Singleton v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. 21521.,21521.
• Citation: 381 F.2d 1
• Parties: George SINGLETON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

381 F.2d 1 (1967)

George SINGLETON, Jr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 21521.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

July 28, 1967.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing September 12, 1967.

Riner E. Deglow, Spokane, Wash., for appellant.

Smithmoore P. Myers, U. S. Atty., Robert M. Sweeney, Asst. U. S. Atty., Spokane, Wash., for appellee.

Before MERRILL and ELY, Circuit Judges, and MATHES,^* Senior District Judge.

ELY, Circuit Judge:

The appellant was charged by indictment with having violated 18 U.S.C. § 2421, a penal statute commonly referred to as the Mann Act. He appeals from the judgment of conviction which followed trial in the District Court without a jury.

The case for the prosecution was based essentially upon the testimony of Pamela Ann McFall. This woman, twenty-three years of age and an admitted prostitute, had resided in Salt Lake City, Utah. She testified that she had become acquainted with Singleton in 1965 and had thereafter lived with him for a time in Utah. During this period, Singleton acted as a panderer in her behalf. Singleton married another woman on October 10, 1965, and, on October 14, 1965, the two women accompanied him by rail from Salt Lake City to Pendleton, Oregon, and thence, by automobile, to Moses Lake, Washington. The prostitute insisted that she made the trip in response to Singleton's request and his suggestion of the probability of successful exploitation of her profession in the Moses Lake community. When the party reached Moses Lake, they visited an establishment known as one of prostitution. McFall there engaged in one such act. Two days later the group traveled to Spokane, Washington, where, through contact with a taxicab driver, the appellant arranged that McFall commit another act of prostitution. For this performance, her customer paid her twenty dollars which she delivered to appellant. Almost immediately thereafter, Singleton informed McFall of his recent marriage to the second woman, whereupon McFall apparently undertook suicide by slashing her wrists and ankles. This led to her hospitalization and to her subsequent arrest by Spokane police.

In his trial, the appellant was vigorously and conscientiously defended by an attorney appointed by the court. Testifying in his own behalf, appellant admitted that he had lived with McFall in Salt Lake City. He admitted that he paid the cost of McFall's interstate transportation and that he had purchased the tickets under a fictitious name. He denied that in arranging the trip he harbored the intent that McFall should continue to engage in her illicit calling, and he denied knowledge that she had engaged in the acts of prostitution in Moses Lake and Spokane.

We commend appellant's court-appointed counsel for the zeal with which he here challenges the sufficiency of the Government's evidence. We agree that the credibility of McFall is open to severe challenge. That she was gravely unstable, as well as depraved, there is no doubt. On three occasions she had been a patient in Utah mental institutions, and she had used heroin and other drugs. All this notwithstanding, it was the proper function of the district judge, with his opportunity to observe the witnesses, to resolve the conflicting testimony. In the dispute as to the crucial facts, the court saw credibility in the testimony of McFall, and we cannot overrule the determination. Singleton does not limit his attack on McFall to her credibility. He also challenges her competency. The district judge determined that she was not incompetent to testify, and his determination was supported by the report of a physician who had previously treated her. This physician, a psychiatrist, was produced as a witness by the appellant, and he testified, in effect, that McFall was sufficiently competent to testify. Her testimony was sufficient to support conviction. United States v. Terry, 362 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029, 87 S.Ct. 758, 17 L.Ed.2d 676 (1967); United States v. Moorman, 358 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 866, 87 S.Ct. 127, 17 L.Ed.2d 93 (1966).

While appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, he also presents additional contentions. He urges that it was error for the court, over his objection, to grant the appellee's motion for continuance of the trial. The motion was presented because McFall, who was at liberty, did not appear on September 14, 1966, the day when the trial was originally scheduled. She had been subpoenaed to do so, and, according to representations made by the prosecution, she had given her assurance to the prosecution's representatives that she would be present. As the court granted the motion for continuance, a warrant for McFall's arrest was issued at the same time. She was quickly apprehended by the Government and returned to Spokane so that the trial began only one week after the day when it had originally been scheduled to commence. Trial courts are properly vested with wide...