Singley v. Singley, No. 1999-CT-00754-SCT.

Decision Date17 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 1999-CT-00754-SCT.
Citation846 So.2d 1004
PartiesDan H. SINGLEY, Jr. v. Jane K. SINGLEY.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Henry Palmer, Meridian, attorney for appellant.

Mark A. Chinn, Jackson, William D. Ketner, Jr., attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SMITH, P.J., for the Court.

¶ 1. The Lauderdale County Chancery Court granted Dan H. Singley (Hank) a divorce from his wife, Jane K. Singley (Jane), on the ground of uncondoned adultery. The chancellor equitably divided the marital estate and awarded Jane rehabilitative alimony. Hank appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to issues concerning equitable distribution. The Court of Appeals also held: (1) goodwill could be incorporated into the business valuation of Hank's dental practice; (2) the evidence supported an almost even division of marital property; (3) Hank's $70,000 inheritance was commingled and became marital property; and (4) Jane could not be awarded temporary rehabilitative alimony, as the issue was not properly before the court because the pre-trial order did not include the issue of alimony. Hank filed a motion for rehearing with the Court of Appeals, which was denied. Hank then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted. Hank asserts the following issues for review:

I. SHOULD MORE WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO MARITAL FAULT IN APPLYING THE FERGUSON FACTORS, PURSUANT TO CARROW I AND CARROW II?

II. SHOULD "GOOD WILL" BE USED IN THE VALUATION OF A SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION?

III. WAS HANK'S INHERITED MONEY COMMINGLED, THUS A MARITAL ASSET FOR THE PURPOSE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION?

¶ 2. In her response to Hank's petition for certiorari, Jane asserts an additional issue for review:

IV. WAS THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECT IN REVERSING AND RENDERING THE CHANCERY COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT IT COULD AMEND ITS OWN PRETRIAL ORDER?

¶ 3. We hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the rehabilitative alimony awarded to Jane. We reverse and remand the issue of the $70,000 inheritance Hank received from his mother. We also reverse and remand the issue of marital fault. The chancellor should reconsider the $70,000 and marital fault when determining equitable distribution of the marital property on remand. Regarding the first impression issue of whether goodwill can be incorporated into the business valuation of Hank's dental practice for consideration by the chancellor in determining equitable distribution of property in a divorce action, we hold that it can not and we reverse and render.

FACTS

¶ 4. The following recitation of facts is taken from the Court of Appeals' decision:

¶ 2. Hank and Jane Singley were married for twenty-three years and had one son who, at the time of their divorce, was in college on scholarship. Jane admitted to having numerous affairs during her marriage, and Hank was granted a divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery. He appeals, however, the chancellor's decisions regarding the division of the marital estate, his $70,000 contribution toward the purchase of the marital home which was his inheritance from his mother's estate, and the court's value of Hank's dental practice. Further, Hank asserts that the "Court failed to take into consideration the Ferguson principles of equitable distribution by failing to appropriately consider the costs and tax effect of money and the ability of Dr. Singley to comply with the equitable division ruling," that is, either liquidate assets which would involve tax consequences or borrow money which would involve interest expenses. In addition, Hank challenges the chancellor's award of temporary rehabilitative alimony. Finally, he contests several evidentiary rulings made by the chancellor.
¶ 3. In her opinion and judgment, the chancellor awarded Jane $1,500 a month in periodic rehabilitative alimony for a period of one year. The chancellor divided the marital estate giving each party fifty percent. The chancellor appointed an expert to valuate Hank's dental practice. Additionally, the chancellor considered the testimony of Chuck Rae, Hank's accountant. However, because the court-appointed expert had expertise specific to the valuation of businesses, while Hank's accountant did not, the chancellor chose to accept the court-appointed expert's valuation of Hank's dental practice at $145,000. It is from these decisions of the chancellor that Hank appeals.

Singley v. Singley, 2000 WL 1387961, *1 (Miss.Ct.App. Sept.26, 2000).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. "This Court will not interfere with a chancellor's findings of fact unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. However, we review the chancellor's interpretation and application of the law de novo." Marshall v. Gipson Steel, Inc., 806 So.2d 266, 270 (Miss.2002).

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER MORE WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MARITAL FAULT IN APPLYING THE FERGUSON FACTORS, PURSUANT TO CARROW I AND CARROW II?

¶ 6. Hank argues that the chancellor erred by not giving more weight to the fact that Jane admittedly had numerous affairs during their twenty-three year marriage. Hank further argues that Jane should have been penalized and should not have received 50% of the marital assets as the chancellor so ordered. Hank argues that one of the principles of Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994), is that marital misconduct or fault as a ground for divorce is relevant to equitable distribution if it impacted the harmony and stability of the marriage.

¶ 7. Jane responds that Hank relies solely on his own testimony and minimizes or ignores the contrary testimony that favors her. In fact, Hank does rely on other testimony, particularly the testimony of Jane's mother. As we have often stated: "This Court must examine the entire record and accept that evidence which supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of fact made below, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom and which favor the lower court's findings of fact." Ezell v. Williams, 724 So.2d 396, 397 (Miss.1998). "The word `manifest,' as defined in this context, means `unmistakable, clear, plain, or indisputable.'" Magee v. Magee, 661 So.2d 1117, 1122 (Miss.1995). "Where evidence is contradictory, this Court `generally must affirm.'" Boatner v. State, 754 So.2d 1184, 1191-92 (Miss.2000).

¶ 8. Hank claims the chancellor's decision is at odds with Carrow I and Carrow II.1 In Carrow I, 642 So.2d at 903, Jean Carrow was granted a divorce from Jimmie Carrow, her husband of twenty-nine years. The chancellor determined that Jean was not entitled to equitable distribution. Id. at 904. This Court reversed and remanded, stating that the chancellor placed undue emphasis on Jean's three affairs that occurred after the couple were separated and failed to make findings on the record as to how these affairs contributed to the deterioration, if any, of the marriage. Id. at 905. This Court stated:

It is difficult to adjust conventional values of morality when weighing marital misconduct for purposes of a just division of marital property. However, marital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 927 (Miss.1994)

. Thus, the chancellor erred in holding that Jean's adulterous conduct precluded her from being entitled to any form of equitable distribution of the property upon divorce. In addition, this case must also be considered in light of this Court's recent case of Ferguson, which deals with the issue of equitable distribution and also provides guidelines for the division of marital property, as well as, Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994), which defines "marital assets as any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage."

642 So.2d at 904-05. Citing Hemsley, we further stated:

We define marital property for the purpose of divorce as being any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. We assume for divorce purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value.

Carrow I, 642 So.2d at 906. We then reversed and remanded with instructions for the chancellor to conduct equitable distribution, applying the Ferguson factors.

¶ 9. In Carrow II, 741 So.2d 200 (Miss. 1999), Jimmie appealed the subsequent equitable distribution of the couple's assets by the chancellor. This Court affirmed, stating:

In addition to contributing her employment income, Jean raised the parties' child, and handled most of the household duties and expenses, which allowed Jimmie to use more of his time and money for business investments. The court determined Jimmie's contribution to the accumulation of the property included his income from employment and rental income, as well as his restoration of the Corvettes in the collection. There was no finding by the court as to any tax consequences or emotional value in reference to the distribution of the marital assets.

Id. at 203. Concerning the adultery, we stated:

The chancellor correctly found the affairs to be just one factor for the court to consider in reference to any burden that may have been placed on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship. The chancellor further found that Jean greatly contributed to the stability and harmony of the parties' marital and family relationship by working full-time, taking care of the family's needs, taking care of Jimmie, and raising the parties' child. It is apparent that the chancellor considered the adultery, but found that it did not burden the stability
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
70 cases
  • May v. May
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 10 November 2003
    ... ... 15 The case which best illustrates the position taken by these courts is Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004 (Miss.2002) ...         In Singley, the husband, who ... ...
  • Lowrey v. Lowrey
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 5 November 2009
    ... ... This is to be decided on a case-by-case basis ... 11. See Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004, 1011 (Miss.2002) (nonmarital assets used to purchase a marital home); ... ...
  • Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 20 January 2009
    ... ...         (Citing Singley v. Singley, 846 So.2d 1004, 1009(¶ 13) (Miss.2004)) ...         ¶ 22. While it is ... ...
  • Rhodes v. Rhodes
    • United States
    • Mississippi Court of Appeals
    • 11 January 2011
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT