of Montgomery, Alabama, who are homeless. They bring suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of two Alabama statutes: Alabama Code § 13A-11-9(a)(1) (prohibiting loitering “in a public place for the purpose of begging”) and Alabama Code § 32-5A-216(b) (prohibiting individuals from “stand[ing] on a highway for the purpose of soliciting . . . contributions”). Plaintiffs assert that the two challenged laws have criminalized their speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Remaining defendants are Derrick Cunningham, the Sheriff of Montgomery County, who is sued in his official capacity; and Hal Taylor, Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency also sued in his official capacity.

Defendants Taylor and Cunningham have moved for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). (Docs. # 22 25.) For the reasons given below, Defendants' motions to dismiss are due to be denied.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights). Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

As noted above, Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) can present either a facial or a factual attack to the court's jurisdiction. See McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). When resolving a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), as when resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint. See Id. If the motion instead depends on the resolution of disputed facts, however, the court must provide the parties an opportunity for discovery and a hearing before deciding the motion. See id.

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jonathan Singleton, Ricky Vickery, and Micki Holmes are residents of Montgomery, Alabama. All three are homeless and rely on panhandling- “soliciting donations in public spaces from others”-to survive. (Doc. # 35, at 3.)^[1]Their typical signs read “homeless, ” “homeless and hungry, ” and “HOMELESS. Today it is me, tomorrow it could be you.” (Doc. # 4, at 7-8.)

Plaintiffs bring suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to challenge the constitutionality of two Alabama statutes: Alabama Code § 13A-11-9(a)(1) (prohibiting loitering “in a public place for the purpose of begging”) (hereinafter “the Begging Statute”) and Alabama Code § 32-5A-216(b) (prohibiting individuals from “stand[ing] on a highway for the purpose of soliciting . . . contributions”) (hereinafter “the Solicitation Statute”). Plaintiffs assert that the two challenged laws (together, “the Statutes”) have criminalized their speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, including through their incorporation into Montgomery's municipal code. They further assert that have been arrested or cited for panhandling under the Solicitation Statute, ticketed under the Begging Statute, and threatened with arrest by police on several occasions.^[2]

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are tasked with the enforcement of Alabama's criminal statutes. (See Doc. # 4, at 3 (¶¶ 11-12); see also Doc. # 35, at 3-4 (describing Secretary Taylor's authority and duty to enforce the Statutes); Doc. # 44, at 7-8 (discussing Sheriff Cunningham's enforcement of the Solicitation Statute).)

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants Taylor and Cunningham move for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), raising challenges to this court's subject matter jurisdiction and to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' claims. These arguments, as raised in Defendants' motions to dismiss, are:

1. The court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);

2. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which provides that federal district courts lack authority to review the final judgments of state courts, see, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005);

3. Plaintiffs lack standing to request relief because, among other issues, they have not demonstrated that their injuries are traceable to Defendants;

4. Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; and

5. Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Cunningham.^[3]

For the reasons detailed below, Defendants' motions to dismiss are due to be denied.

1. Younger Abstention

Defendants suggest that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims because relevant proceedings are ongoing in state court.^[4](See, e.g., Doc. # 23, at 10-11.) Defendants note that several municipal court cases remain open under the municipal incorporation of the statute at issue here. (Doc. # 23, at 11 (asserting that at least sixteen relevant cases remain open in municipal court).) But, contrary to Defendants' arguments, Younger abstention is not warranted.

“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). As a general matter, “federal courts have a virtually unflagging obligation to exercise their jurisdiction except in those extraordinary circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest.” Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 901 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018) (observing that “[a]bstention . . . has become disfavored in recent Supreme Court decisions”). Still, the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris “restrain[s] courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions . . . .” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Under Younger, “absent extraordinary circumstances federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions.” Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Federal courts have consistently recognized this limitation on enjoining state criminal prosecutions unless one of a few narrow exceptions is met.” Id. at 1263.

As a threshold matter, Younger abstention is clearly inappropriate as to the Begging Statute. Plaintiffs have no open municipal court cases involving the Begging Statute, and Younger abstention requires a pending proceeding. (See, e.g., Doc. # 35, at 14-15; Doc. # 36, at 10.) See also Walker, 901 F.3d at 1254. For the reasons described below, it is also inappropriate as to the Solicitation Statute.

To begin, it is not clear that Younger even applies in the instant context. First, “[t]he Younger Court held that federal courts should abstain from suits aimed at restraining pending state criminal prosecutions.” For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v. City of Columbus, Ga., 281 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). Defendants have not established that the adjudication of the instant claims would “represent[ ] . . . the interference with ongoing judicial proceedings against which Younger was directed . . . .” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. (NOPSI) v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372, (1989). Most notably Plaintiffs' suit explicitly seeks only forward-looking relief, not a restraint on open criminal proceedings. (See Doc. # 35, at 16 (noting that “all three Plaintiffs are seeking wholly prospective relief”).) In contrast, Plaintiffs do not appear to seek an injunction against pending prosecutions. Cf. Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 817 n.11 (1974) (noting, as an indication that Younger did not apply, that “no injunctive relief against pending prosecutions was ever requested”); The News-J. Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing the Younger inquiry as whether federal courts should “intervene in an ongoing...